The Third Republic of Somalia was built on a federal system, with the understanding that a lasting national government could not be rebuilt around a central authority controlling everything. The purpose of federalism was to decentralize power, safeguard the interests of the regions and reunite a country that had been crippled by devastating conflicts for decades. However, the political settlement under which the country has been governed is now facing immense pressure. Disagreements over the constitution, the electoral process and the distribution of powers have brought the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), several federal member states and the opposition into direct confrontation. In South West State, these disagreements have already turned into violence and armed conflict.
This article examines how disputes over federalism, constitutional amendments, the expiration of the president’s term and the electoral process have brought Somalia to this difficult juncture. My argument is that this crisis can never be resolved through unilateral decisions or military force; it requires an inclusive political settlement that restores trust and removes the Somali National Army from factional political competition.
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Puntland and Jubaland have completely rejected the federal government’s constitutional process, while other political stakeholders accuse Villa Somalia of undermining the autonomy of the federal member states and concentrating power in Mogadishu. The federal government argues that one-person, one-vote elections and strong national institutions are essential to move Somalia beyond the perpetual bargaining among political groups. That objective certainly has merit. But a democratic system cannot gain full legitimacy if one side alone sets the rules and then imposes them on the rest of the country. As a result, the federal government’s measures toward the regional administrations are being seen as a plan to dismantle the federal system rather than reform it.
The president points to voting held in parts of South West State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle as evidence that Somalia is moving toward one-person, one-vote elections. However, Somalis viewed those measures as orchestrated appointments rather than legitimate elections. Political competition was restricted, and the resulting outcomes were heavily managed, without giving voters a genuine opportunity to choose. Despite this, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud described the results as a major democratic achievement. Democracy cannot be measured solely by the opening of polling stations; it requires genuine competition, institutional independence and public confidence in the outcome.
The electoral timetable has also significantly fueled the current dispute. The president’s electoral commission announced that parliamentary elections would be held on April 15, 2027, followed by presidential elections scheduled for May 15. Opposition groups rejected the timetable because it was announced without agreement on the electoral process, the administration of voting or a constitutional basis for extending the terms of the current institutions. Much of the opposition supports direct elections in principle, but rejects a process managed exclusively by Villa Somalia.
This unilateral timetable has also fueled rumors that the president intends to push through an election under conditions he himself sets, win it himself and remain in office even if his authority is confined to Villa Somalia alone. Whether or not such a plan exists, the fact that fears of this kind are circulating across the country demonstrates the depth of the mistrust and increases the need for a political process accepted by all sides.
The dispute is also directly linked to the president’s term in office. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s four-year term ended on May 15, 2026. In January 2024, the president assured the Somali public that any constitutional amendment, particularly one affecting the presidential term, would apply to the next parliament and would not affect the current one. Two months later, an amendment was approved extending the terms of the federal institutions to five years from four. The president is now relying on that amendment to justify remaining in office until May 2027.
His current position clearly contradicts his earlier pledge. The opposition insists that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively to extend a term secured under the previous four-year law. The president’s decision to govern under the amended electoral framework, including the method for electing national leaders, has further inflamed the constitutional crisis and deeply damaged the trust that existed.
The president is expected to uphold the Constitution and serve as a symbol of national unity, particularly during periods of political crisis. His responsibility is to hold the country together while reconciling competing interests at the national level. When he becomes a party to the dispute rather than a trusted mediator, the presidency loses its role as a unifying institution.
The proposed consultative forum, scheduled to take place in Mogadishu from November 14 to 18, has yet to restore the trust that has been lost. Simply sending invitations is not enough under the current circumstances, especially given the repeated failure of previous talks with opposition groups, even after international efforts to resolve the electoral impasse. Many stakeholders suspect that the invitation is merely intended to buy time rather than reach a genuine agreement.
That mistrust has deepened because Villa Somalia has failed to present a clear agenda, mutually agreed rules or a process that both sides consider effective for dialogue. It has not explained how participants would influence the issues under discussion or decisions already announced. Unless the opposition’s grievances are addressed, the forum may not take place in any meaningful form. A meeting completely controlled by the presidency would amount only to political management, not genuine negotiations.
The political standoff is also directly visible on the ground in South West State. In March, federal troops entered Baidoa, ousted the administration of President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and backed a replacement administration. Armed clashes continued, with forces loyal to Laftagareen retaking several district centers and placing heavy pressure on the roads leading into Baidoa. The use of federal forces in this contest transformed a political dispute into an armed civil conflict.
The conflict is also diverting the Somali National Army (SNA) from its expected national security role at a time when it is supposed to take over as African Union forces withdraw from the country. The SNA is not prepared to fill the role of those forces across the country; some areas previously handed over to Somali forces have fallen back into the hands of Al-Shabaab. Using the army against groups opposed to the government is further weakening its capacity to defend the country and eroding public confidence in its national duties. This also damages public trust and creates opportunities for Al-Shabaab to expand its influence.
The tensions in South West State and the diversion of the SNA toward internal disputes make a negotiated political settlement urgent and indispensable. The first step required is to de-escalate the conflict and keep the army away from factional political struggles. The president, the leaders of the federal member states and opposition groups must then sit at the negotiating table through a process with an agreed agenda and procedures, supported by mediation trusted by all sides. The talks must resolve the constitutional issues that have been
