The Growing Alliance Between Somalia and Turkey: Unveiling the Strategic Motivations
In October 2024, Turkey’s bigwig, Recep Erdogan, launched a seismic research vessel bound for Somalia, as captured by Turkish Presidency/Murat Kula/Handout/Anadolu through Getty Images.
Turkey’s been dialing up its connection with Somalia lately. They’re backing Somalia in safeguarding its seas and have penned a pact to scout for oil and gas along the East African country’s coast.
Chatter has also surfaced about Turkey setting up a missile and rocket testing ground in Somalia.
These moves highlight Turkey’s bold dreams and economic pursuits in the Horn of Africa.
Recently, Turkey’s been boosting their gear exports to the area. They’ve dispatched drones to tussles in Libya and Ethiopia often.
I’ve dived into Turkey’s past and present shenanigans in Somalia to get the lowdown on Ankara’s game plan. My view is that Turkey’s play here is multi-layered: from chasing clout on the world stage to strategic regional recalibrations.
Opening a training base in Mogadishu has extended Turkey’s reach into Africa, beyond into the Indian Ocean vibe. Their involvement in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict with drones showcases their deepening local impact.
Somalia’s Mojo
Turkey got curious about Somalia around 2010-2011. Somalia, reeling from decades of chaos and global shrug-offs, faced fresh terror group threats and a famine that wiped out over 250,000 folks.
For Turkey, Somalia was a golden chance to plant its flag in a crucial location, boosting its persona in Africa and on the world stage.
Firstly, big players couldn’t care less about Somalia, beyond anti-piracy patrols and a bit of U.S. war-on-terror focus. Turkey spotted a window to flaunt leading in a global crisis glare.
Second, with the Arab Spring drawing eyes, Somalia’s troubles were fading memories for the globe. Turkey’s decision-makers grabbed this vacuum to gain international kudos and highlight their presence.
Turkey navigated Somalia’s challenges with a many-sided approach: humanitarian cash, diplomacy, and bucks for business, knitting support for governmental and armed forces rebuilding.
Inside Story
Turkey’s bankroll and tact towards Somalia spring from both neighborhood politics and homegrown motivations.
Regionally, from 2016 to 2021, Turkey was eyeballing Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Somalia became the sparring ring for influence and rivalry.
Back home, Turkey’s endeavors have burnished the ruling party’s badge. Their Horn of Africa intrigues click with the cash flow dreams of various business power blocks, like builders and defense allies tied to top echelons.
Somalia’s story is a feather in Turkey’s ruling party hat, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party). This conservative party has an Islamist groove. Many party fans consider charity acts (sadaqa) crucial for devout Muslims. Therefore, Turkey’s overseas and homeland moves support struggling Muslim communities like Somalia, painting them as both a political and kindhearted win. The Turkish populace nods in agreement.
Turkey swiftly expanded its defense and security ties. Turkey’s Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı oversees this, reporting straight to Erdogan since it got VIP status in 2017 under the presidency’s helm.
This expedited defense dealings—a linchpin of Ankara’s foreign choreography.
Turkey has also jumped at the energy chance, yearning to be a heavyweight energy hub, with eyes on Somalia’s offshore treasures. As emerging nations do, Turkey craves energy, explaining their July 2024 oil and gas plot with Somalia.
Pivot Moment
Ankara’s defense pact in February 2024 was a handshake of new depth in Turkey-Somalia bonds.
This scheme will train and arm the Somali navy, also aiding their oceanic patrol along its massive shoreline. Turkey’s playbook here tilts toward maritime acts, a strategic call given Somalia’s shaky territorial command.
This scheme reacts to shifting regional tides and ongoing power layout in the Horn of Africa.
Somalia’s leap to stoke diplomatic and defense friendships with Turkey needs a read through this lens.
Edited by: Ali Musa
alimusa@axadletimes.com
Axadle international–Monitoring