Somalia’s centralization efforts face resistance, Hiiraan Online op-ed says

By Abdirahman JeylaniMonday June 8, 2026

The bursts of gunfire that rattled Mogadishu in early June should end any remaining hope that Somalia’s political crisis is just another quarrel over election dates.

What played out in the capital was not merely a clash between government troops and forces tied to the opposition. It marked the first violent eruption of a constitutional dispute that has been simmering for years — one now threatening the fragile political understanding that has held Somalia’s post-conflict state-building effort together.

The federal government’s version of events is simple enough. Officials say constitutional reform was needed to complete Somalia’s unfinished journey from a provisional political arrangement to a modern democratic state. They argue that electoral changes are meant to replace the country’s deeply discredited clan-based indirect voting system with one-person-one-vote elections. Delays, revisions and political bargaining, in that telling, are necessary detours on the road to democracy.On paper, the case is not without weight.

Few Somalis deny the need for constitutional reform. Few would defend the current electoral model, which has repeatedly triggered political deadlock, accusations of corruption and endless negotiations among elites. The idea of universal suffrage still enjoys broad public backing across much of the country.

But the present crisis shows that legality alone does not create legitimacy.

The real issue facing Somalia is not whether reform is needed. It is whether changes of this scale can be imposed without broad political agreement in a federal system whose survival depends on that very agreement.

That is the question now at the center of a standoff that has grown steadily more dangerous.

For more than a decade, Somalia operated under a provisional constitution adopted in 2012. The document deliberately left some of the country’s most sensitive questions unresolved. The balance of power between Mogadishu and the federal member states stayed unclear. The electoral system remained unsettled. Core issues involving executive authority, federalism and political representation were postponed for later negotiation.

Successive governments largely refrained from forcing final decisions because they understood the risks involved.The administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took a different path.

In March 2026, parliament approved a set of constitutional amendments that supporters described as the culmination of a 14-year review process. Government officials cast the package as a major step in Somalia’s state-building project. Critics saw something far different: a unilateral rewrite of the political order carried out without enough consultation with opposition figures and key federal member states.

That difference matters.

Constitutions endure not just because they are passed into law, but because political actors accept them. A constitutional framework can be technically valid and still lack the broad legitimacy needed to hold a fragile state together. That is especially true where institutions are weak and trust between rivals is thin.

Defenders of the government say parliament acted within its constitutional powers. The opposition replies that formal authority cannot replace consensus when the foundations of the political system are being redesigned.

The dispute has become more explosive because it goes directly to elections.

The federal government has made direct elections its signature political project. Officials say constitutional reform is essential to move toward universal suffrage and reduce the influence of clan politics. The goal is bold and, in principle, hard to dispute.

The difficulty is that Somalia’s institutional reality remains far from that ambition.

Voter registration is still incomplete. Large parts of the country continue to face serious security problems. Relations between Mogadishu and several federal member states remain tense. Above all, Al-Shabaab still poses a major threat across much of southern and central Somalia.

Those conditions have deepened opposition fears that direct elections may sound attractive politically but remain impossible to deliver within the proposed timeline.

Critics increasingly believe the language of reform has become entangled with the interests of incumbency. In their view, the new constitutional framework gives current leaders room to stay in office while preparations for direct elections remain indefinitely unfinished.

Whether that reading is wholly fair is almost beside the point.

In politics, perceptions can matter as much as legal reasoning. And among many opposition figures, the perception is that constitutional reform has become a tool for extending executive power rather than limiting it.That perception has fueled a serious legitimacy crisis.

Parliament’s mandate expired in April 2026. The president’s mandate expired in May. Yet no political roadmap has won the backing of all Somalia’s major stakeholders. The government insists that the constitutional amendments provide continuity and legal authority. The opposition rejects that argument, saying no institution can continue to govern beyond its mandate without broad political consent. What began as a constitutional dispute has therefore become a struggle over legitimacy itself.The armed clashes in Mogadishu show how quickly that struggle can turn dangerous. For months, the fight had largely stayed in the realm of political rhetoric. Opposition leaders organized demonstrations challenging the government’s reading of constitutional authority. Before those protests could fully unfold, armed confrontations broke out between government forces and units aligned with opposition figures.

The significance of that violence goes beyond deaths or damage to property.

What matters is that major political actors showed they were prepared to use force to pursue political goals. Once competition takes on a military edge, compromise becomes harder and escalation more likely.

That points to a deeper structural weakness in Somalia’s political system.

In established constitutional democracies, disputes over elections and executive power are usually settled through courts, legislatures and negotiated politics. Somalia’s institutions remain too fragile to do that consistently. As a result, political actors often lean on clan networks, regional administrations, security forces and armed supporters to improve their leverage.

The country’s constitutional institutions are weaker than the political forces capable of challenging them.Federalism sits at the heart of this contest.

While much of the focus has centered on Mogadishu, the broader conflict is really about how power is shared between the federal government and the regional administrations. Puntland State’s rejection of parts of the constitutional process shows how deep those tensions run. Other regional actors have also voiced concern that reforms were pushed through without enough consultation. The federal government argues that stronger central institutions are vital to defeating Al-Shabaab, organizing elections and consolidating national authority. Regional leaders fear that centralization could recreate the concentration of power that has long fed mistrust and instability.

Neither concern is groundless.

Somalia does need stronger national institutions. It also needs a federal system that regional stakeholders see as legitimate and durable. The problem is that those goals increasingly appear to be pulling in opposite directions. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab remains the chief beneficiary of political division.

Every day spent on constitutional brinkmanship is a day pulled away from the fight against the insurgency. Political infighting weakens coordination, erodes public confidence and distracts leaders from urgent security needs. At a time when Somalia faces serious threats, its political class appears increasingly absorbed by rival claims over constitutional authority.

The irony is hard to miss.

A reform effort meant to strengthen the state has instead exposed just how fragile the political settlement behind it really is.Ultimately, Somalia’s crisis is not simply about elections. It is not only about constitutional amendments, either. It is about the limits of legal authority in a system where consensus remains the most valuable source of legitimacy.The government’s case rests on law. The opposition’s case rests on legitimacy. Neither side is strong enough to impose a lasting settlement on its own.

That leaves an uncomfortable conclusion. Somalia’s constitutional future will not be settled by parliamentary math alone, and it will not be decided through armed force. It will require a fresh political compromise among actors who increasingly distrust one another.

The gunfire in Mogadishu should therefore be read as a warning, not an endpoint.

What began as a dispute over voting procedures has widened into a battle over constitutional legitimacy. What began as a constitutional argument has become a security emergency. And what began as a debate over the 2026 elections now threatens the foundations of Somalia’s entire political order.

The gravest danger is not merely postponed elections. It is the slow collapse of the political consensus that has kept Somalia’s many disputes from tipping into wider conflict. If that consensus falls apart, Somalia will not just face an electoral crisis.It will face a crisis of the state itself.

———The Author is Abdirahman Jeylani, a Somali journalist based in Mogadishu, a foreign policy commentator and communications specialist. You can reach out to him: [email protected]