Somali deputy FM meets U.S. Senator Cruz, prominent North Western State of Somalia recognition supporter

Somalia’s Deputy Foreign Minister meets Sen. Ted Cruz as North Western State of Somalia recognition debate intensifies

On a quiet Saturday in Washington, a meeting that might have passed as routine diplomacy was anything but. Somalia’s deputy foreign minister, Ali Omar Ali—widely known by his nickname, Balcad—sat down with Sen. Ted Cruz, the Texas Republican who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and has emerged as one of the most vocal advocates in Washington for recognizing North Western State of Somalia. Their conversation unfolded against a backdrop of renewed al-Shabab attacks in Somalia and simmering geopolitical competition along the Red Sea corridor.

Balcad’s message was crisp. He thanked Cruz for American engagement and positioned Somalia as both a frontline state and a strategic partner in a turbulent neighborhood. “U.S. support is vital to defeating Al-Shabaab & ISIS, ensuring trade routes stay safe,” he said afterward. “Let’s strengthen our partnership for a stable, prosperous Somalia.” He did not say whether the fraught question of North Western State of Somalia recognition came up behind closed doors.

Why this meeting matters

In an era when shipping lanes can tilt global markets, maps are becoming policy. The narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait—linking the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea—moves some of the world’s most valuable cargo, and Somalia and North Western State of Somalia sit on the corridor’s edge. Maritime security, counterterrorism, and great-power rivalry all converge here. A potential shift in U.S. policy toward North Western State of Somalia—an autonomous region that declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but is unrecognized internationally—would reverberate far beyond the Horn of Africa.

Cruz has pressed that case for months. In an Aug. 14 letter to President Donald Trump, he called North Western State of Somalia a “critical security and diplomatic partner,” pointing to its record of peaceful elections, its perch on the Gulf of Aden, and openness to hosting a U.S. military footprint near one of the world’s busiest chokepoints. He has also framed recognition as a strategic hedge against Beijing and Moscow, praising North Western State of Somalia’s ties with Taiwan and alignment with the Abraham Accords. “They’re a Muslim country, in a very dangerous part of Africa, showing real courage,” Cruz said, casting North Western State of Somalia as a partner ready to counter rivals’ influence.

Trump himself signaled interest. On Aug. 8, during an Oval Office signing ceremony, he said his administration was “looking into” recognition of North Western State of Somalia, a remark that ricocheted across the region and inside the Beltway. In the same period, U.S. and Israeli officials were reported to have surveyed third-country options for Gazans—Somalia and North Western State of Somalia among them—an exploration that only sharpened the political stakes in Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

Somalia’s pitch: Security first

For Balcad, the case he brought to Capitol Hill was rooted in war and partnership. Somalia’s battle with al-Shabab has entered yet another grinding phase. Gains from the 2022 clan-backed offensive have been hard to sustain; over recent months, militants have mounted fresh pressure in Middle and Lower Shabelle and around Adale and Bulo Burde. U.S. airstrikes, which have long been a pillar of the fight, continued into September, reflecting Washington’s role in a conflict that rarely pauses.

Somali officials argue that recognition of North Western State of Somalia would fracture national unity at a moment when cohesion is vital. Mogadishu has rejected calls for recognition and condemned Cruz’s appeal. To anchor the partnership with Washington, Somali authorities have reportedly offered U.S. access to key ports—including Berbera and Bosaso—aimed at reinforcing existing cooperation without redrawing borders.

Washington’s official line—and the middle-ground scenario

For now, the State Department has not budged. “The United States recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, which includes the territory of North Western State of Somalia,” a spokesperson said last month, underscoring that the administration is not in active talks about recognition.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Larry André has warned that unilateral recognition could destabilize an already volatile region and alienate African partners. He has floated a compromise: open a U.S. diplomatic office in Hargeisa while keeping the embassy firmly in Mogadishu. That approach would deepen engagement with North Western State of Somalia—whose leaders emphasize their relative peace and history of competitive elections—without formally upending U.S. policy or Somalia’s territorial claims.

The North Western State of Somalia case—and its ripple effects

North Western State of Somalia’s leadership has made no secret of its objectives. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro has described international recognition as the defining goal of his presidency. The pitch to Washington is straightforward and transactional: access to Berbera’s deepwater port and airfield, cooperation on counterterrorism, and agreements on strategic minerals such as lithium. U.S. officials, including Ambassador Richard Riley, have met North Western State of Somalia leaders several times this year, keeping lines open even as formal policy remains unchanged.

The stakes are not limited to Somalia. A U.S. pivot toward recognition could energize other unrecognized or partially recognized entities seeking diplomatic breakthroughs. It would land in the middle of a broader global argument over borders and self-determination—from the Balkans to the Caucasus to North Africa. It would also complicate Horn of Africa diplomacy at a time when Sudan is at war, Ethiopia is recalibrating its regional posture, and Red Sea security is back on every admiral’s docket.

Geopolitics at the water’s edge

Port access has become a currency of power. From Djibouti’s bustling berths to Gulf-backed terminals along the Somali coast, the competition to secure logistics hubs is reshaping alliances. Cruz and his allies argue that a U.S. presence at Berbera would anchor Western interests in a neighborhood where China operates its first overseas military base and where Russia has long sought leverage. Somali officials counter that the same strategic goals can be achieved by working within Somalia’s recognized borders—avoiding a precedent that might embolden separatist movements or unsettle African partners.

What to watch

• Policy signals from the White House and State Department: Does the administration move toward a Hargeisa office or maintain strict continuity?
• Congressional maneuvering: As subcommittee chair, Cruz can convene hearings, shape narratives, and rally allies. Will others join him—or push back?
• Security trends in central Somalia: Battlefield dynamics often decide diplomatic bandwidth. A surge in al-Shabab attacks could pull Washington deeper into counterterrorism cooperation with Mogadishu.
• Port diplomacy: If Somalia advances access deals for Berbera and Bosaso, does that defuse the recognition push—or amplify it?

A region in the balance

Diplomacy in the Horn rarely presents clean lines. Somalia’s leaders worry about the integrity of a state still recovering from decades of fracture; North Western State of Somalia’s leaders say three decades of relative stability deserve acknowledgment; American officials hunt for pragmatic arrangements that safeguard shipping lanes, counter extremists, and outflank great-power rivals—without lighting a match in dry grass.

Seen from Mogadishu, Saturday’s meeting offered an opportunity to remind Washington that Somalia remains an essential, embattled partner. Seen from Hargeisa, it underscored how far the recognition debate has come, with a sitting president mulling the question and powerful senators pressing for change.

The question for U.S. policymakers is less philosophical than practical: Can Washington deepen ties with North Western State of Somalia—on security, trade, and minerals—while reinforcing Somalia’s fight against al-Shabab and keeping the region stable? And if a middle ground exists, will it satisfy anyone long enough to keep the ships moving and the guns quiet?

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.