China’s Fishing Fleets Face Scrutiny Over Somalia’s Rich but Vulnerable Waters
MOGADISHU, Somalia — Somalia’s expansive coastline has become a target for foreign fishing fleets, but Chinese vessels are facing particular scrutiny amid allegations that prized marine resources are being harvested more rapidly than the country can oversee, regulate or profit from them.
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The controversy extends beyond the question of illegal fishing. It also highlights concerns over control of Somalia’s waters, the process for issuing fishing licences and whether limited maritime enforcement is enabling foreign operators to exploit one of the country’s most important natural assets.
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, known as IUU fishing, costs Somalia an estimated $300 million each year, according to a 2025 analysis by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The report named Chinese vessels among fleets accused of pursuing yellowfin tuna and employing techniques that could damage fish populations and marine ecosystems.
A lucrative resource under pressure
Somalia’s waters contain commercially valuable species, with tuna among the most important. Yellowfin tuna commands strong demand in international markets, making the country’s fishing grounds attractive to distant-water fleets.
Somalia, however, has limited ability to patrol and monitor its vast maritime territory. Decades of conflict weakened state institutions and surveillance systems, leaving extensive areas of ocean beyond effective government oversight.
Global Fishing Watch has previously described Somalia’s waters as especially exposed to illegal fishing because monitoring, surveillance and enforcement capabilities remain limited. Its satellite-based work has shown how technology can reveal fishing activity that is difficult for authorities to identify from the coast.
The pressure is not limited to Chinese operators. Earlier satellite analysis detected nearly 200 Iranian and Pakistani vessels allegedly fishing illegally in Somali and Yemeni waters, underscoring the broader foreign demand affecting the northwest Indian Ocean.
Even so, Chinese fleets have drawn increasing attention.
The Liao Dong Yu case
The Liao Dong Yu fleet, associated with China’s Liaoning Daping Fishery Group, is one of the most prominent examples.
ISS researchers said the fleet has a documented record of operating in Somali waters and alleged that some of its vessels secured fishing licences from Puntland State authorities in questionable circumstances. They further said Chinese vessels had used large purse seines, longlines and other gear capable of catching substantial quantities of tuna. (ISS Africa)
International attention intensified after Somali pirates hijacked Liao Dong Yu 578 in January 2026. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime said counter-piracy officials estimated that between $1.2 million and $1.5 million was paid to secure the vessel’s release in March. The group also cited the fleet’s documented history of illegal fishing in Somali waters. (Global Initiative)
The episode reflects the tangled relationship between piracy and illegal fishing along Somalia’s coastline. Researchers have repeatedly warned that shrinking fishing grounds and competition from industrial foreign vessels can increase economic hardship in coastal communities, and piracy has historically been linked in part to those pressures.
Licences do not end the controversy
Chinese vessels operating in Somali waters are not automatically acting illegally.
Somalia’s Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy publishes an official fishing-licence database, showing that foreign operations can receive legal authorisation from the Somali government. Records released by the ministry have included numerous vessels with Chinese-sounding names among licence holders in previous years. (mfbe.gov.so)
That distinction is critical.
A Somali licence does not by itself settle questions about a vessel’s fishing locations, catch volumes, equipment or compliance with conservation requirements.
The key issue, therefore, is not merely whether a permit has been issued. Somalia must also be able to independently confirm that licensed vessels are operating within the conditions of those permits.
A system vulnerable to exploitation
ISS researchers have characterised Somalia’s fisheries governance as susceptible to political influence and a lack of transparency. They cited a 2018 agreement permitting Chinese companies to fish within 24 nautical miles of Somalia’s coast in exchange for $1 million, while raising concerns about the agreement’s transparency and terms.
Deals of this kind leave Somalia facing a difficult question: is the country receiving a fair share of the value extracted from its waters?
For many small-scale Somali fishermen, the disparity is clear.
A fisherman working from a small boat cannot realistically compete with an industrial vessel that can remain at sea for weeks and use advanced equipment to locate and capture large quantities of fish.
Weak controls on industrial fishing could bring consequences well beyond lost earnings. Declining fish stocks may undermine food security, reduce employment and threaten the livelihoods of coastal communities.
The missing piece: transparency
Advances in satellite technology are making it increasingly feasible to track where fishing vessels operate.
Global Fishing Watch combines AIS signals, satellite imagery and machine-learning systems to identify apparent fishing activity. Its researchers have previously reported that 94% of industrial fishing effort detected in Somalia was taking place inside zones strictly reserved for small-scale fishing.
The technology could provide Somalia with a powerful means of monitoring foreign fleets, provided the government has the resources and political will to respond to what the data reveals.
Converting information into enforcement remains the central challenge.
Authorities need reliable records detailing which vessels hold licences, who owns them, where they fish, which species they target and how much they land. Independent observers and electronic monitoring systems could further help settle disputes over catches and identify violations.
Who owns Somalia’s fish?
The underlying issue is not solely China.
Somalia’s marine resources belong to a country whose coastal communities have endured decades of instability as foreign fleets gained access to waters the state has struggled to safeguard.
China is among the world’s largest fishing nations, and its distant-water fleet operates across oceans far from the country’s shores. Yet protecting Somali waters is ultimately also a responsibility for Somalia and the international bodies that oversee tuna fisheries.
When foreign fleets operate legally, Somalia should be able to make the terms of their agreements public.
When vessels fish illegally, they should be punished.
And when licences permit excessive exploitation, Somalia should have the authority and capacity to amend them.
The stakes are considerable. A fishery estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars could become a lasting economic foundation for Somalia — or be depleted before Somali fishermen and coastal communities can benefit.
For Mogadishu, the question is becoming more pressing by the day: can Somalia transform its vast coastline from a poorly protected frontier into a properly governed national economic resource?
AXADLETM
