Somalia’s ambition to emerge as more than a battleground for regional rivalries is facing one of its most important tests yet.
The deepening crisis involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt will show whether Mogadishu can maintain that strategic ambition without being pulled into conflicts beyond its control.
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The fighting in northern Ethiopia is no longer merely an Ethiopian domestic affair. The deterioration of relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara, Egypt’s strategic rivalry with Ethiopia, Sudan’s continuing war, and the competition over Red Sea access are creating a regional security environment in which developments in one theatre can rapidly affect another.
Somalia’s challenge is not simply deciding whether to support one side in Ethiopia’s conflict. Mogadishu must remain engaged enough to defend its interests while avoiding entanglement in a war whose outcome it cannot determine.
Meeting that challenge will require something Somalia has often found difficult to sustain: strategic consistency.
Ethiopia’s instability creates risks and opportunities for Somalia
Somalia cannot afford to ignore Ethiopia, but neither can it confront its much stronger neighbour casually.
The two countries share a lengthy border, deep economic and security links, and a complicated political history. Ethiopian forces have also been central to Somalia’s security arrangements, including through the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia.
Any major crisis inside Ethiopia would therefore carry immediate consequences for Somalia.
Should Addis Ababa need to shift military resources toward Tigray, Amhara, Afar or other internal fronts, its capacity to maintain operations beyond its borders could change. That would raise pressing questions for Somalia about AUSSOM’s future structure, border security and counterinsurgency efforts.
But instability in Ethiopia would not automatically work in Somalia’s favour.
A weakened Ethiopian state could bring heightened insecurity along the border, new refugee movements, illicit arms transfers, interrupted trade and fresh opportunities for Al-Shabaab.
Mogadishu should reject the tempting but hazardous idea that Ethiopia’s strategic problems necessarily improve Somalia’s position.
They do not.
Eritrea adds another layer to the crisis
The worsening relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is especially consequential.
For years, the Horn of Africa’s strategic balance was heavily influenced by relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Their rapprochement in 2018 briefly eased one of the region’s most serious rivalries.
That détente now appears increasingly vulnerable. The latest diplomatic rupture raises the prospect of renewed competing security blocs across the Horn. For Somalia, the shift creates a demanding diplomatic balancing act.
Mogadishu has an interest in preserving constructive ties with Eritrea while retaining its strategic partnership with Ethiopia. At the same time, it is expanding defence cooperation with Egypt and Türkiye.
Committing Somalia fully to one regional camp would therefore carry significant costs. A more durable policy would keep several diplomatic channels open at once.
Somalia should be able to engage Addis Ababa, Asmara and Cairo without allowing any of them to dictate its foreign policy.
Egypt is a partner, but Somalia must not inherit its disputes
From Cairo’s perspective, deeper engagement with Somalia is readily understandable.
Egypt’s dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile, Sudan’s continuing instability and the Red Sea’s strategic importance have all encouraged Cairo to strengthen ties with countries on Ethiopia’s eastern flank.
Egyptian military cooperation could give Somalia valuable capabilities, training and institutional assistance. Even so, Mogadishu must clearly separate Somali-Egyptian cooperation from Egyptian-Ethiopian rivalry.
Somalia should not permit its territory, military facilities or diplomatic ties to become tools in the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The same standard should govern every foreign partnership. Those relationships should build Somali state capacity—not turn Somalia into a launchpad for another country’s regional strategy.
The Ankara framework has become even more significant
The 2024 Ankara Declaration gives Somalia an important diplomatic foundation.
The agreement helped ease tensions after Ethiopia reached a maritime-access understanding with North Western State of Somalia. Its central premise—that Ethiopia can secure dependable commercial access to the sea while respecting Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—continues to matter.
The latest crisis in Ethiopia makes that framework more, rather than less, relevant.
Ethiopia’s need for maritime access is unlikely to disappear because of domestic political turmoil. Strategic uncertainty could instead make access to the sea even more important to policymakers in Addis Ababa.
That gives Somalia an opportunity to turn a potential flashpoint into a durable economic relationship.
Doing so will require clear limits. Mogadishu must distinguish commercial access from sovereign control. Ethiopia may hold an economic interest in Somali maritime infrastructure without receiving sovereign rights over Somali territory.
That principle should remain at the heart of Somalia’s policy.
Somalia must plan for a possible Ethiopian military redeployment
A wider conflict inside Ethiopia could quickly affect the country’s external military commitments.
If Addis Ababa needs more troops at home, it may reconsider its deployments in Somalia. Mogadishu should assess that possibility now rather than wait until a decision is made.
The Federal Government should coordinate with the African Union and AUSSOM partners on contingency plans for multiple scenarios, including a reduction or restructuring of Ethiopian forces.
This does not amount to an assumption that Ethiopia will withdraw. It means acknowledging that Somalia’s security policy cannot rest on expectations about another country’s domestic military needs.
Over time, Somalia should develop a security architecture able to operate regardless of which external partner can or wants to provide troops.
The maritime front could prove decisive
Somalia’s geopolitical importance is increasingly tied to the sea.
Its coastline borders the Gulf of Aden and lies close to one of the world’s most significant maritime trade routes.
The latest tensions involving Ethiopia and Eritrea must therefore be viewed alongside the broader contest for influence in the Red Sea. For Somalia, that reality brings both exposure and leverage.
The coastline could draw investment, expand trade and support strategic partnerships. It could also attract foreign military rivalry, illicit networks and greater geopolitical pressure. The answer is not to shut Somalia’s coast to outside partners.
It is to ensure that Somalia sets the terms of engagement.
That will require stronger Somali Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, expanded maritime surveillance, better port governance and the institutional strength to oversee foreign security and commercial agreements.
Strategic fragmentation poses the greatest danger
Somalia’s foreign policy is becoming more diverse.
Türkiye is a significant defence partner. Egypt has increased military cooperation. Ethiopia remains a vital neighbour and security actor. Gulf states have major economic and strategic interests. The United States and European countries continue to play important roles in security and development.
There is no inherent conflict in maintaining all those relationships. The problem arises when outside partnerships pull Somali policy in incompatible directions. The answer is not to select a single partner. It is to establish a Somali strategic doctrine that defines what each relationship is meant to accomplish.
Such a doctrine should rest on several principles: Somalia will not take part in Ethiopia’s internal war.
Somalia will oppose violations of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of who commits them. Somalia will support peaceful regional dialogue.
Somalia will welcome commercial and security partnerships that strengthen national institutions. It will not allow its territory to serve as a platform for another state’s military confrontation. Most importantly, Somalia will maintain diplomatic relations with competing regional powers at the same time.
The strategic decision
Mogadishu is unlikely to possess the means to shape the outcome of Ethiopia’s internal conflict directly.
It can, however, significantly influence whether Somalia becomes collateral damage. That distinction should define its policy. The goal should neither be to exploit Ethiopia’s instability nor to endorse every decision made by Addis Ababa. It should be to protect Somalia’s strategic autonomy and prevent instability from spilling across the border.
That calls for a foreign policy built on non-alignment without indifference to threats, engagement without entanglement, and partnership without dependence. The Horn of Africa is entering another period in which borders, alliances and security calculations may shift rapidly.
Somalia cannot control what happens in Ethiopia. It can control its own response. That may ultimately be the more important strategic choice.
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The author is Abdirahman Jeylani Mohamed, a Somali journalist, communications specialist and foreign policy commentator based in Mogadishu, Somalia. You can reach out to him; [email protected]
