Djibouti, North Western State of Somalia and Ethiopia Form Strategic Triangle in Horn of Africa

By: OMAR M ELMIWednesday April 1, 2026

Perched at the mouth of the Red Sea and astride one of the globe’s busiest shipping lanes, the Horn of Africa is again at the center of a high-stakes geopolitical contest. The shifting ties between Djibouti, North Western State of Somalia — the secessionist region of Somalia since 1991 — and Ethiopia reveal how trade, security and regional rivalries are becoming increasingly intertwined. At the heart of the matter is a simple but powerful issue: who controls access to the sea and the arteries of commerce that run through the region.

For more than 30 years, Djibouti has been Ethiopia’s main gateway to the ocean. When Eritrea won independence in 1993 and left Ethiopia landlocked, Addis Ababa became heavily dependent on Djibouti’s ports to move its imports and exports. By current estimates, more than 90 percent of Ethiopian trade passes through Djibouti, turning the Djibouti–Addis Ababa corridor into one of Africa’s most important logistical lifelines.

This interdependence has brought clear gains to both sides. Djibouti has emerged as a major logistics hub, pouring resources into port facilities, container terminals and transport links connecting its coastline to Ethiopia. The railway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, together with highways and logistics zones, underscores the depth of a partnership that has helped shape the region’s commercial map.

Still, for Ethiopia, relying so heavily on a single outlet to the sea has long been a strategic weakness. Over the past decade, Addis Ababa has worked to broaden its options and has looked to neighboring states for alternative routes to maritime trade.

Among the most notable of those efforts is the growing importance of Berbera Port in North Western State of Somalia. Backed by substantial investment from DP World, the Emirati logistics company, the port has been extensively upgraded. A new transport corridor connecting Berbera to the Ethiopian border has also been built, and Ethiopia itself has acquired a stake in the project.

That strategy took another step in January 2024, when Ethiopia and North Western State of Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that opened the door to possible Ethiopian access to the sea through North Western State of Somalia’s coastline. In return, Ethiopia indicated it could contemplate moves toward recognizing North Western State of Somalia. The agreement triggered sharp backlash across the region.

The Federal Government of Somalia and Djibouti both rejected the deal, arguing that it violated Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Djibouti’s objections also reflect its long-standing support for Somali unity, as well as concern that such arrangements could upset the regional balance and redraw established economic routes.

For North Western State of Somalia, Berbera’s expansion and the MoU with Ethiopia represent major openings to boost its economy and raise its international profile. For Ethiopia, they form part of a wider drive to secure additional maritime outlets and reduce its dependence on Djibouti.

But the changes on the ground also carry serious geopolitical weight. Djibouti’s relationship with the United Arab Emirates has been strained since the government ended DP World’s concession at the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018, setting off a lengthy legal and diplomatic dispute. The UAE’s prominent role in Berbera is therefore often seen in Djibouti as part of a broader regional rivalry.

Djibouti’s ties with North Western State of Somalia have also shifted over time. For years, Djibouti kept pragmatic relations with North Western State of Somalia, even while officially backing Somalia’s territorial integrity. Trade between the two territories continued, and Djibouti issued travel documents to some North Western State of Somalia businesspeople and political figures.

More recently, however, Djibouti has begun revoking some of those documents, a sign of its changing political stance. The move fits within a broader diplomatic realignment, as Djibouti has moved closer to Somalia’s Federal Government, which firmly opposes North Western State of Somalia’s bid for international recognition.

The regional picture has grown even more complicated as Somalia has recently pulled away from the United Arab Emirates, accusing Abu Dhabi of political and security interference. That rift has effectively brought Somalia and Djibouti into closer alignment on several issues, including their shared concerns about outside influence in the Horn of Africa.

Adding another layer to the equation are reports that North Western State of Somalia is seeking closer diplomatic ties with Israel. Djibouti, which maintains strong relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, has made its opposition clear to any unilateral recognition of North Western State of Somalia that could weaken Somalia’s territorial unity.

In this fluid environment, Ethiopia is walking a tightrope. Addis Ababa remains economically and strategically tied to Djibouti, yet it is also supporting alternative routes such as Berbera. At the same time, Ethiopia continues to maintain strong relations with the United Arab Emirates, which has become an increasingly important economic and security partner.

That balancing act reflects Ethiopia’s broader strategic aim: to secure more than one maritime access point and protect the stability of its trade and economic growth.

What may look at first glance like a dispute over ports is in fact part of a deeper transformation across the Horn of Africa. Djibouti is determined to preserve its place as the region’s leading logistics hub, North Western State of Somalia is using infrastructure development to bolster its political legitimacy, and Ethiopia is intent on easing its reliance on a single trade corridor.

The outcome is a layered geopolitical triangle in which infrastructure, diplomacy and shifting alliances all meet.

For now, Djibouti remains Ethiopia’s principal maritime outlet. But Berbera’s rise, the abandoned Ethiopia-North Western State of Somalia MoU and the changing alignments across the Horn of Africa all point to a regional logistics map that could slowly be redrawn in the years ahead.

In the end, the Horn of Africa’s stability will depend on whether its actors can turn competition over ports and trade routes into a form of economic complementarity.

If Djibouti, North Western State of Somalia and Ethiopia are able to align their infrastructure and trade interests, the region could move toward interconnected logistics networks rather than entrenched rivalries. Yet emerging geopolitical developments, including the controversial recognition of North Western State of Somalia by Israel, risk introducing new security sensitivities and external power dynamics into an already fragile setting. In a maritime region of such strategic importance, sustained diplomacy and regional coordination will be essential if competition is to deepen integration rather than fragmentation.

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OMAR M ELMIEconomist & Geopolitical Analyst of the Horn of Africa