Somalia and Uganda security ministers meet to boost bilateral security cooperation

Uganda and Somalia tighten security ties after joint gains against al‑Shabaab

A Kampala meeting with eyes on intelligence, training, and the front lines

Kampala—Somalia and Uganda have moved to deepen their security partnership after a fresh battlefield gain in southern Somalia, with both governments framing the moment as a chance to accelerate counterterrorism coordination in the Horn of Africa.

On Tuesday in Kampala, Somalia’s Minister of Internal Security, Gen. Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail Fartaag, met Uganda’s Minister of Security, Jim Katugugu Muhwezi, for talks that focused on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, and capacity-building for security forces. Somali officials cast the discussions as part of a broader push to lock in gains against al‑Shabaab and fortify institutions tasked with holding reclaimed ground.

Uganda, one of the most experienced troop contributors to African Union operations in Somalia since 2007, reaffirmed its commitment to work with Mogadishu under the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Uganda’s role has evolved over the years—from clearing operations under AMISOM, to transition planning under ATMIS, and now to stabilization-focused tasks alongside Somali forces. Tuesday’s encounter underscored that Kampala still sees Somalia’s security as deeply tied to its own.

A turning point on the Shabelle

The meeting came just days after Ugandan troops serving under AUSSOM, operating alongside the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), recaptured Awdheegle, a strategic farming town on the Shabelle River roughly an hour’s drive from Mogadishu. The joint operation, concluded Sunday, October 5, is part of the third phase of “Operation Silent Storm,” a campaign aimed at peeling back al‑Shabaab’s presence across southern Somalia’s vital riverine belt.

Military sources said the push in Awdheegle dismantled trenches, tunnels, and hideouts left by al‑Shabaab. The geography matters: the Lower Shabelle region is Somalia’s breadbasket, with irrigation channels and farm-to-market roads that have long been exploited by militants to tax trade, extract cash from farmers, and stage ambushes on supply routes. Securing towns like Awdheegle is less about planting a flag than it is about reopening roads, protecting harvests, and giving local administrations the breathing space to function.

Every advance in Lower Shabelle carries a familiar challenge. Holding ground requires reliable police, courts, and local governance—backstopped by steady pay for security forces, predictable logistics, and a social contract that convinces residents the state can outlast the insurgency. In Somalia, the follow-through is often the hardest part of the fight.

Why this matters beyond Somalia

For Uganda, Somalia’s resilience is a national security issue. Al‑Shabaab has demonstrated the capacity to strike beyond Somalia, targeting Uganda and Kenya in retaliation for military deployments. The group’s media operations and online propaganda aim to keep pressure on troop-contributing states, disrupt regional diplomacy, and exploit political transitions. Across the Horn, Kenya and Ethiopia have grappled with cross-border incursions and the economic aftershocks of insecurity—more expensive insurance for cargo, cautious investors, and disrupted trade corridors.

From a global perspective, the stakes are equally clear. The Horn of Africa borders the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes. Even intermittent instability can ripple through supply chains—from East African agricultural exports to container traffic destined for Europe and Asia. Stability in southern Somalia is not only a local concern; it touches energy routes, maritime security, and the cost of doing business for companies operating from Mombasa to Dubai.

The long arc of Uganda’s role

Uganda’s military footprint in Somalia is one of the most enduring in contemporary African peace operations. Since its first deployment in 2007 under AMISOM, Kampala has rotated thousands of troops through some of the most difficult terrain in South-Central Somalia—Mogadishu’s urban battlefields, the scrublands of Lower Shabelle, and the ambush-prone roads connecting district capitals. Ugandan commanders have learned—sometimes at great cost—how to counter roadside bombs, build local rapport, and coordinate with Somali units that vary in experience and kit.

With the African Union mission reconfigured as AUSSOM, and Somali forces increasingly at the forefront, regional actors are recalibrating. The template today is less about large forward operating bases and more about nimble operations, targeted intelligence, and stabilization packages that can move quickly behind the front lines. That means training police units who will stay when the soldiers move on, supporting district administrators, and protecting the schools and clinics that signal a return to normal life.

Inside the Kampala talks

Officials familiar with Tuesday’s meeting described a pragmatic agenda: accelerating real-time intelligence sharing, expanding training for Somali security forces, and coordinating on counter-IED capabilities. The two ministers reviewed progress under AUSSOM, assessed gaps in logistics and airlift, and discussed how to streamline joint planning so that Somali commanders can bring pressure to bear in multiple districts at once.

For Gen. Fartaag, the visit was also about gratitude and momentum—thanking Uganda for its support while pushing for deeper collaboration at a moment when the battlefield narrative is favorable. For Minister Muhwezi, it was a chance to stress that Uganda’s commitment endures, and that regional stability is a shared project—with dividends measured not only in military wins but in schools reopened, markets buzzing, and families choosing to stay rather than flee.

What to watch next

• Holding Awdheegle: Securing the town’s approaches and keeping supply routes open will test joint operations and the speed of civilian stabilization efforts.
• Police and justice: Quick deployment of trained police and accessible courts will determine whether residents view the state as a reliable alternative to militant “taxation” and rough justice.
• Intelligence fusion: How quickly Kampala and Mogadishu can integrate intelligence feeds and respond to threats across district lines will shape al‑Shabaab’s room to maneuver.
• Funding and fatigue: International support—financial, technical, and political—remains crucial. The risk is not just a budget shortfall; it’s the erosion of political will if quick wins don’t translate into lasting calm.
• Militant adaptation: Al‑Shabaab has a long record of retreating, regrouping, and striking back asymmetrically. Expect greater reliance on IEDs and targeted assassinations if territorial losses mount.

A measured step, not mission accomplished

Somalia’s security story has never turned on a single operation or summit. Progress tends to look like this: a town retaken, a road reopened, a joint patrol that goes right, a community brave enough to report a suspicious face. The Kampala meeting and the Awdheegle advance fit that pattern—modest steps that matter because they are linked, and because they hint at a maturing partnership between a frontline Somali state and a seasoned Ugandan force that has, for nearly two decades, been part of Somalia’s long climb back.

The question now is whether the machinery around the soldiers—intelligence officers, engineers, police, prosecutors, and local administrators—can move fast enough to turn military progress into everyday security. In Somalia, and across the region, that is how victories are kept—and how they are often lost.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.