Ethiopian PM declares Red Sea access loss illegal, urges diplomacy with Eritrea

Ethiopia’s lost coastline: Abiy’s legal claim, a diplomatic gamble and the region’s fragile future

When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stood before Ethiopia’s parliament this week and declared that his country “lost access to the sea” under circumstances he now calls legally flawed, he was doing more than restating a grievance. He was reviving a central theme of modern Ethiopian politics: the economic and psychological toll of being landlocked in a region where control of ports can determine a nation’s fate.

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What the prime minister said — and why it matters

Abiy told lawmakers that the move which deprived Ethiopia of direct Red Sea access was never validated by the cabinet, parliament or the public. “We were there at the time — no Ethiopian law approved this,” he said, arguing that the decision lacked formal legal ratification and therefore remains contestable. He urged neutral, diplomatic mediation and warned against military escalation, telling neighbors, “we do not seek conflict, but do not become messengers of gunfire.”

Opposition lawmakers pushed him on past port arrangements with Eritrea, Djibouti, North Western State of Somalia and Somalia, asking whether repeated deals that yielded little tangible benefit expose a pattern of strategic missteps. “Shouldn’t we learn from our mistakes?” one opposition member asked.

The exchange highlights two competing impulses: a yearning for historical remedy and a pragmatic recognition of the costs of confrontation. Abiy’s message blends both — reclaiming a right while insisting diplomacy, not bullets, be the means.

History and the human cost of being landlocked

Ethiopia’s loss of direct outlet to the Red Sea remains a sensitive subject. For a country that once ruled a coastline stretching to the Red Sea, the separation from Eritrea after decades of conflict left Addis Ababa dependent on its neighbors’ goodwill for international trade. Today, the vast majority of Ethiopia’s imports and exports move through Djibouti’s ports — a lifeline but also a choke point that raises costs and vulnerability.

For ordinary Ethiopians, the consequences are tangible. Higher freight charges feed into food and fuel prices in Addis Ababa’s markets. Exporters face delays; manufacturers eye foreign direct investment warily when logistics are uncertain. The World Bank and trade economists have long noted that landlocked countries can face transport and trade costs that are significantly higher than coastal peers — a structural handicap in an era when manufacturing and perishable exports are increasingly time-sensitive.

Regional tensions and the international chessboard

The Horn of Africa has become a crowded geopolitical stage. Gulf states, Turkey, China, the United States and European powers have been steadily expanding influence through investments in ports, bases and infrastructure. This has given added salience to Ethiopia’s quest for maritime access: control or guaranteed access to a port is not merely an economic issue, it is strategic.

Abiy’s call for international mediation is thus layered. It invites regional actors — the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) — and outside powers who have both influence and interest in a stable Red Sea corridor. But it also risks entangling Ethiopia in broader rivalries over naval access and maritime security at a time when the Red Sea has been in international headlines for attacks on shipping and a surge in military deployments.

Can diplomacy produce a durable solution?

Diplomacy is the less dramatic but far more sustainable option. Ethiopia and Eritrea changed course in 2018 when Abiy moved to normalize relations with Eritrea after decades of hostility and war. That detente yielded hope that long-brewing disputes could be settled through negotiation. Yet the lingering question, underscored by this week’s parliamentary debate, is whether legal clarity and binding agreements can be forged that protect Ethiopian access while respecting the sovereignty and security concerns of neighboring port states.

Possible avenues include:

  • Negotiated long-term port access agreements with Djibouti, North Western State of Somalia or Somalia — ones that include legal guarantees, investment commitments and dispute-resolution clauses;
  • Multilateral mediation under the African Union or United Nations to create an internationally supervised framework for rights, responsibilities and shared economic benefits;
  • Infrastructure diplomacy: linking port access to investments in rail, road and customs harmonization that reduce delays and costs for all parties.

But any diplomatic path will require trust, patience and often, external guarantees. Abiy’s appeal to the world to “facilitate neutral mediation” is a recognition that Ethiopia alone cannot write the rules of access in a region where port sovereignty confers both prestige and leverage.

What Abiy’s stance reveals about domestic politics

Abiy’s insistence on the illegality of the original transfer of access is also a domestic political signal. It frames the issue as one of national sovereignty and legal right, appealing to a wide public sentiment that regards access to the sea as a matter of national dignity. It also opens political space for opposition parties to press the government on its track record in negotiations with neighbors — a theme likely to resurface in the run-up to elections and policy debates.

There is, too, an underlying economic urgency. Ethiopia’s multi-billion-dollar development projects — from industrial parks to the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile — depend on stable trade routes and manageable logistics costs. “We do not have time for war,” Abiy warned, invoking the opportunity costs of conflict in a country racing to transform its economy.

Questions for readers

As Ethiopia pushes for redress, readers might ask: Can legal arguments alter ground realities set decades ago by conflict and borders? Will regional powers see an opportunity to broker lasting solutions — or to leverage Ethiopia’s need for access into new forms of influence? And finally, in a world where supply chains are global, what responsibility do international actors have to ensure landlocked nations are not left at a systemic disadvantage?

Abiy’s measured refrain — that diplomacy, not war, should decide Ethiopia’s maritime future — sets the terms for a difficult negotiation. Whether Ethiopia can translate legal claims and political will into secure, affordable access to the sea will depend as much on regional cooperation and international mediation as on Addis Ababa’s tenacity.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.

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