Sudan’s Border Crisis: Why Is Al-Burhan Treading Carefully Around Cairo?
A deadly confrontation on the Egypt-Sudan frontier has exposed the limits of Sudan’s sovereignty and the political cost of its dependence on Cairo. After Egyptian warplanes struck Sudanese gold miners at Jabal al-Uqaydat, reports of dozens of deaths have triggered demands for accountability. Yet Port Sudan’s response has remained cautious, with official statements focused on condolences and an investigative committee rather than identifying the party accused of killing Sudanese citizens.
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Attacks on Sudan’s Borderlands: Why Is Al-Burhan Avoiding a Confrontation with Cairo?
Egyptian aircraft have bombed Sudanese miners inside Sudan twice in four months, but Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has offered no public position matching the scale of the reported loss of life. Cairo has defended its military campaign, while Port Sudan has limited its response to a fact-finding committee, expressions of sympathy and references to communication between the two leaderships—without naming the side accused of carrying out the attacks.
This leaves a stark picture: one state is using military force along Sudan’s border, while Sudan’s army commander appears unwilling to identify the alleged perpetrator, apparently wary of alienating an ally whose political and military support has become central to his position. On the morning of 10 October 2026, five successive airstrikes hit the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan, turning it into what a survivor described to Agence France-Presse as a killing ground.
Thousands of people had travelled to the war-weary region in search of gold. Some were buried beneath the debris; others escaped into the mountains without water or basic supplies.
The location of the strike has also become central to the sovereignty dispute. In a report published on 12 October 2026, The New York Times said the mine was in Sudan’s Red Sea State, approximately 25 miles—about 40 kilometres—inside Sudanese territory and close to the Egyptian border. Al-Hurra, reporting on the June attack, had cited an estimate that placed Jabal al-Uqaydat roughly 20 kilometres inside Sudan. The 40-kilometre figure cited here reflects the American newspaper’s assessment of the October strike site, keeping the questions of territorial jurisdiction and civilian protection at the centre of the controversy.
Survivors told Agence France-Presse that thousands of miners were present. “Emergency Lawyers” gave a preliminary death toll of 72, while witnesses speaking to the BBC reported more than 60 deaths and about 150 injuries. Sudan Tribune quoted survivors who put the number killed at least 200 and said more than 15,000 workers had fled. The Sudan Doctors Network recorded an initial toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, while warning that the figure could increase.
Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator
The organization “Emergency Lawyers” accused Egypt’s air force of attacking civilian miners and described the operation as a breach of international law. Egyptian security officials, questioned by Reuters, did not deny that the raid had occurred. Instead, they defended it as an effort to end what they called disorder along the border and prevent Egyptian and Sudanese groups from seizing control of mining zones.
Two days later, an Egyptian military spokesman said the “third phase” of the campaign would continue. He said warning leaflets had been dropped on people described as criminal elements. The statement, however, located the operations inside Egypt and stopped short of explicitly acknowledging an Egyptian strike inside Sudan or confirming that miners had been killed.
Cairo, therefore, has presented a security rationale for military action near a Sudanese mining site, while Burhan’s government has not issued a direct condemnation of the party that human rights groups accuse of killing Sudanese civilians. The result is a striking reversal of priorities: the state expected to defend the victims’ rights appears more concerned with preserving its relationship with Cairo than with publicly assigning responsibility for their deaths.
From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains
The October bombardment followed an earlier attack on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 deaths, while Sudanese platforms put the toll at roughly 100. Testimonies indicated that the operations reached Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area surrounding Souk al-Ansari. The attacks reportedly involved warplanes and drones, followed by a ground operation. “Darfur Victims Advocacy” cited witnesses who said an Egyptian force of about 60 armed vehicles surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.
After the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported that about 2,000 deported miners had arrived through the Argeen crossing, citing a local activist. The crossing’s director put the number at more than 3,000 over the preceding days. The Egyptian army said it had arrested 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj and, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, said: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”
Many Sudanese expected the army commander to speak in defense of those killed. Instead, they heard an appeal to respect the borders of the very neighbor accused of bombing them. When the attacks recurred in October, the Sovereignty Council again responded with condolences over what it called a “painful incident,” announced a fact-finding committee and said the leaderships of the two countries remained in contact.
Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, called the bombing an unjustified and unacceptable crime and said border violations could be addressed without deploying warplanes. His comments, however, were not followed by a publicly announced protest or a clearly defined process for determining responsibility.
Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force
Jabal al-Uqaydat sits within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt. Chatham House estimates that around 60% of gold produced in Sudan’s Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled into Egypt—more than 100 kilograms a day and over 60 tonnes from the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.
Officially recorded gold exports to Egypt in 2024 were worth no more than about $16 million, or approximately 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan figures cited in the Chatham House report.
Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had seen drilling equipment and trucks transporting rocks across the border into Egypt. They also said an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them not to approach a location it claimed was inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra reported testimony describing tensions between miners and employees of an Egyptian mining company operating nearby.
Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 permits the government to contract with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, which is affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit quarries and salt works identified under the law for 30 years. The state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is also active in the southern Eastern Desert. Businessman Naguib Sawiris praised the June operation and connected it to investor confidence in Egypt’s mining industry.
That same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum rejected statements attributed to its minister concerning agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan. Researcher Mohamed al-Hadi nevertheless said the attacks may be connected to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a possibility he said requires an independent investigation.
Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen
Al-Hurra quoted a miner as saying that pro-government joint forces left the mountain one day before the June attack, while the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and recover the bodies until the third day. The account fueled suspicions among workers that the two governments may have coordinated, although it did not establish that such coordination occurred.
Burhan’s silence, however, presents a political accountability issue regardless of whether those suspicions are ultimately proven. Cairo backs the Sudanese army commander and regards conflict near its border as a security threat. Agence France-Presse has authenticated satellite images showing repeated deployments of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan. Other reports have described Egypt facilitating drone deliveries to the Sudanese army, training its crews on Egyptian soil and expanding military and intelligence cooperation. An analysis published by the Horn Review in June linked the army’s silence over the raids to Egyptian support.
That partnership does not remove Burhan’s responsibility; it makes the obligation to protect Sudanese citizens more pressing. Dependence on another country for weapons and political backing cannot turn civilian protection into a negotiable matter, nor should it give Cairo effective immunity when Sudanese lives are at stake.
Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor
The latest raids have revived the long-running dispute over Halayeb and Shalateen, the triangle controlled by Egypt. Sudanese administrative maps place the targeted mining areas inside Sudan, while Cairo considers them part of the border zone adjoining the disputed territory.
Human rights, political and trade union groups have demanded an independent international inquiry. The “Sumud” alliance, led by Abdalla Hamdok, directly held the Egyptian side responsible.
Egypt now faces demands to account for the bombing and the civilian deaths, rather than simply labeling the victims criminal elements and invoking security concerns. Burhan, meanwhile, must publish the findings of any investigation, establish responsibility, seek compensation and accountability, and pursue the required diplomatic and legal measures.
Condolences alone do not defend sovereignty. They suggest instead that the authorities value the alliance with Cairo above Sudanese citizens’ right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat, the consequences are plain: gold moves across the border, the dead remain beneath the rubble, and Burhan remains silent.
Mohsin Osman is journalist based in Paris, interested in human rights issues and Middle Eastern affairs, who provides analyses and opinion articles for a number of Arab and Europian newspapers.
