Somalia faces deepening legitimacy crisis and risk of fragmentation

By Dr. Ali Said FaqiSunday May 17, 2026

Somalia is edging into a precarious political chapter, one that may prove among the most volatile in recent years. The constitutional amendments passed in March 2026 have ignited a fierce dispute over legitimacy, governance, and the country’s political future. That tension sharpened after the presidential term expired on May 15, 2026, and the parliamentary mandate ended on April 14, 2026, leaving the nation in a sensitive constitutional and political void.

To many in the public and on the opposition benches, the amendments look less like reform than a bid to extend presidential power beyond the consensus-driven model that has long underpinned Somalia’s state-building efforts. Critics say the changes were designed to create a legal and political route for the current administration to retain control. The fallout has further eroded confidence in national institutions and in the constitutional order itself.

At stake now is more than the timing of elections. The deeper question is whether Somalia’s political class can still settle disputes within a shared national framework, or whether trust in the system has already frayed beyond repair.

This op-ed examines the fault lines shaping the crisis: the role of the security forces, the opposition’s ability to translate anger into pressure, the positions of Puntland State and Jubaland, the implications for North Western State of Somalia, the stance of international actors such as Türkiye, and the possibility that Somalia could move toward even greater fragmentation.

Will the army remain loyal as the president’s legitimacy continues to erode?

Few issues are more consequential than the stance of the security forces. Somalia’s army may remain formally loyal to the presidency, but institutional loyalty does not necessarily guarantee political cohesion. The security sector is shaped by clan dynamics, regional interests, political allegiances, salary structures, foreign partnerships, and internal rivalries.

If the political standoff deepens, different currents could emerge within the ranks. Some commanders may stay aligned with Villa Somalia. Others may try to stay clear of the confrontation, while some units may increasingly give priority to regional or clan loyalties over centralized command.

Somalia’s history offers a warning. During extended political crises, parts of the security establishment have fractured before, with some officers openly backing opposition movements or rival political figures. In a country already scarred by instability, divisions inside the military can quickly turn political disagreement into a wider security threat.

If violence escalates in Mogadishu and elsewhere, the pressure on the president to return to negotiations could grow. Somalia’s own political experience has shown that serious deterioration in the security environment often pushes adversaries back to the table after periods of confrontation.

The gravest risk, then, may not be an instant collapse of the state, but the slow weakening of institutional discipline and centralized authority.

Can the opposition transform political frustration into meaningful pressure?

The opposition remains active, but it is not united. Its main asset is not force, but the argument that the current administration no longer enjoys a broadly accepted constitutional mandate. Through legal challenges, public mobilization, and engagement with international actors, opposition figures are trying to frame the dispute as a question of legitimacy rather than armed struggle.

Still, the opposition faces clear constraints. It lacks a single leadership structure, a coherent national strategy, and broad mobilization power in Mogadishu and beyond. Unless it builds closer coordination with Puntland State, Jubaland, other influential stakeholders, and the wider public, its ability to alter the balance of power may remain limited.

What role will Puntland State and Jubaland play in the next phase of the crisis?

Puntland State is expected to continue casting itself as a defender of federalism and constitutional balance, while Jubaland may intensify its resistance to what it sees as federal centralization and overreach.

Yet resistance may not be the end point. Another question now looms: could one of the regional states, especially Puntland State or Jubaland, take the lead in organizing a larger opposition conference designed to contest the political legitimacy of the federal leadership?

If Mogadishu remains deadlocked and no meaningful compromise is reached, opposition forces may eventually try to build a parallel political process outside Villa Somalia’s authority, especially now that both the presidential and parliamentary mandates have expired.

That could lead to efforts to establish alternative representative bodies or even a rival administration claiming constitutional legitimacy. Somalia’s recent political history suggests that prolonged constitutional crises can produce competing centers of power and further weaken national unity.

Will Somalia’s political crisis strengthen North Western State of Somalia’s diplomatic position?

The consequences of the standoff are likely to extend well beyond Somalia’s internal arena.

Every prolonged deadlock in Mogadishu strengthens North Western State of Somalia’s long-held argument that Somalia remains politically fragmented and unable to govern its federal system effectively. Continued disputes between the federal government and regional states, uncertainty over elections, and constitutional wrangling all bolster North Western State of Somalia’s case in diplomatic circles.

That does not mean recognition is around the corner. Many African governments remain wary, in part because of the African Union’s traditional stance on maintaining colonial borders and the fear that recognition could embolden separatist claims elsewhere.

Even so, continuing instability and fragmentation in Somalia are likely to give North Western State of Somalia greater visibility and a stronger hand in its international outreach.

Will Türkiye maintain its current position or gradually recalibrate?

Türkiye has emerged as one of Somalia’s most significant international partners, with ties spanning military cooperation, infrastructure, humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and investment. Ankara’s support has been central to efforts to bolster Somali institutions and security capabilities.

But the relationship is becoming more complicated as anti-Turkish sentiment grows in parts of Somali society. Türkiye’s influence has long rested on public goodwill built through tangible projects — hospitals, roads, scholarships, and humanitarian assistance. If that support is increasingly seen through the lens of domestic political conflict, some of that soft power could fade.

Türkiye is now facing criticism from sections of the opposition and the public for backing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud during internal political confrontations, including allegations of drone support when federal forces moved into Baidoa in Southwest State of Somalia.

Those concerns have been amplified by contentious fisheries, oil, and gas exploration agreements that many Somalis say were struck without enough transparency or accountability. In the eyes of many, Türkiye’s support for President Hassan Sheikh is now being linked to the protection of those strategic deals, amid fears a future government might reopen or challenge them.

That leaves Ankara in a delicate position. The longer Somalia’s crisis drags on, the greater the chance that Türkiye becomes identified with one side of a constitutional dispute rather than remaining broadly seen as a long-term partner of the Somali state.

For that reason, Türkiye would be wise to act pragmatically. It should continue to support Somali state institutions and safeguard its strategic interests, while gradually stepping back from any appearance of direct political alignment with one leader and quietly encouraging de-escalation and stability.

Is Somalia heading toward deeper fragmentation?

With both the presidential term and the parliamentary mandate now expired, Somalia has entered a dangerous constitutional and political vacuum. The dispute is no longer only about elections or constitutional amendments; it is about which actors can legitimately claim the authority to govern.

The federal government is likely to continue defending its own constitutional interpretation, even though the president previously said publicly that any changes related to term extensions would apply not to the current administration but to the next one, before later reversing that position.

Meanwhile, opposition groups, regional authorities, and other political players are increasingly contesting the current order, raising the prospect of institutional paralysis and rival claims to authority.

The most immediate threat may not be an abrupt collapse, but the steady weakening of national cohesion, declining confidence in federal institutions, growing fragmentation, and possible international isolation. Somalia’s recent past has shown again and again that unresolved political disputes can snowball into broader security and governance crises.

Without a credible settlement and an agreed electoral roadmap, Somalia risks sliding into a prolonged era of instability and political splintering, with consequences that could reach far beyond Mogadishu.