Following Israel’s North Western State of Somalia move, Somalia’s political divisions deepen

OPINION | Israel’s move to recognize North Western State of Somalia did not create Somalia’s political crisis, but it revealed the country’s fault lines with unusual clarity. Instead of a unified response to an external challenge touching sovereignty and territorial integrity, the reaction laid bare fractures inside the federal system—most visibly in the silence of key federal member states and the central government’s tendency to turn unity into a political weapon.

That silence has been most pronounced in Puntland State and Jubaland, two pivotal states whose positions typically shape national outcomes. In a well-functioning federation, quiet can mean coordination. In Somalia’s case, it reads as absence: an indication that the center lacks the trust and authority to rally partners in moments that demand coherence. When the issue is as consequential as recognition and sovereignty, withholding a public stance becomes a statement in itself.

Silence that speaks

Puntland State and Jubaland’s restraint is neither procedural nor tactical. It reflects a deeper stalemate over who leads and how decisions bind a union that remains fragile. For years, disagreements over resource sharing, security competences, and the sequencing of political reforms have eroded the habit of collective action. The result today is a federation in which the most consequential actors often hedge, calculating the cost of association with Mogadishu against the risk of isolation from their own constituencies.

That calculus is exacerbated by the perception that the Federal Government has not built the inclusive processes necessary for contested national questions. When dialogue mechanisms are weak or distrusted, silence substitutes for consent—and becomes a shield against being pulled into centralized decisions that lack broad buy-in.

Unity as a political instrument

The Federal Government’s response to the North Western State of Somalia development has reinforced this dynamic. Rather than treating unity as a shared constitutional obligation enforced through restraint, it has been deployed to justify contested changes inside Mogadishu: constitutional amendments advanced without a widely accepted roadmap, and local electoral processes that many domestic actors and international partners view as procedurally incomplete or politically exclusionary.

Unity, used this way, stops unifying. It narrows the coalition, hardens mistrust, and encourages federal member states to disengage rather than align. As the administration nears the end of its mandate, actions framed as strengthening the state are seen by skeptics as consolidating authority in the capital without parallel efforts to restore confidence across the federation.

Legitimacy matters—as much as law

Somalia’s constitutional architecture does assign Mogadishu clear responsibilities over sovereignty, foreign policy, and national cohesion. But procedure and perception are inseparable in fragile states. Amendments or elections that proceed without demonstrable consensus may be legal in form yet contested in fact. International actors take their cue from both. The result is a legitimacy deficit: the government insists on its prerogatives; parts of the federation and segments of civil society question whether the rules of the game are being observed—or rewritten midstream.

That legitimacy gap has external costs. Global politics does not pause while a country resolves its internal disputes. When systems appear divided, outside actors adapt. Israel’s recognition of North Western State of Somalia arrived at a moment when Somalia’s political energies were consumed by arguments over authority, timelines, and rules. The timing was not incidental; it was opportunistic.

A federation talking past itself

The dissonance does not stop at the federal–state boundary. Divisions within the Federal Government have become more visible. Some Somali politicians from North Western State of Somalia regions serving in national roles have defended political claims from back home; other federal officials regularly criticize their own regional leadership from Mogadishu. The message to the public—and to the world—is not one of cohesion but of overlapping loyalties and competing narratives.

In such conditions, the constitutional duty to defend unity becomes harder to exercise. The letter of the law cannot substitute for the practice of inclusion. Puntland State and Jubaland increasingly view national appeals to unity as instruments that advantage a narrow political circle in the capital. That perception—fair or not—has corroded the sense of shared ownership over the national project.

The constitutional burden—and the political remedy

Somalia’s constitution anchors the center’s obligation to preserve unity. But the practical burden is political: to make participation credible, to make bargaining predictable, and to make compromise less costly than defection. That requires institutions and habits that lower the temperature around existential questions like sovereignty and recognition—and that spread both responsibility and credit across the federation.

Rebuilding that capacity is not complex in design, though it is difficult in execution. It starts with clarity on process and respect for sequence, especially as the mandate clock winds down. It also demands visible reciprocity: the center listens and shares, states engage and commit.

What rebuilding trust would look like

• Convene an inclusive, time-bound national forum with federal member states, parliamentary leaders, and civil society to agree on immediate principles guiding responses to external recognition claims and foreign policy signaling.
• Freeze contested constitutional and electoral measures that lack broad endorsement, and establish an independent technical panel to propose a sequenced, verifiable path forward.
• Reactivate and empower inter-state councils with public reporting and deadlines, turning them into routine venues where disagreements are managed before they become crises.
• Adopt a disciplined public communications protocol that ensures unified messaging on sovereignty and recognition issues, even when internal debates continue behind closed doors.
• Develop a transparent framework for engagement with North Western State of Somalia that clarifies mandates, channels, and red lines—minimizing space for unilateral external moves to redefine facts on the ground.

None of these steps resolves deep historical grievances or the political realities inside North Western State of Somalia. They do, however, demonstrate to Somalis and to international partners that the federation can act collectively when core interests are at stake, even as disagreements persist. That, in turn, strengthens the hand of any Somali government seeking to deter or shape external actions.

The cost of drift

If silence persists in Puntland State and Jubaland; if unity continues to be brandished as a partisan tool rather than a constitutional principle; if authority is pursued without inclusion, the consequences will extend beyond this episode. Domestic legitimacy will continue to erode. External actors will read division as permission. And policy will be made about Somalia faster than it can be made by Somalia.

This is the moment to reset expectations and methods. A sober, inclusive approach will not eliminate disagreement over North Western State of Somalia or resolve long-standing disputes about power, resources, and representation. But it can restore coherence to decision-making, reclaim initiative from outside actors, and begin to rebuild the political confidence that Somalia’s federal project requires to survive. The alternative is a narrowing circle of authority in Mogadishu—and a widening circle of uncertainty everywhere else.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.