Hiiraan Online examines institutional weakness and political practice in Somalia

By Mahad CamalTuesday May 5, 2026

Jurist and DirectorBackground in Conflict Studies

Somalia’s political reality can be read most clearly when one looks not at slogans, but at how power is actually exercised. That is the lens used here, drawing on remarks made by four Somali traditional leaders during their April 27 meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud at Villa Somalia. Rather than treating those comments as routine expressions of support or criticism, they offer a useful window into the country’s institutional condition.

Using Francis Fukuyama’s ideas on state capacity, political decay, and the tension between formal and informal institutions, this analysis argues that Somalia’s central problem is not clan in itself. The deeper issue is that state institutions remain unfinished, leaving room for informal structures to carry responsibilities that should belong to the state.

The remarks delivered after the Villa Somalia meeting are especially revealing because they point to structural features of the Somali state rather than to one-off political frustrations. Read through Fukuyama’s framework, they show a political order still struggling to complete the basic work of state formation. Formal institutions exist, but they do not yet fully govern political life.

Fukuyama (2014) identifies three foundations of durable political order: state capacity, the rule of law, and accountability. When those pillars are weak, systems rarely disappear altogether. Instead, they bend. Formal rules remain on paper, while informal arrangements step in to fill the gap. Authority becomes ambiguous, and legitimacy is bargained for rather than securely institutionalized. Somalia fits that pattern closely.

Meritocracy and the Limits of Institutional Capacity

Garaad Jaamac Garaad Cali’s remark:“…sidee cadaalad u aragtaan oo igula tartami kartaan ku dheh…”should be understood as more than a plea for fairness. It points to a political environment in which access to power is not yet governed by dependable, impersonal rules. The very demand for just competition suggests that such standards are not taken for granted.

In a system with strong state capacity, merit-based competition is built into the rules themselves. In this case, the need to ask for fairness indicates that those rules are either weak, unevenly applied, or not trusted. That is a sign that the state has not yet become a neutral arbiter of political access (Fukuyama 2013).

Collective Consultation and Institutional Displacement

Islaan Ciise Islaan Maxamed’s statement:“…in si wadajir ah loo wada tashado loona wada socdo…”puts collective consultation, or wada-tashi, at the center of the discussion. Yet the crucial question is not whether consultation matters, but where it takes place. In a stronger institutional order, such consultation would occur inside formal political bodies. Here, it appears to happen outside them.

That matters because it suggests formal institutions are not fully carrying out their expected role. As Douglass North (1991) notes, informal institutions tend to shape outcomes when formal rules are weak or poorly enforced. In Somalia, clan-based consultation is therefore not merely a cultural habit; it is also a practical response to institutional absence.

Support, Protection, and Blurred Institutional Boundaries

Ugaas Max’ed Ugaas Kayse’s statement:“…Waxaana ugu hiilinaynaa adiga, Naftayda iyo dowladdaba.”reveals a dual promise: backing the leader and safeguarding the state. That pairing is not simply rhetorical loyalty. It shows how closely the person and the institution are still tied together.

In a fully institutionalized system, the state stands apart from the individuals who lead it. Here, however, support for the leader is presented as inseparable from protection of the state itself. The boundary between office and personality remains blurred.

That is characteristic of a political system where institutional autonomy is still weak and authority remains partly personalized (Fukuyama 2014).

Accountability, Exclusion, and Legitimacy

Imaam Daahir Imaam Maxamuud Imaam’s criticism:“…talo aan la wadaagin laguma tiqsado… Albaabkaaga waad xiratay…”speaks directly to the problem of exclusion from decision-making. At its core, it is a complaint about accountability. When political processes are seen as closed, they quickly lose credibility. Fukuyama (2014) argues that accountability is central to building trust and securing compliance; without it, actors look elsewhere for influence.

In Somalia, that often means turning back to clan structures, which continue to provide representation and access where formal institutions do not. The point also echoes Menkhaus (2007), who shows that governance in Somalia often functions beyond the formal state.

Institutional Weakness in Practice

Taken together, the remarks point in the same direction. Somalia’s political system is not empty of institutions; rather, those institutions remain incomplete. Formal bodies exist, but they do not yet fully organize political behavior.

Competition is only partly regulated, important decisions are often made outside formal channels, and the line between leader and state remains uncertain. At the same time, limited participation undermines confidence in the system.

That closely matches Fukuyama’s idea of political decay, in which institutions survive but fail to fully discipline political conduct (Fukuyama 2014).

Conclusion

Somalia’s challenge is not clan as such, but the unfinished construction of state institutions. Clans remain influential because they continue to perform functions the state has yet to absorb. For that reason, strengthening state capacity, accountability, and institutional autonomy is essential to lasting political stability.

References

Fukuyama, Francis. 2013. “What Is Governance?” Governance 26 (3): 347–368.Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping.” International Security 31 (3): 74–106.North, Douglass C. 1991. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 97–112

Mahad Camal : [email protected]

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Hiiraan Online’s editorial stance.