Former Jubaland Minister Says Somalia Defeated in Lower Juba, Demands New Gedo Administration

Somalia’s Fragile Federal Compact Tested Again as Jubaland Rift Deepens

When Cabdirashiid Janan, once Jubaland’s security minister and now describing himself as the intelligence chief for Gedo, stood before supporters in Beled-Hawo this week and declared that the federal government had been “defeated” in Lower Juba, he did more than score a rhetorical point. He crystallised a slow-burning crisis at the heart of Somalia’s experiment with federalism — a contest over territory, revenue and the meaning of sovereignty that is rippling across the country and the wider Horn of Africa.

What was said — and why it matters

“The people of Gedo must prepare for a new Jubaland administration. Lower Juba is under Ahmed Madobe, who holds military power and has rejected the Federal Government,” Janan told a crowd in Beled-Hawo, a dusty border town that has long been a hinge between Somalia and Kenya. His comments, aimed at mobilising political support in the Gedo region and naming Garbaharey as a future centre of regional authority, underline the persistent rivalry between Jubaland’s leadership and Mogadishu.

Janan’s message is blunt: the federal centre does not control the south, and Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe — who retains a powerful militia presence around Kismayo and other Lower Juba towns — is effectively the dominant actor there. Whether Janan’s remarks signal an organised secessionist push, a political gambit or simply loud posturing is unclear. What is obvious is that the ingredients for wider instability remain: competing claims to legitimacy, armed regional forces, and the high stakes tied to ports and cross-border trade.

Roots of the dispute

The Jubaland conflict is a thread in Somalia’s broader struggle to fuse decades of clan politics, armed movements and donor-engineered state-building into a durable federal system. Jubaland itself emerged after 2013 as a bargaining outcome between local leaders, federal authorities and regional neighbours. Kismayo, its regional capital, is a prize — a major port whose customs revenue is a lifeline for whichever authority controls it.

President Madobe has cultivated a base and a force capable of defending what he sees as the region’s autonomy. Mogadishu, for its part, has long questioned his legitimacy and the parallel security structures that operate outside federal control. Those tensions burst into the open periodically — through contested elections, accusations of foreign meddling, and sporadic military standoffs — and they have now resurfaced in the form of Janan’s public declaration.

On the ground in Gedo

For ordinary people in Beled-Hawo and Garbaharey, the political debate is less constitutional than practical. “We worry about trade and safety,” said a merchant in Beled-Hawo who asked to be named Ali for fear of reprisals. “When governors change or troops move, the market shuts and prices jump. We want peace more than politics.” Locals report the increased visibility of militia checkpoints and the occasional rumour of troop movements — small signs that can herald larger shifts.

Gedo and Lower Juba sit astride key transit routes, with informal cross-border commerce with Kenya and Ethiopia sustaining livelihoods. That economic web makes the region both resilient and vulnerable: resilient because communities have adapted to limited state services, vulnerable because contestation over revenue and control can disrupt daily life and invite criminal or extremist exploitation.

Regional and international reverberations

The stakes extend far beyond village markets. International actors watch the Jubaland-Mogadishu standoff closely. Kismayo’s port is not only a local asset; it is a gateway for humanitarian aid, commercial imports and — potentially — illicit trade. Regional capitals in the Horn of Africa, and partners such as Kenya, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, have in recent years played roles as security backers, brokers or economic partners in Somalia’s federal matrix. Any shift in control could trigger diplomatic tug-of-wars as much as local unrest.

Moreover, the persistent fissures in Somalia echo a broader regional pattern: states grappling with decentralisation while trying to consolidate authority in the face of armed non-state actors. From Libya to eastern DR Congo, decentralised power structures can offer local stability yet also fragment national strategies for development and security.

What this could mean for counter-extremism and governance

Competing authorities and unmonitored armed groups create openings that extremist outfits such as al-Shabab can exploit. While neither Jubaland nor the federal government is synonymous with stability, a fracturing of governance would make coordinated security operations against militants more difficult and could disrupt humanitarian aid delivery to vulnerable populations.

Equally important is the question of legitimacy. If regional administrations continue to assert autonomy through force or unilateral declarations, they risk undermining the delicate bargains that underwrite Somalia’s federal project. Conversely, heavy-handed attempts by Mogadishu to impose authority could inflame local grievances and harden regional resistance.

Paths forward — and the hard choices

Somalia’s leaders face a narrow path. Meaningful negotiation requires recognition of local power realities while protecting national cohesion and the rule of law. That calls for transparent revenue-sharing agreements, credible security-sector reforms that bring militias under accountable command, and neutral mediation — ideally from respected Somali elders and international partners — to prevent miscalculations that could lead to violence.

But political deals alone will not suffice. For many Somalis the immediate questions are practical: will their children go to school, will the market stay open, will aid workers reach families in need? Policies must translate into visible improvements in basic services to blunt the appeal of armed solutions.

Questions for readers and policymakers

• Can Somalia’s federal model accommodate powerful regional actors without sliding into fragmentation?
• How should international partners balance support for a central government with recognition of local realities on the ground?
• What steps can be taken now to insulate humanitarian operations and civilian life from the fallout of political brinkmanship?

Cabdirashiid Janan’s proclamation may be intended to rally supporters in Gedo — but it also serves as a reminder of a larger truth: Somalia’s stability rests on bargains that are always provisional. Whether those bargains will be revised at a negotiating table or reset on a battlefield remains to be seen. The answer will shape not only the fate of Jubaland and Lower Juba, but the trajectory of a country still trying to stitch itself back together after decades of conflict.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.