Puntland State’s mountain push: can Somalia’s northeastern state finish what others have tried?
For more than a year Puntland State’s security forces have been hunting a tiny but stubborn ISIS affiliate in the jagged Cal‑Miskaad range of northeastern Somalia. The regional president, Said Abdullahi Deni, speaks of “real progress” and a determination to drive the extremists from the cliffs and wadis where they have long taken refuge. But as the fighting inches forward, the campaign illuminates familiar dilemmas: brutal terrain, civilian suffering, outside backers and a fragile central government that risks being sidelined.
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The battlefield and the tactics
The Miskaad mountains are the kind of landscape that makes conventional warfare almost impossible. Steep escarpments, narrow ridgelines and canyons conceal cave complexes and single-track trails that are impassable to vehicles. “The terrain is extremely difficult; even vehicles cannot reach some areas,” President Deni told reporters, underscoring why the operation has required patience as much as force.
Puntland State officials say their offensive has pushed ISIS fighters out of certain hideouts after a campaign stretching close to a year. But they also accuse the militants of increasingly using civilians — including women and children — as shields, a tactic that complicates clearance operations and raises the risk of civilian casualties and displacement.
The human toll matters as much as territorial control. Displacement undercuts the very stability the forces say they are trying to secure: farmers abandon terraces, markets in nearby towns thin out, and a sense of normalcy frays. If militants are driven from their caves, what must follow is governance, services and security that reach the valleys and towns where families return.
Outside partners, local ambitions
Puntland State has not fought alone. Officials cite the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the United Arab Emirates as partners in the effort, reflecting a wider reality in the Horn: local forces frequently depend on external military and intelligence assistance to pursue small, mobile extremist groups.
The involvement of foreign partners is double-edged. On one hand, air support, surveillance and training can make operations feasible in inhospitable terrain. On the other, heavy external footprints can fuel narratives of foreign intervention that militant groups exploit, and they can deepen local political rivalries if assistance is seen as politicized.
Across the Horn of Africa, counterterrorism cooperation has been a consistent — if sometimes controversial — element of Western and Gulf policy. For Somalia, it has at once limited the operational freedom of groups like ISIS-Somalia and al‑Shabaab and complicated the task of building durable Somali-led security institutions.
Politics at home: Puntland State and Mogadishu
One of the striking elements of the campaign is its political backdrop. Puntland State, an autonomous federal state that predates Somalia’s current federal architecture, has long operated with a degree of independence from Mogadishu. President Deni’s office makes little secret of its frustration with the federal government, accusing it of prioritizing political wrangles over the security fight.
That friction is more than a quarrel over credit. When regional governments take the lead in military operations without consistent federal coordination, it can create gaps in logistics, intelligence sharing and post‑conflict stabilization. It can also feed broader disputes over resource control, electoral timing and the balance of power in a country still recovering from decades of fragmentation.
For residents of Puntland State, though, such politics can feel distant next to the immediate question: will their towns be safe? Deni’s rhetoric — “Peace and stability for our people is non‑negotiable” — is aimed at a domestic audience hungry for security and normalcy. Whether that mandate translates into inclusive governance after the fighting will be decisive.
What victory looks like — and what comes after
“Eliminated” is a useful word for political leaders; it signals closure. But military displacement of an insurgent group in rough terrain does not always amount to a lasting defeat. Small cells can melt into the population, regroup in other areas or exploit political vacuums. Somalia’s long experience with al‑Shabaab illustrates that kinetic operations must be paired with politics, justice and development to be durable.
There are several hard questions Puntland State and its partners must confront now:
- How will displaced civilians be protected, returned and supported so they do not become a recruitment pool for extremists?
- Who will hold and govern any territory cleared of militants — and how will local clans and authorities be included?
- Can coordination between Puntland State and the federal government be improved to prevent gaps that insurgents could exploit?
Without credible answers, military success risks being temporary. The international community’s appetite for long-term stabilization funding is uneven; donors often support short bursts of military activity but are less consistent on governance and livelihoods programs that underpin security.
Broader implications
Puntland State’s campaign matters beyond the Miskaad ridges. It is part of a global pattern in which sub‑state armed groups inhabit marginal, difficult terrain and are pursued by local forces aided by outside partners. From the Sahel to Southeast Asia, clearing such groups is only the first step in a longer project of preventing their return.
For Somalia — where two decades of international engagement have produced incremental gains alongside recurring setbacks — the fight against ISIS in the northeast is a test of whether regional strength can translate into national progress. It asks whether Somali leaders can turn military momentum into stable institutions that reach villages as well as ridgelines.
The people of Puntland State deserve security. They also deserve a future in which the mountains no longer define them as a theater of war but as part of a region at peace with itself. The real measure of victory will be whether the next chapter brings schools, markets and quiet harvests back to the valleys below.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
