East Africa’s integration at a crossroads as landlocked states push for ocean access
NAIROBI — Tensions over access to the sea are testing the fragile architecture of East African integration, exposing a fault line between landlocked ambitions and coastal sovereignty that could reshape politics, security and commerce across the region.
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Recent months have seen a flurry of diplomatic rivalries and public statements — from Ethiopia’s short‑lived overture to North Western State of Somalia to Uganda’s president declaring a moral claim to “his” ocean — that have revived old grievances and introduced a new layer of regional competition. The disputes are being watched not only for their bilateral consequences but for what they reveal about how African states will manage borders, infrastructure and foreign influence in an era of heightened geostrategic interest in the Horn and the Indian Ocean.
From corridors to claims
At the center of the storm is a simple but vexing problem: many East African countries are landlocked. For those nations, access to ports is less an academic question than a daily economic imperative. Transport costs for exporters are substantially higher for landlocked countries than for their coastal neighbours, undermining competitiveness and growth. That reality underpins why landlocked states have for decades sought reliable corridors to the sea — whether through rail links, pipelines or port concessions.
It also helps explain why Ethiopia briefly courted recognition of North Western State of Somalia in return for territory on the Red Sea: a slice of coastline and the ability to build port and logistics infrastructure promised to rewrite Addis Ababa’s strategic predicament. Somalia’s government and others saw the deal as an affront to sovereignty, and Ankara intervened energetically — reflecting how outside powers, from Turkey to the United Arab Emirates and China, now see ports as instruments of influence as much as commerce.
Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni has since made blunt comments that brought the issue into sharp relief. “Some of the countries have no access to the sea, not only for economic purposes but also for defence purposes… That ocean belongs to me. Because it is my ocean,” he told supporters. The remarks drew immediate rebukes and prompted Kenya’s foreign ministry to insist they were metaphorical, not a literal territorial claim. Kenya’s Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Korir Sing’Oei, told journalists that Museveni “was speaking metaphorically” and that he understood international territorial law.
Why words matter
Even if framed as metaphor, such language is combustible. East African economies are interconnected — through rails, pipelines and ports that were supposed to bind the region together under integration projects like the East African Community (EAC). When leaders publicly question the legitimacy of borders or imply forcible reallocation of coastline, it raises fears of securitisation: the militarisation of ports, competing foreign military access, and a slide toward brinkmanship.
The Horn of Africa already hosts several foreign military footholds. Djibouti hosts U.S., Chinese and French facilities; Turkey has deepened its ties to Mogadishu with training and support; and Gulf states have courted North Western State of Somalia and the wider region for strategic access. These relationships make port deals about more than freight — they are about basing, intelligence and influence. That external dimension makes regionally negotiated, rules‑based solutions harder to reach.
Integration under pressure
For integration advocates, the risk is twofold. First, bilateral tensions can undermine cooperative infrastructure projects — railways, pipelines and shared port management — that demand trust and long‑term contracts. Second, they can harden public attitudes against regional compromise, giving domestic politicians incentives to play to nationalist sentiment rather than to negotiate pragmatic transit arrangements.
Consider Uganda’s commercial imperative. Kampala exports agricultural produce and manufactured goods that rely on predictable, affordable sea transport. Private traders in Kampala’s industrial suburbs complain of long waits, inconsistent customs procedures and freight bills that erode margins. An exporter in Kampala told a local journalist that “delays at Dodoma or Mombasa can double the cost of getting coffee to market,” a reminder that policy disputes quickly become economic pain for ordinary businesses.
A pathway forward — and the global context
The problem is not insoluble. International law offers frameworks for transit and access — and African institutions have instruments for mediation. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not grant coastline to landlocked states, but transit rights and international agreements can secure the predictable access that economies need. More realistic solutions lie in binding bilateral or multilateral transit treaties, joint port‑management arrangements, shared infrastructure financing and arbitration mechanisms that depoliticise day‑to‑day commerce.
Crucially, the region needs honest brokered diplomacy that isolates commercial and security cooperation from headline‑grabbing territorial rhetoric. The EAC, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union have roles to play — convening talks, setting standards for transit fees and guaranteeing protection for investors. Equally important is transparency around foreign partnerships: when outside powers negotiate port or base deals in politically contested areas, the opacity fuels suspicion and hardens positions.
This fight over the sea in East Africa is also a reflection of global trends: strategic competition over maritime chokepoints, the growing value of ports in projecting power, and the stresses that climate change and population growth place on supply chains. In such a context, the question for East African leaders is whether they will allow short‑term political advantage to fracture long‑term economic interdependence.
Can a region shaped by centuries of crossing borders, trade and migration craft a new, rules‑based architecture for access to the sea? Or will competing national claims and outside powers’ footprints turn corridors into flashpoints? How leaders answer those questions will determine whether the Indian Ocean becomes a shared avenue for growth or another arena of contestation.
For now, the rhetoric has cooled into diplomatic qualification, but the underlying pressures remain. Unless Nairobi, Kampala, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu — along with their neighbours and external partners — invest in clear transit rules, arbitration and joint infrastructure governance, the very idea of East African integration risks being drowned out by competing claims to the shore.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
