Saudi Arabia is knitting together an ambitious web of defense partnerships stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, a bid to harden regional security as faith in Washington’s umbrella frays and rival Gulf capitals jostle for influence. From talks with Egypt and a potential pact with Somalia to deepening ties with Pakistan and possible alignment with Turkey, the moves revisit a familiar idea with new urgency: an “Islamic NATO.”
The latest stitch came in Davos, where Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan met Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum. Riyadh confirmed the discussion covered a range of issues. It is highly likely the ministers revisited US President Donald Trump’s invitations to his Board of Peace — which both have accepted — and the contours of a new defense pact between their countries.
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Somalia could be next. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is expected in Riyadh to sign a defense deal. If folded into a Saudi-Egypt agreement, Somalia’s inclusion would extend the pact’s reach to the African shore of the Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. That would add strategic depth along a corridor critical for global shipping and energy flows.
Overlaying those efforts is another track: Bloomberg has reported that Turkey is increasingly interested in joining the “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” that Saudi Arabia signed with Pakistan in September 2025. Advocates have framed a Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey alignment — layered atop existing security understandings — as a credible counterweight in a region of fragile deterrence and proliferating crises.
“This would not be a symbolic bloc,” Sergio Restelli, an Italian political adviser and geopolitical analyst, wrote in January. “It would unite … nuclear capability, control of strategic waterways, expeditionary forces and ideological influence,” he argued, describing “a trans-regional security axis stretching from the eastern Mediterranean through the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean” that could challenge balances long upheld by US alliances and informal deterrence.
The deeper logic, however, may be less about grand blocs and more about risk hedging. “There is a growing view in the region that the US can no longer be depended upon to defend the security of those Gulf states,” said Sami Hamdi, managing director of the London-based risk consultancy The International Interest. He pointed to Washington’s restraint after the 2019 Houthi attack on Saudi oil facilities, and to September 2025, when Israel — the closest US ally in the region — struck Hamas political leaders in Doha. In Hamdi’s reading, the message Gulf capitals heard was that the US response is no longer guaranteed, even in moments of strategic shock.
That anxiety is sharpened by widening geopolitical rifts. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, close partners for years, now back opposing factions in Sudan and Yemen. In December, Saudi jets struck a camp held by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen’s Hadramout province. Earlier this month, Riyadh reportedly offered a $1.5 billion Pakistan-Sudan arms package to Sudan’s army in its war with the Rapid Support Forces, who are reportedly equipped by the UAE — a claim Abu Dhabi has denied.
The UAE, for its part, is moving assertively on its own partnerships. Abu Dhabi signed a sweeping accord with India, Pakistan’s longtime adversary, that makes India its largest buyer of liquefied natural gas and a favored partner for nuclear cooperation. “I think that the UAE-India deal is not just about military technology but it is a political statement,” Hamdi said. In his view, it signals Abu Dhabi’s intent to show “muscle” against Saudi Arabia even as it remains a smaller state.
Yet few expect a full break between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Coalition politics still run through Washington, and both Gulf powers maintain strong ties to the US. “Both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are sitting on Donald Trump’s Board of Peace,” noted Cinzia Bianco, a Gulf research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. She also underscored how potential new security partners interlock: Turkey, for instance, remains closely aligned with the UAE even as it eyes deeper defense coordination with Riyadh and Islamabad.
The US remains the indispensable node that constrains how far any new “axis” can go. The UAE hosts multiple American bases, and US-Saudi ties have recently tightened, with mega deals announced during state visits between Trump and Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Those connections limit the scope of any independent defense architecture, even as regional states pursue more self-reliance.
In that context, the “Islamic NATO” label risks overpromising. “The idea of an Islamic NATO is slightly exaggerated,” Hamdi said. He argues the region’s major players retain sharp ideological differences and divergent interests that will thwart NATO-style collective defense. What the recent pacts do offer, he said, is leverage: technology transfer, joint training and procurement, and a pathway to partial autonomy in a more multipolar security landscape.
What to watch next:
- Whether Somalia formally joins a Saudi-Egypt pact, extending influence along the Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea corridor.
- How Turkey calibrates ties with the UAE while exploring entry into the Saudi-Pakistan defense accord.
- Signs of de-escalation or further proxy friction between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen and Sudan.
- The degree to which US policy — and Trump’s Board of Peace — shapes, supports or circumscribes these regional alignments.
For now, Riyadh is moving on parallel tracks: consolidating influence around strategic waterways; deepening partnerships with states that bring nuclear capacity, manpower or geography; and ensuring that any new architecture complements rather than collides with US ties. It is coalition-building for a hedged era, an attempt to insulate against shocks in a neighborhood where the shocks keep coming — and where the old guarantees no longer feel guaranteed.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
