Rebuttal Questions Whether Baidoa Affects Red Sea Maritime Security

By Abdulkarim AbdulleSaturday April 18, 2026

A recent article from Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) on Baidoa has drawn a sharp rebuttal, with critics saying it distorts events on the ground and misreads Somalia’s constitutional security structure. Although the original piece attempted to place developments in South West State within a wider regional security debate, its argument leaned on conjecture, selective history, and a flawed reading of the Federal Government of Somalia’s responsibilities. The central claim—that federal activity in South West State somehow strengthens insurgents—has been described as analytically thin and deliberately misleading.

To begin with, the article treats the movement or deployment of federal forces toward Baidoa as a destabilizing move, rather than what Somalia’s Constitution requires: action against terrorist groups and the dismantling of their networks in rural areas and along major supply routes. Under the constitutional order, the Federal Government of Somalia holds the ultimate duty to defend the country, secure its territory, and preserve national stability. Suggesting that federal authorities should stand aside for fear of terrorist exploitation creates a dangerous logic in which the state reacts to insurgents instead of exercising lawful authority and meeting national security needs.

The article also rests heavily on the idea that friction between federal and state authorities automatically gives Al-Shabaab an operational edge. That assumption oversimplifies how counterterrorism works in Somalia. Recent offensives in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and parts of Southwest have shown a different picture: coordinated federal leadership, working with federal member state partners, has over the past four years weakened Al-Shabaab’s territorial presence, disrupted extortion schemes, and encouraged defections from the group. By attributing insurgent gains to political maneuvering, the article ignores these concrete developments.

Another weakness is the attempt to tie the Baidoa situation to Red Sea insecurity, including Houthi attacks on maritime traffic and the wider geopolitical tensions involving the United States and Iran. That connection is stretched beyond credibility. Regional dynamics can certainly shape the security environment in Somalia, but there is no verified evidence that maritime instability in the Red Sea has changed Al-Shabaab’s tactical posture in South West State. Sound analysis must separate plausible scenarios from established facts; otherwise, policy discussion risks slipping into speculation.

The article also raises the specter of Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa without offering empirical support. The fact that al-Shabaab is aligned with al-Qaeda effectively undercuts that line of reasoning. While al-Qaeda is factually sunni islam sect, the Islamic Republic of Iran differs in ideology which has the Shia sect of Islam. The discussion between the differences of Sunni and Shia sects on global foreign policies have separate literature in which the writer should have read well thoughtfully. One may question how Iran’s alleged support to Houthi may affect the situation in Baidoa? It is quite interesting that the the write did not work on her homework better, but depended on shallow narratives that serve specific agenda. Introducing unverified proxy dynamics only fuels alarm and distracts from Al-Shabaab’s real operating model, which relies on taxation, extortion, intimidation, and local coercion.

The claim that federal activity along the Mogadishu-Baidoa corridor could weaken counterinsurgency operations also assumes security resources are fixed in a zero-sum arrangement. In reality, modern counterterrorism depends on layered force structures, intelligence sharing, and reserve capacity. Federal deployments aimed at stabilizing MSR corridors are usually part of broader operational planning. They do not automatically drain frontline operations; in many cases, they strengthen them by securing rear areas, preserving political stability, and reinforcing unified command.

The article’s treatment of legitimacy is equally narrow. It suggests that legitimacy depends mainly on political neutrality. Yet in national security doctrine, legitimacy also comes from the state’s capacity to enforce the law, defend sovereignty against internal and external threats, deliver public services, and uphold constitutional order. Inaction in a rapidly evolving security environment can, over time, weaken public confidence just as much as overreach can.

The discussion of Ethiopia’s role likewise places external sensitivities above Somali sovereignty. Cross-border coordination remains important, but Somalia’s internal security decisions cannot be dictated by the economic or strategic interests of neighboring states. The Federal Government of Somalia’s first obligation is to protect national stability, not to tailor its actions to hypothetical regional anxieties. Baidoa should not be reduced to a prize in another country’s geopolitical contest. The core issues here concern electoral legitimacy, federal authority, and Somali state-building. Any effort to erase Somali agency by recasting the matter as part of an external rivalry misrepresents reality.

The article also undercuts the logic behind the federal deployments in the Baidoa corridor. Their purpose was not to consolidate political control in Baidoa, but to clear and secure the Mogadishu-Boidoa MSR and dismantle terrorist pockets and strongholds along the route.

That corridor has long been one of the most difficult fronts in Somalia’s counterterrorism campaign. Securing it now represents an important milestone, one that can build operational momentum and allow forces to align for the final phase of offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. Strategically, that shift opens the way for advances toward south, widely seen as among the group’s key operational hubs.

At the political level, the central dispute between the FGS and the previous South West State leadership concerned implementation of the one-person, one-vote electoral model previously endorsed under the National Consultative Council decision. The administration in Baidoa repeatedly slowed the process, even as citizens across the state continued to push for timely elections.

Against that backdrop, the federal government acted within its constitutional mandate and in line with wider national political priorities and democratic commitments. The Baidoa situation should not be seen as a chain reaction of uncontrollable crises or as a trigger for regional instability. At its core, it was a test of state capacity. The FGS has a duty to preserve constitutional order, maintain security, and stop political disputes from sliding into violence or governance collapse.

For that reason, firm and lawful federal engagement in Southwest should not be viewed as a risk factor. It is, instead, a stabilizing force, a crucial move toward universal suffrage elections, and a long-term investment in statebuilding. The greater strategic danger lies not in federal action, but in hesitation, fragmentation, and the normalization of insecurity as a political bargaining tool.

Particular concern should be paid to the author’s closing assertion that any deterioration in Baidoa, or any Al-Shabaab resurgence, could justify unilateral Ethiopian action to secure its borders without proper consultation with the main actor on the ground, the FGS. The suggestion that such intervention could happen at any time is a serious one, because it risks normalizing action outside established diplomatic and legal channels and could itself fuel avoidable tensions, in which such a time, Somalia will have its own say.

More broadly, the article appears to promote a narrative that casts doubt on Somalia’s ability to confront Al-Shabaab and protect the security of the Gulf of Aden. In doing so, it implicitly creates space for Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions under the language of regional security. That framing shifts attention away from sovereignty, partnership, and shared responsibility—principles that remain essential to durable peace and stability in the region.

Modern analysis of Somalia’s security landscape and the evolving terrorist threat cannot rest on speculation, recycled narratives, misinformation, or disinformation. Credible assessments must be grounded in verified facts from the field and must fully reflect the measurable gains Somalia has made in counterterrorism over the past four years. Any scenario-building in this space should be anchored in rigorous fact-checking and evidence-based data.

Author: Abdulkarim Abdulle,Researcher and Counterterrorism Expert