By Hanad Mohamed HusseinMonday July 6, 2026
Somalia’s war against Al-Shabaab has endured for more than twenty years, testing the country’s citizens, institutions and allies against one of the most persistent terrorist threats in the world. Any serious examination of that fight deserves attention, especially when it sharpens public understanding of security, governance and stability across the region.
The International Crisis Group’s recent report, New Chapter, Same Stalemate: Somalia’s War with Al-Shabaab, offers a wide-ranging account of recent military developments and rightly points to several pressures inside Somalia’s security sector. It says Al-Shabaab achieved major gains in 2025, that the Federal Government subsequently reorganised its defence around Mogadishu, and that the war has settled back into a kind of stalemate. The report also calls for stronger military training, better force retention, closer federal-state coordination and broader non-military responses to the conflict.
These questions are important. The Ministry of Defence does not reject well-founded scrutiny. Somalia’s security transition is difficult. The terrorist threat is still serious. Building a professional, accountable and lasting national defence force after decades of conflict and state collapse is not a task that can be completed quickly.
Yet the report’s main finding — that Somalia’s campaign has merely returned to strategic deadlock — does not fully reflect the broader changes now under way in the country’s defence institutions, operational planning, territorial stabilisation and democratic state-building.
The assessment places heavy emphasis on territorial comparison, especially the shifting frontlines between 2022 and 2026. Territory is important. No responsible defence authority would claim otherwise. But modern counterterrorism cannot be judged only by which actor temporarily holds a rural location. Insurgencies are contested through intelligence, logistics, public trust, institutional endurance, financial disruption, mobility, civilian protection and the state’s capacity to reconnect communities.
On those tests, Somalia is in a stronger position than the report indicates.
Over the past two years, the Somali Armed Forces, with support from international partners, have shifted from largely reactive missions to more coordinated, intelligence-led campaigns aimed at weakening Al-Shabaab’s long-term operational capacity. Precision operations and ground offensives have struck senior commanders, weapons stores, logistics networks, training locations, explosive capabilities and movement corridors used by the group. These gains may not always be obvious on a battlefield map, but they directly limit the enemy’s ability to plan, travel, recruit, tax, intimidate and carry out attacks.
Lower Shabelle provides the clearest illustration. Al-Shabaab tried to generate momentum there toward the capital. Lower Shabelle is not a routine front. It is the southern gateway to Mogadishu, a crucial agricultural zone and a strategic corridor connecting the capital with Marka and other important population centres. Control of this area shapes not only military access, but also food supplies, local commerce, civilian movement and the safety of communities along the Shabelle River.
The ICG report itself notes that the group’s parallel offensive in Lower Shabelle was less effective, and that Somali and partner forces drove it from a series of towns along the Shabelle River. That outcome was not accidental. It reflected better coordination, stronger partner backing and a sharper operational design.
Under Operation Silent Storm, Somali forces, supported by international partners, liberated Sabiid, Anoole, Bariire and Awdheegle, halting and reversing Al-Shabaab’s attempted push in Lower Shabelle while securing key approaches to Mogadishu. These were not merely symbolic victories. They restored state authority in strategic locations, protected communities, disrupted terrorist mobility and reduced the group’s capacity to menace the capital through the south-western corridor.
That progress was strengthened by Operation Rolling Thunder, which cleared and secured the Mogadishu-Marka corridor, restoring movement along one of Somalia’s most important routes. The ability of Somali forces to move safely by road from Mogadishu to Baidoa, together with the securing of the Mogadishu-Jowhar route, further shows that the campaign is delivering tangible security results.
Roads are decisive. When Al-Shabaab dominates roads, it controls taxation, intimidation, movement and access. When the government secures them, trade resumes, services return, military mobility improves and civilian confidence grows. Reopening these routes has allowed military convoys, officials, traders and local communities to move with greater confidence after years in which Al-Shabaab relied on checkpoints, extortion and threats to isolate towns and disrupt ordinary life.
Securing and reopening the Mogadishu-Marka, Mogadishu-Baidoa and Mogadishu-Jowhar routes therefore represents more than battlefield success. It is a political and economic advance. It demonstrates that the state is physically reconnecting communities that Al-Shabaab has long sought to cut off from one another.
