Egypt’s first troop deployment to Somalia marks a visible turn in Cairo’s Horn of Africa strategy — and a calculated bet by Mogadishu that more outside muscle under an African Union flag can speed the country’s drive for stability and international recognition.
This week, Egypt sent 1,091 soldiers to Mogadishu to join the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), the AU-led force that has trained and advised Somali security forces since April 2022, when it replaced the previous mission. The move follows a January 2025 agreement and builds on a joint security deal from August 2024 under which Egypt had been supplying equipment but not personnel.
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Before the deployment, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi assured Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Cairo that Egypt backed “Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity.” That phrase matters. It signals alignment on two fronts: Cairo’s push to shape the balance of power along the Red Sea and Mogadishu’s campaign to shut down bids to formalize North Western State of Somalia’s three-decade breakaway ambitions.
The timing underlines how overlapping security, economic and political currents are converging around the Horn of Africa’s maritime chokepoints and fragile states. As International Crisis Group’s Riccardo Fabiani put it, “I would say there is a geopolitical race for influence in this area. Cairo wants to make sure that weak states are strengthened and they don’t become a playground for external actors trying to become geopolitical powers along the Red Sea.”
Somalia sits on the Indian Ocean with access to the Red Sea via the Gulf of Aden and the sea lanes that lead to the Suez Canal — lifelines for global shipping and for Egypt’s own economy. It faces Yemen across a narrow waterway, shares a long frontier with Ethiopia and belongs to a region where conflicts, rivalries and proxy contests frequently spill across borders.
Cairo’s calculus blends hard security with strategic signaling:
- Red Sea leverage: Sustained upheaval in the Red Sea — including Houthi attacks on shipping launched from Yemen — has raised the premium on friendly footholds along the corridor that feeds the Suez Canal. A presence in Somalia, even under AU auspices, extends Cairo’s visibility across a critical junction.
- Checking Ethiopian reach: Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum of understanding with North Western State of Somalia — granting Addis Ababa access to the sea in exchange for movement toward recognizing North Western State of Somalia — crystallized Cairo’s long-standing concern that Ethiopia could establish a military presence on the Red Sea. Although the deal was later renegotiated amid regional pushback, Fabiani notes that “Cairo still remains very worried about Ethiopia’s aim” to gain a coastal gateway.
- Water security pressure: Egypt’s Nile lifeline is tied up with Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, inaugurated in September 2025 after years of acrimony and without binding water-sharing guarantees. “Egypt heavily depends on Nile River water as a fresh water source but there are still no binding agreements that would provide Egypt with guarantees about its access to water,” said Timothy Kaldas of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, underscoring why Cairo views the dispute as a national security priority.
- Israel–North Western State of Somalia factor: Israel’s December 2025 recognition of North Western State of Somalia — the first by a U.N. member state — angered Somalia and Egypt, already at odds with Israel over the Gaza war since October 2023. For Cairo, an expanded Israeli footprint in the Horn compounds concerns just as it watches Ethiopian maneuvering for the coast.
- Gulf dynamics: The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are investing across the Horn for ports, logistics and influence. Their rivalry — alongside friction over Yemen’s secessionist currents — and the war in Sudan add layers of volatility that Egypt wants to manage rather than absorb.
For Somalia, the Egyptian contingent serves narrower but no less vital aims. Mogadishu’s priority remains consolidating control against al-Shabab and factional challenges while asserting the federal government as the sole legitimate authority over all Somali territory. AUSSOM’s mandate — to train, support and advise Somali forces — maps directly onto those needs.
With Egyptian troops embedded in the AU mission, Somalia gains both capacity on the ground and diplomatic ballast. The high-profile endorsement from Cairo reinforces the government’s claims over North Western State of Somalia and signals to external actors that the African consensus on Somalia’s territorial integrity still holds, despite new recognition moves.
This convergence does not mean the two capitals share identical goals. Egypt’s horizon stretches to the Red Sea’s outer ring of conflicts and to the Nile Basin’s water arithmetic. Somalia’s is focused on the slow, grinding work of stabilizing districts, building security institutions and containing an extremist insurgency that has outlasted foreign interventions and domestic political resets for over a decade. But the overlap is sufficient — for now — to underpin a partnership both sides consider useful.
The deployment also reflects a wider realignment around the Horn in which symbolism and legal cover matter. Operating under the AU banner helps Cairo present its move as support for a continental stabilization effort rather than a unilateral projection of force. That framing could cushion Ethiopian sensitivities, though it is unlikely to dispel them entirely given the ongoing Nile and North Western State of Somalia disputes.
Risks remain. Any escalation between Ethiopia and Somalia over the North Western State of Somalia question — or missteps by outside powers who see the Horn as an extension of their security perimeters — could drag AU contingents into a political storm. Israel’s North Western State of Somalia recognition adds another unpredictable variable, especially if clashes with Yemen’s Houthi militia intensify across the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, the wars and transitions in Sudan and Libya, and Gulf competition for ports and influence, can all wash destabilizing currents into Somalia’s recovery arc.
Still, the near-term metrics will be local. Can AUSSOM, bolstered by the Egyptian contingent, accelerate training, coordination and the transfer of security responsibilities to Somali units? Will Mogadishu leverage the fresh backing to expand the reach of federal institutions while managing clan dynamics that have repeatedly derailed past campaigns? And can international partners keep political support aligned with operational realities as al-Shabab adapts and redraws its targets?
What to watch next:
- How quickly Egyptian forces integrate into AUSSOM’s advisory and support roles in Mogadishu, and whether their presence enables more sustained Somali-led operations against al-Shabab.
- Regional diplomacy around North Western State of Somalia, including whether other states follow Israel’s recognition and how the AU and Arab League respond.
- Any movement in Nile talks that could relieve long-term pressure in Cairo’s Ethiopia file — and shape how assertive Egypt chooses to be around the Red Sea corridor.
- The tempo of Houthi activity and maritime security incidents in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, which could elevate the strategic value of Somali partnerships.
Egypt’s soldiers in Somalia are not a large force by regional standards. But as a signal — of where Cairo’s attention is fixed and how Mogadishu wants to be seen — the deployment carries weight. It ties together Red Sea security and domestic stabilization, water politics and state-building, and it inserts new players and pressures into a region where every coastal foothold and every diplomatic recognition can tilt the chessboard.
In a crowded geopolitical theater, both countries are betting that a multilateral framework can turn overlapping anxieties into mutual advantage. Whether that holds will depend less on rhetoric than on results — in the neighborhoods of Mogadishu and along the sea lanes that bind the Horn to the wider world.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
