Somalia’s ex-president Farmaajo arrives in Mogadishu after two-year absence

Farmaajo Returns to a Changed Mogadishu — And a High-Stakes 2026 Race Begins

MOGADISHU — The political weather in Somalia shifted on Thursday with the return of former president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, widely known as Farmaajo, after more than two years abroad. He arrived to a rousing welcome at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport — lawmakers, veteran politicians, and clusters of supporters waving flags and phone cameras — and immediately became the most consequential opposition figure in the capital.

His timing is deliberate. Somalia is entering a bruising season of constitutional debate and early maneuvering for the 2026 presidential contest. Farmaajo’s presence changes both calculations and tone. This is not merely a homecoming; it is a reopening of a chapter that many Somalis thought had been closed, or at least dog-eared for later. The question, for a country still navigating insecurity, economic recovery, and a profound reimagining of its political architecture, is whether his return clarifies the path ahead — or complicates it.

Why his return matters now

Somalia’s politics run on a hybrid engine of personality, clan calculus, and policy disputes. Farmaajo, who governed from 2017 to 2022, embodies all three. His tenure was defined by high-octane nationalism, an assertive executive, fraught relations with some federal member states, and a high-profile legal victory in Somalia’s maritime case against Kenya. He cultivated strong ties with Turkey and Qatar and aligned with the Ethiopia–Eritrea détente at its peak, while clashing with segments of the Somali political class who saw his approach as over-centralizing and combative.

Since leaving office, Somalia has undergone meaningful shifts. The government in Mogadishu has pushed controversial constitutional amendments aimed at streamlining the system and, eventually, moving toward one-person-one-vote elections. Key regional administrations, notably Puntland State, objected to the process and pace. Meanwhile, the security file remains urgent: al-Shabab is bloodied but not broken; the African Union mission has been transitioning responsibilities; Somali forces are stretched; and international partners are debating what comes after the drawdown.

Against that background, Farmaajo’s potential roles are several: a presidential aspirant, a kingmaker knitting together a broad opposition bloc, or a spoiler forcing the government to recalibrate its constitutional push. His allies say he will begin meeting factions across Mogadishu, listening, and mapping the terrain. Even that choreography sends a message: the opposition intends to be coordinated, not just loud.

A capital that remembers, and recalibrates

In Mogadishu, memory is political currency. Many urban youth who supported Farmaajo once celebrated his strident anti-corruption rhetoric and tough posture toward foreign interference. Others recall the spring of 2021, when election delays and distrust tipped the city toward confrontation. The capital has learned, sometimes the hard way, that political brinkmanship carries a security premium.

Since 2022, Somalia also achieved a milestone on economic reform, reaching the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative. That win — secured under the current administration, but built on years of fiscal work — released the government from a mountain of arrears and unlocked longer-term financing. It is the kind of quiet success that doesn’t trend on TikTok but matters in classrooms, clinics, and payrolls. A re-politicized Mogadishu must now balance the scramble for 2026 with preserving those gains.

The constitutional fault line

The most immediate collision is over the constitution. Somalia has operated under a provisional charter since 2012. Attempts to finalize it have faltered over the architecture of federalism, the balance of power between the presidency and prime minister, and the mechanics of elections. In recent years, the government moved to consolidate executive authority and establish a more direct electoral model—moves sold as necessary to break free from the clannish horse-trading of the 4.5 formula. Critics call the process rushed and exclusionary, warning that centralization without consent will backfire.

Farmaajo’s re-entry will likely pull more opposition figures into a single tent. Whether he argues as a defender of federalism or as a pragmatist offering a different centralizing vision is an open question. He once favored strong federal control. Yet politics is elastic, and Somalia’s coalition math could nudge him toward building bridges with regions that clashed with him in the past. Watch for how Puntland State, Jubaland, and South West State position themselves in the weeks ahead. The first litmus test may be whether dissenting states and Mogadishu can agree on an inclusive roadmap for constitutional finalization that avoids a binary win-or-lose outcome.

Regional ripples and foreign friends

Somalia’s domestic drama rarely remains domestic. The region has been jittery since Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions and North Western State of Somalia’s dealmaking set off alarms in Mogadishu. Turkey’s deepening security partnership with Somalia and the UAE’s rising economic footprint add layers of rivalry and opportunity. Under Farmaajo, Mogadishu leaned hard into Ankara and Doha; under the current government, ties diversified but remained anchored in those relationships even as the UAE returned in force. If Farmaajo rebuilds a campaign, embassies here will quietly re-run their spreadsheets: who funds what, who trains whom, and what that means for security cooperation in 2026 and beyond.

Risk and opportunity

There is both promise and peril in a competitive field. On the upside, a credible opposition can force better governance, more transparent debate over the constitution, and a real conversation about security strategy that goes beyond slogans. If Farmaajo and his rivals can disagree without crisis, Somalia inches closer to normal politics — a rare commodity in a region where power struggles often unfold at gunpoint.

On the downside, political polarization can slow security operations, spook investors, and deepen regional rifts. The memory of 2021 should be caution enough. A capital already bracing for al-Shabab’s asymmetric warfare cannot afford a political vacuum. The choreography of the coming months matters: inclusive dialogue, clear ground rules for the constitutional process, and a shared timeline for 2026 are not luxuries but guardrails.

What to watch next

• Who joins his meetings: If Farmaajo’s first rounds include heavyweights from Puntland State or former rivals, expect faster consolidation of the opposition.
• Signals from Villa Somalia: A conciliatory tone on constitutional consultations would lower the temperature; a combative one could set the stage for stalemate.
• Security tempo: Any dip in operations or uptick in attacks will test whether politics is distracting from the front lines.
• Donor and regional messaging: Subtle shifts in support packages or training missions will reveal how partners read the new landscape.

In Somalia, politics often moves at the pace of the tea houses — quick debates, quicker rumors, long memories. But the stakes are not abstract. They are measured in the safety of a commuter bus on the K4 road, the salary of a police officer, the water pump in a village, the vote a young Somali hopes to one day cast directly. Farmaajo’s return is an inflection point, not a conclusion. The choice now facing Somalia’s leaders — across the aisle and across the country — is whether to turn that inflection into a more inclusive and predictable politics, or to replay old contests with higher volume.

For a nation that has survived so much, the path to 2026 will test not only who governs, but how.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.