For families who can now travel with less fear, traders able to return to markets, officials reaching communities more safely and children whose everyday lives depend on secure roads, security is not an abstract argument over maps. It is lived reality.
These security improvements have also created space for political and civic gains. In December 2025, residents of Mogadishu elected their municipal leaders, an important milestone in local democratic participation. In May 2026, successful elections took place across 13 districts in South West State, including the recently liberated district of Awdheegle. Planned elections in Hirshabelle and Galmudug mark another step toward stronger democratic governance under improving security conditions.
Conducting local elections in districts recently affected by conflict is not a ceremonial act. It directly challenges Al-Shabaab’s political project, which seeks to replace public choice with fear. Every district that votes in safer conditions demonstrates that state authority is returning not only through military presence, but through civic participation, local leadership and democratic legitimacy.
That is not the picture of a state simply holding the line. It is the work of a government reconnecting cities, reopening strategic corridors, enabling elections and gradually restoring public confidence in national institutions.
The report also devotes significant attention to Al-Shabaab’s capacity to adapt. It suggests the group has modified its conduct in areas under its control, including attempts to improve relations with local communities and reduce dependence on coercion. That conclusion should be handled carefully. Tactical adaptation is not the same as political legitimacy.
Al-Shabaab remains a terrorist organisation. It continues to depend on intimidation, illegal taxation, forced recruitment, including of children, limits on basic freedoms and violence against civilians. Any temporary change in its behaviour is better understood as a survival tactic, not a true transformation. A group that extorts communities, recruits children, assassinates officials and attacks civilians cannot be recast as simply a political actor moving toward moderation.
The ICG report also acknowledges that Al-Shabaab’s public support remains weak and that its governance continues to generate deep grievances, including heavy taxation and forced recruitment. That point is vital. The group may alter its methods, but it has not changed its character.
By contrast, the Federal Government’s campaign is increasingly grounded in the opposite principle: protecting civilians, restoring legitimate authority and building institutions capable of lasting beyond the conflict.
Since May 2025, the Ministry of Defence has placed defence reform at the centre of its work, including command and control, force generation, logistics, specialised training, interoperability with partners, public accountability and operational discipline. These reforms are not finished, but they are genuine. They form part of a long-term effort to build a national defence force that is professional, sustainable and able to take on increasing responsibility from international security partners.
The ICG report correctly identifies force retention, training, equipment and holding capacity as critical concerns. These are not outside observations unfamiliar to Somalia. They are priorities already recognised by the Ministry of Defence and built into current reform efforts. Somalia’s military challenge has never been limited to defeating terrorists in a single operation. It is to build a force capable of clearing, holding and stabilising territory in coordination with federal member states, local authorities, police, Darwish forces and civilian institutions.
That task is especially urgent as Somalia prepares for the continued transition from African Union security support. The Ministry recognises the importance of AUSSOM, the sacrifices made by troop-contributing countries and the continuing role of international partners. But the strategic direction is clear: Somalia must steadily assume greater responsibility for its own national security.
Such a transition demands patience, resources and partnership. It also requires a realistic view of what progress looks like. In counterinsurgency, gains are rarely linear. Setbacks happen. Territory can shift. The enemy adjusts. The central question is whether the state is becoming more capable, more coordinated and more legitimate over time.
Somalia is doing exactly that.
The Somali Armed Forces are today more experienced, more closely coordinated with partners and increasingly able to conduct complex operations than in earlier stages of the conflict. International cooperation has become more integrated across intelligence, air support, training, logistics, institutional development and strategic planning. Operational planning is increasingly driven by intelligence. Strategic communications have improved. Public reporting on operations has become more regular. Civilian protection has taken a more visible place in national security policy.
The Ministry has also sought to build public confidence by communicating more openly about military operations, honouring the sacrifices of Somali soldiers and exposing Al-Shabaab’s brutality. This communications work is not separate from the military campaign. It is part of it. Terrorist groups survive not only through weapons, but through fear, misinformation and psychological control. Countering that influence requires credible state communication, engagement with communities and a clear national narrative.
The campaign against Al-Shabaab cannot be separated from the protection of civilians. The legitimacy of the state depends not only on defeating terrorists, but on the manner in which that fight is conducted. Civilian protection, respect for international humanitarian law and accountability remain central to Somalia’s security transition. The Council of Ministers’ approval of the Civilian Protection Policy was an important step in strengthening the legal and operational framework for protecting civilians during security operations and armed conflict.
