Iran’s Uniquely Complex Power Structure: A Closer Look

Iran elevated Mojtaba Khamenei to supreme leader following the Feb. 28 killing of his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a U.S.-Israeli strike that also killed about 40 senior officials, a move intended to signal constitutional continuity in a precarious moment.

The strike that assassinated the supreme leader aimed to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spur a popular push to unseat those in power. Debate over the strategy’s wisdom will continue, but authorities moved quickly to install Mojtaba Khamenei to show the state still functioned within its constitutional framework.

Iran’s post-1979 constitution, grounded in the dominant Shia tradition, vests ultimate authority in religious jurists until the return of the 12th imam, believed to have gone into hiding in 874. That design puts clerical power at the apex of the state.

Supreme Leader

Placing religious authority above all other offices is why Iran is often described as a theocracy. The supreme leader holds direct or indirect sway over state matters from foreign policy to domestic politics and is appointed for life, yet the system runs on a dual track: republican institutions alongside clerical bodies.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini outlined his governing vision in exile, largely in Iraq. He held that society’s laws should be those of Sharia alone and sidelined theologians and clerics who disagreed, undercutting space for either religious or secular opposition.

Khomeini’s death—the first major test of the new order—prompted immediate, significant constitutional amendments. His personal religious standing had conferred immense power; the role was recast to rest more on political control and institutional backing.

Assembly of Experts and Guardian Council

To smooth leadership succession, revisions clarified how a successor would be chosen and transitions managed. The Assembly of Experts elects, oversees and can remove the supreme leader, though the constitution gives the sitting leader decisive influence over selecting his successor—one reason Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise was no surprise to close observers.

Mojtaba Khamenei was elected supreme leader following the killing of his father on Feb. 28.

All assembly candidates must be qualified clerics, and the Guardian Council—largely controlled by the supreme leader—must approve their eligibility. The council can veto parliament’s legislation, supervises elections, and operates within the judiciary, embedding clerical oversight deep inside republican institutions.

President and parliament

Iran is constitutionally a republic, but its democratic standing is weak. The 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked Iran 154th of 167 countries, classifying it as an authoritarian regime.

Elections are held for the parliament, or Majles, and the president—described as head of state in the source—is popularly elected to manage the government’s day-to-day administration. The presidency is formally the second-most powerful post after the supreme leader.

In practice, the office has narrowed. It is the arena where reformists and conservatives most visibly clash. Current president Masoud Pezeshkian is a reformist; his limited leverage showed when he urged Tehran to avoid escalating tensions with Arab neighbors, only to be swiftly rebuked.

Expediency Council

Long-running friction between parliament and conservative clerical bodies led to the 1989 creation of the Expediency Council to resolve disputes between lawmakers and the supreme leader–controlled Guardian Council. Over time, it became another tool for the leader and allies to monitor reformists.

Official turnout in the 2024 legislative elections was 41%, the lowest since the 1979 revolution. Many analysts cited first-time pre-registration and the disqualification of most moderate and reformist figures as factors that depressed participation. In a country where about 40% of people are under 25—some involved in recent protests—questions about regime legitimacy persist.

National security and intelligence

Ali Larijani’s killing leaves a major gap. As security chief, he was a powerful operator directing Tehran’s war effort, and his assassination could weigh more heavily on the conflict than Ayatollah Khamenei’s death.

Both men were shaped by the Iran-Iraq War and by Tehran’s long confrontation with Israel and the United States. Whoever replaces Larijani will emerge from the current fight hardened, and the system’s resilience is likely to influence the region for years.

Iran’s armed forces total close to one million personnel, placing the country 16th in the Global Firepower index. The military’s distinctive feature is its deliberately complex, parallel structure: the regular army, or Artesh, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose mandate is to safeguard the revolution and whose reach extends deep into the economy and politics.

Within the IRGC, multiple divisions are designed to deter coups and block infiltration. The Quds Force—named for Jerusalem—supports non-state actors beyond Iran’s borders, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, among others, bringing it into direct conflict not only with Israel but also with several neighbors.

The Supreme National Security Council, added to the constitution in 1989, sets national security policy within parameters defined by the supreme leader. Combined with nearly 20 intelligence agencies, this architecture keeps the leadership’s grip tight.

Israel’s strategy of targeting top figures is dramatic and devastating. The structure described here suggests Iran’s system is built to endure. The government’s oppressive nature complicates outside analysis, but its institutions reveal a project driven not only by ideology, as the source frames it, but by regime survival more than four decades after the revolution.