MOGADISHU — Analysis U.S. Africa Command signaled a broader play in Somalia that reaches beyond counterterrorism. Lt. Gen. John Brennan, AFRICOM’s deputy commander, said Washington’s presence and operations could extend into trade and investment, citing untapped Somali resources on land and offshore. His framing underscores a shift: pairing security assistance with private capital to help stabilize a country long defined by conflict and commercial risk.
Brennan argued that chronic insecurity has kept Somalis from benefiting from what lies beneath their territory and waters. He pointed to emerging information about strategic minerals and other high-value assets, as well as possible offshore energy resources near Mogadishu, including liquefied natural gas. While the military remains a core partner against extremist threats, he said the United States’ most effective tool in Africa is mobilizing private-sector investment—an approach increasingly favored in Washington’s competition with other global actors on the continent.
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The timing is notable. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s federal government is pursuing resource-development agreements with foreign partners, some of whom critics say have contributed little to the fight against militant groups. The result is a crowded field: countries vying for energy, minerals and logistics access across the Horn of Africa while Somali leaders court deals they hope can spark post-conflict growth.
Domestic and external pressure is mounting. In recent months, U.S. President Donald Trump delivered sharp assessments of Somalia’s governance and security, accusing the country of lacking effective state institutions and linking instability to piracy targeting commercial shipping. He has said his administration would take steps to address those concerns. Analysts read those remarks as part of a broader push on Somali leadership—especially over commercial agreements that critics argue have yet to tangibly improve the economy.
Against that backdrop, Brennan’s comments function as more than a development pitch. They hint at a strategy to align security gains with market incentives and regulatory standards, helping Somalia attract capital that sticks. If foreign investment follows clear rules and delivers visible benefits, the thinking goes, it can underwrite long-term security better than military operations alone.
The competition for influence is already visible in the sky. Residents in Mogadishu reported seeing a Turkish F-16 fighter jet in recent hours, stirring speculation about Ankara’s expanding footprint. Turkey has reportedly reached agreements with the Mohamud government on oil exploration, and there are claims of plans to establish a satellite-related facility on the outskirts of the capital. A NATO member with deep commercial and political ties to Gulf partners, Ankara has been active across the Horn, North Africa and the Red Sea, where access to ports, airspace and resources carries strategic weight.
The contest is not merely about who invests, but how. For Somalia, years of fragmented authority, insurgent violence and contested jurisdiction between federal and regional levels have left a patchwork legal landscape. Any race to secure oil blocks, mine strategic minerals or deploy telecom and satellite infrastructure will test whether the central government can set and enforce transparent rules, share revenues fairly with federal member states and ensure environmental and community protections are in place.
The risks are clear. Without robust oversight, resource deals can inflame local grievances, fuel corruption and weaken the very institutions needed to manage a resource windfall. A fragile security environment compounds those risks: insurgents seek rents from logistics and construction, threaten energy infrastructure and target communities perceived to be aligned with government or foreign firms. At sea, commercial activity faces fluctuating threats that, as Trump noted, can intersect with piracy dynamics when state authority is thin.
Yet the opportunities are real if sequenced correctly. For a country with a young population and a critical geographic position along the Indian Ocean, well-structured investment in energy, logistics, fisheries, telecoms and strategic minerals could catalyze jobs and revenues. The key is aligning capital with governance. That means publishing contract terms, conducting environmental and social impact assessments, securing local consent, and building independent oversight that can audit royalties and spending. Investors tend to look for risk-mitigation tools—political risk insurance, clear dispute-resolution mechanisms, reliable licensing—and for signals that security gains are durable enough to support multi-year operations.
That is where AFRICOM’s message intersects with policy. A security umbrella can create space for commerce, but the United States is also hinting it wants to help shape the “rules of the road.” Encouraging U.S. and allied firms to enter Somali markets brings with it compliance regimes and due diligence norms that, if applied consistently, may help institutionalize transparency. For Somalia’s leaders, the challenge is converting interest into projects that survive election cycles and extricate themselves from opaque, ad hoc dealmaking.
Ankara’s visibility—F-16s overhead, energy discussions on the table, claims of space-related infrastructure—illustrates how quickly the geopolitical chessboard moves. Gulf partners, too, are competing for logistics and resource access from the Red Sea to the Horn. In that race, Somalia’s bargaining power improves when it can set a clear, credible policy path: delineated exploration zones, auction processes insulated from political meddling, and revenue-sharing agreements that convince regional authorities and communities that they will see tangible benefits.
For Somalis, the bottom line is whether investment translates into livelihoods and security. That will depend on basics: road and port access to move goods, functioning courts to resolve disputes, and security forces that protect rather than prey. It will also depend on whether the federal government can articulate a national resource strategy that balances immediate fiscal needs with long-term development, and whether partners—U.S., Turkish or otherwise—support those goals rather than shortcut them.
What to watch next:
- Whether Mogadishu publishes clear frameworks for hydrocarbons and mining, including public disclosure of contracts and royalties.
- Signals of U.S. commercial engagement, such as trade missions or partnerships that pair investment with governance and compliance assistance.
- Turkey’s next moves on energy exploration and any progress toward a satellite-related facility near the capital.
- Security trends around prospective resource corridors and offshore blocks, including how authorities deter threats to commercial shipping.
- How federal member states are brought into revenue-sharing arrangements, reducing incentives for parallel deals that could undermine national cohesion.
Brennan’s message is ultimately pragmatic. Security operations can suppress immediate threats, but prosperity requires jobs and markets. Somalia’s untapped resources will attract suitors; aligning them with transparent rules and public benefit is the only way they can become a foundation for stability rather than another source of conflict.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