The report is right that Somalia cannot depend on military means alone. Lasting security requires political unity, functioning institutions, local governance, economic recovery and sustained partnership. But acknowledging that there is no rapid military solution should not lead to the conclusion that Somalia is caught in an endless stalemate.
A more precise assessment is that Somalia is moving through a difficult but real transition: from emergency counterterrorism toward territorial stabilisation, institutional consolidation and democratic state-building.
That transition is visible in the liberation of strategic towns in Lower Shabelle. It is visible in the reopening of roads connecting Mogadishu with Baidoa, Marka and Jowhar. It is visible in successful local elections in Mogadishu and South West State. It is visible in the continued reform of the Somali Armed Forces. It is visible in the ability of Somali forces and partners to deny Al-Shabaab the freedom to threaten the capital as it once did.
None of this means Somalia underestimates the challenge. Al-Shabaab remains dangerous, adaptive and determined. It continues to exploit political disputes, local grievances, poverty, climate shocks and governance gaps. It still uses propaganda to inflate its strength and weaken public confidence in the state. It continues to target civilians, security forces, public officials and communities that reject its ideology.
But the persistence of a threat is not proof that progress is absent.
The Federal Government of Somalia has drawn important lessons from earlier phases of the campaign. Operations must be better sequenced. Liberated areas must be stabilised quickly. Local communities must be shielded from retaliation. Holding forces must be reinforced. Federal and state-level security institutions must work more closely. Military advances must be followed by governance, reconciliation and service delivery.
Those lessons are now shaping the next phase of Somalia’s national security approach. The goal is not simply to enter a town, raise a flag and depart. The goal is to restore legitimate authority, protect civilians, enable local administration, reopen roads, support humanitarian access and prevent Al-Shabaab from returning.
At the same time, partnership must continue to adapt. Somalia’s aim is not permanent dependence. It is a responsible transition in which Somali forces gradually take on greater responsibility while partners continue to provide targeted, coordinated and sustainable support. A premature withdrawal of assistance would risk opening gaps that Al-Shabaab would try to exploit. A conditions-based transition remains the most responsible course.
The ICG report is right to underline the importance of military reform and stronger coordination between the Federal Government and Federal Member States. The Ministry agrees that no durable security outcome can be achieved without closer cooperation at every level of government. National security must remain above political rivalry. Al-Shabaab gains when Somali institutions are divided; it weakens when they act together.
For that reason, the Ministry of Defence continues to support a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. The fight against Al-Shabaab is not the duty of soldiers alone. It requires local administrations, religious scholars, elders, youth, women, civil society, media, humanitarian actors and international partners. Terrorism is defeated not only when fighters are removed from the battlefield, but when communities no longer fear, fund or tolerate them.
The International Crisis Group has added to an important debate. Its report identifies real risks and challenges that merit attention. But Somalia’s story cannot be compressed into the word stalemate. It is the story of a state rebuilding itself while fighting terrorism, reopening roads while reforming its army, holding elections while conducting operations, and strengthening institutions while confronting an enemy determined to destroy them.
The map tells one part of the story.
The roads reopened tell another.
The districts voting tell another.
The soldiers holding ground tell another.
The communities returning to normal life tell another.
Together, they point to a Somalia that is not standing still, but moving through one of the most demanding phases of its security transition with determination, sacrifice and growing national capability.
Somalia’s struggle against terrorism is not defined by one map, one campaign or one moment of movement on the battlefield. It is defined by the steady building of a professional national defence force, the restoration of state authority, the reopening of strategic corridors, the protection of civilians and the strengthening of democratic governance.
Al-Shabaab seeks to cut communities off from the state. The Federal Government is reconnecting them.
Al-Shabaab seeks to replace civic life with fear. Somalia is restoring elections, local leadership and public participation.
Al-Shabaab seeks to erode trust in national institutions. The Ministry of Defence is building a force capable of defending the sovereignty, security and future of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
That is the broader story beyond the battlefield. And it is a story no map alone can fully capture.
_______________________________________
By Hanad Mohamed HusseinDirector of Communications and Public RelationsMinistry of Defence, Federal Government of Somalia[email protected]
