In Mogadishu’s tightening political season, former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmaajo, has reemerged with a packed schedule: meetings with supporters, quiet conversations with media figures and political brokers, and visible outreach to segments of the opposition. His renewed profile is unmistakable. But it also reveals a telling split-screen in Somalia’s politics ahead of a potential 2026 presidential contest: the energy of a comeback bid versus the structural headwinds of coalition math, federal dynamics and unresolved grievances from his years in office.
That tension defines the question at the heart of Somalia’s political conversation. For loyalists, Farmaajo still represents sovereignty-first leadership and a hard line on corruption. For many others—federal member state leaders, opposition camps and a share of civil society—his return reads more as positioning than probability, especially within Somalia’s complex, indirect electoral system where coalitions, timing and trust count as much as popular appeal.
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To understand why the pathway is so narrow, it helps to recall the dual legacy of his tenure: a presidency that arrived in 2017 on a wave of national expectation and left behind a more polarized political arena, punctuated by constitutional brinkmanship and strained relations with federal member states.
A COMEBACK MEETS THE COALITION MATH
Somalia’s indirect system—brokered through layered negotiations among federal and regional actors—rewards bridge-builders. It penalizes zero-sum tacticians. That reality poses the central test for any former leader seeking a second act. Durable success depends on assembling cross-clan alliances, reassuring skeptical regional presidents and convincing a wary political class that the next chapter will differ from the last.
Farmaajo’s current visibility suggests intent. The obstacles, however, are institutional: shifting alliances, hardened memories of past confrontations and the emergence of alternative power centers, including figures within his own broader political network. Momentum alone will not overcome those structural limits.
FEDERALISM UNDER STRAIN
Somalia’s federal project is not just a constitutional blueprint; it is a confidence-building process after state collapse. During Farmaajo’s tenure, relations with key federal member states—including Puntland State and Jubaland—deteriorated into cycles of mistrust and confrontation. Disputes that could have moved to structured dialogue too often escalated, breeding suspicion about resource allocation, security deployments and the balance of authority between Mogadishu and regional capitals.
That perception—of centralization by other means—undercut a basic requirement of federalism: shared ownership. In fragile settings, treating regional leaders as adversaries rather than partners can deliver short-term leverage but erodes the long-term cohesion required for constitutional reform, credible elections and coordinated security efforts.
SECURITY: PRIORITY AND POLITICIZATION
Supporters of Farmaajo cite his emphasis on the Somali National Army and efforts to assert sovereignty over security policy. Yet critics argue that strategy blurred into politics. Allegations of politicized deployments, friction among security agencies and the sense that intelligence and military tools sometimes served elite competition complicated the fight against Al-Shabab.
No single administration can defeat an entrenched insurgency. Still, the core lesson is clear: counterterrorism requires a united political front and institutional insulation from electoral maneuvering. When rival elites contest command, the security architecture absorbs the shock—and the public pays the price.
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COST OF POPULIST POSTURE
Somalia sits in a demanding neighborhood. Maritime disputes with Kenya, friction within regional blocs and the constant balancing act with external partners require steady, calibrated diplomacy. Farmaajo’s sovereignty-forward message resonated domestically, but critics contend it sometimes morphed into confrontational posture that reduced maneuvering space in a region where quiet, sustained engagement is often more productive than rhetorical escalation.
Somalia’s strategic geography magnifies both risk and opportunity. Success depends on continuity, consensus and institutions that outlive any one leader—not on foreign policy tethered to the rhythms of domestic political competition.
POWER, PERSONNEL AND INSTITUTIONS
Perhaps the most consequential critique of the Farmaajo years is the charge of personalization of power. Admirers saw a reform-minded presidency surrounded by loyalists. Opponents saw an insular circle that concentrated decision-making and sidelined formal checks. Figures like former intelligence chief Fahad Yasin became lightning rods in this debate, frequently cited by critics as evidence that informal influence outpaced institutional process.
In states rebuilding from collapse, personality-driven governance invites instability. Durable legitimacy flows from transparent, rules-based institutions—judiciaries that adjudicate rather than arbitrate politics, parliaments that legislate rather than litigate power struggles and security services that serve the state rather than individuals.
THE 2021 CRISIS AND THE WEIGHT OF PRECEDENT
The most destabilizing moment of Farmaajo’s tenure came in 2021, when parliament voted to extend the presidential mandate beyond its constitutional limit. Armed units aligned with rival elites took positions in the capital. The reversal that followed prevented deeper crisis, but the damage—eroded trust, weakened norms and alarm among international partners—has lingered.
Precedent matters. In fragile democracies, even a brief departure from constitutional boundaries can echo for years. Any leader seeking another mandate must provide convincing assurances that lessons were learned and that guardrails—not personalities—will define the next chapter.
POLARIZATION AS A POLITICAL LIABILITY
Polarization is not a uniquely Somali phenomenon, but its cost is higher here. It slows reform, complicates security coordination and discourages investment. The memory of bruising federal-state standoffs, sharpened clan grievances and brinkmanship still informs today’s coalition thinking. Reintroducing a figure tied—fairly or not—to those rifts risks relitigating the past rather than consolidating the future.
WHAT A VIABLE RETURN WOULD REQUIRE
Somalia’s debate should rise above personalities and focus on governing philosophy. Whether led by Farmaajo or a rival, the next administration will be judged by its ability to replace confrontation with consensus and rhetoric with results. For any contender, three tests stand out:
- Federalism in practice: codify shared revenue, clarify security roles and resolve intergovernmental disputes through rules, not force or fiat.
- Security insulation: professionalize command, depoliticize intelligence and align all actors under a single national strategy against Al-Shabab.
- Constitutional discipline: commit publicly and credibly to timelines, processes and precedents that no administration can bend for short-term gain.
A FORWARD-LOOKING IMPERATIVE
Somalia’s institutions remain young; peace and growth are real but fragile. The margin for error is thin. The country needs leadership that treats dissent as dialogue, federalism as partnership and power as stewardship. That standard will challenge every aspirant in 2026. It is also the only path to a politics that lowers the temperature, raises competence and builds trust at home and abroad.
Farmaajo’s resurgence is a political fact. Whether it becomes a governing possibility depends on whether Somalia’s power brokers see more value in revisiting a polarizing model or investing in a broader, steadier compact. The lesson of the past decade is unambiguous: personality can mobilize, but only institutions can stabilize. The more the next chapter is written by rules instead of rivalries, the better the odds that Somalia’s fragile progress hardens into something durable.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
