Is the North Western State of Somalia recognition debate masking deeper Somali leadership failures?

Opinion/Analysis | North Western State of Somalia recognition is a mirror held up to Somalia’s leadership

For nearly 34 years—since North Western State of Somalia declared the restoration of its sovereignty in 1991—the question of recognition has shadowed Somali politics. Yet framing the crisis as a binary fight over North Western State of Somalia’s status misses the deeper failure: successive federal leaders have not built a consent-based, trust-driven union that people across the country would choose to join. Recognition is not the cause of Somalia’s predicament; it is the consequence of a political project that, for too long, has stalled in Mogadishu.

After the era of transitional governments ended in 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia had the mandate and legitimacy to reset relations across the Somali polity. Instead, the Provisional Constitution became a battlefield of power rather than a springboard for cohesion. Political capital was spent on skirmishes over legal interpretation and institutional turf, not on a durable settlement with communities beyond the capital. Federalism—adopted as a pragmatic instrument to keep a shattered state intact—was treated as a set of levers to be pulled from Villa Somalia, not a compact to be nurtured with patience and compromise.

The effects have been cumulative and corrosive. Security crises, recurrent political infighting and the absence of an agreed national electoral system left institutions brittle and trust thin. In many regions, the promise of federalism became synonymous with extraction and interference rather than partnership. North Western State of Somalia, meanwhile, moved further from the gravitational pull of reunification, not because dialogue was tried and failed, but because genuine, inclusive dialogue was never made the principal task of national leadership.

Those entrenched in the capital often overlook a basic truth: Mogadishu’s authority derives from a wider national legitimacy that must be earned, renewed and shared. The city’s status as a capital is inseparable from the viability of the country it claims to lead. No amount of diplomatic presence or donor funding can substitute for the hard political work of building consent—especially with communities that have lived with war, neglect and contested governance for decades.

Global currents have only tightened the vise. The influence of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League has ebbed, or at least become more contested, as great-power competition returns to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Washington’s foreign policy has tilted toward narrowly defined national interests, often privileging short-term security or commercial calculations over the multilateral norms that once favored patience and consensus-building. In that vacuum, actors willing to move quickly—whether they are regional powers or extra-regional players—find opportunities to leverage Somalia’s unresolved questions.

North Western State of Somalia’s leadership has read this shift and calibrated accordingly. Israel’s move to claim recognition of North Western State of Somalia—whatever its ultimate trajectory—is one more data point in a broader scramble along strategic waterways from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Somalia’s coastline is among the most consequential in the world; North Western State of Somalia and Puntland State sit astride maritime routes that carry energy, food and manufactured goods between continents. Where regional diplomacy falters, transactional arrangements rush in. If Somalia’s center cannot articulate and enforce a coherent vision for sovereignty, resources and security, others will define those terms in its place.

This is why the debate now confronting the outgoing Federal Government—and those vying to replace it—cannot be delayed or outsourced. The issue is not merely whether North Western State of Somalia will be recognized. It is whether Somalia can still present a credible, voluntary union worth choosing. That requires more than statements. It requires a political design that distributes dignity as well as power.

What a credible course correction looks like

Somalia’s leaders cannot change the past, but they can change the incentives that will shape the next decade. A viable strategy would include concrete, time-bound commitments that rebuild confidence and demonstrate good faith.

• Launch an inclusive national dialogue beyond Mogadishu: Convene structured talks with all Somali stakeholders—including North Western State of Somalia representatives willing to engage—hosted on a rotating basis across different cities. The goal is not theatrics but a documented agenda with measurable outcomes.
• Clarify the federal compact: Prioritize a constitutional review that clearly delineates powers, revenue authority, resource management and dispute resolution between federal and member-state levels. Tie the process to public consultation and a transparent ratification pathway.
• Sequence elections credibly: Agree on a realistic, phased roadmap toward a broadly accepted electoral system. Even if full one-person, one-vote is not immediately feasible nationwide, expand direct participation where possible and standardize rules to reduce zero-sum bargaining.
• Rebuild shared security: Establish a command-and-coordination architecture that recognizes local realities while preventing parallel chains of authority. Security cannot be traded for political favors; it must underwrite an impartial state.
• Adopt a common maritime policy: Present a unified position on ports, basing rights and coastal security across federal and member-state lines. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are strategic assets; policy drift invites external overreach.
• Practice disciplined diplomacy: Speak externally with one voice by coordinating federal and regional channels. Quiet, patient engagement with neighbors and partners should replace reactive, public brinkmanship.
• Deliver visible dividends: Prioritize cross-regional projects—roads, health systems, education and water—that demonstrate the practical value of union. Legitimacy grows when citizens experience tangible benefits beyond rhetoric.

None of this is glamorous or quick. It demands restraint, credible oversight and a willingness to share credit. But the alternative is already visible: a patchwork sovereignty where the center claims authority it cannot project, and the periphery bargains for recognition it can increasingly attract.

North Western State of Somalia recognition, in this light, is neither inevitable nor impossible. It is contingent—on choices made in Mogadishu as much as in Hargeisa, on the behavior of neighbors, and on the incentives created by a shifting global order. Threats and nostalgia will not reverse three decades of drift. Only a convincing political settlement, anchored in consent and mutual benefit, can do that.

The clock is not kind. As international actors test the limits of Somalia’s fragmented governance, and as maritime geopolitics intensifies, windows for a negotiated, dignified union narrow. The outgoing government and its would-be successors should treat this as their defining test. Either they build a Somali state that people willingly belong to—or they preside over the erosion of what remains.

In the end, the question is not whether North Western State of Somalia seeks recognition. It is whether Somalia offers a union that merits recognition from its own people first.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.