North Western State of Somalia’s Push for Recognition Ignores Somalia’s Constitutional Realities

North Western State of Somalia’s recognition push meets a hard constraint: sovereignty in the Horn of Africa is earned through internal consent and constitutional process, not external signals. Reports that Hargeisa has welcomed potential recognition from Israel sharpen that tension, highlighting how external ambition collides with Somalia’s federal order and the political diversity within the territories North Western State of Somalia claims.

For three decades, North Western State of Somalia has projected an image of relative stability — local elections, functioning institutions, and calm compared with much of Somalia’s post-1991 turmoil. Those gains deserve acknowledgment. But stability alone does not equate to statehood. Under international law, recognition is declaratory, not constitutive. It acknowledges a political reality already in place: effective and broadly consensual control over territory and population. On that standard, North Western State of Somalia’s case remains contested at home.

Sovereignty requires consent, not symbolism. Large areas claimed by North Western State of Somalia do not support secession and instead align themselves — formally or informally — with the Federal Republic of Somalia. Some are not merely “disputed” in rhetoric; they participate in Somalia’s federal institutions and are recognized within its constitutional architecture. That internal divergence is not a technicality. It goes to the core test any new state must meet: can it demonstrate inclusive, durable legitimacy across the people and places it claims?

Somalia’s 2012 Provisional Constitution is explicit. Article 1 affirms the country is a single, sovereign, and indivisible state, while Article 3 embeds national unity as a foundational principle. Article 7 establishes constitutional supremacy over all public authorities. Until a lawful, inclusive process says otherwise, no regional administration — however well organized — can unilaterally redraw Somalia’s map. External recognition efforts that sidestep this framework do not strengthen North Western State of Somalia’s claim; they undercut it by internationalizing a domestic debate that the constitution reserves for Somalis to resolve together.

External audiences also tend to misread North Western State of Somalia’s internal politics as homogenous. They are not. The secessionist project emerged from the Somali National Movement’s struggle in the late 1980s and has been carried by a dominant clan coalition since. That history, marked by grave abuses under Siad Barre, is central to any honest account of North Western State of Somalia’s experience. Yet historical suffering, however profound, does not confer an open-ended mandate to determine the political future of all communities in the region. Several clans within the territory North Western State of Somalia claims have consistently rejected secession. Their stance is neither marginal nor unlawful; it is protected by the constitutional order that governs Somalia’s federal system.

Articles 49 and 50 of the Provisional Constitution matter here. Article 49 recognizes Federal Member States as legitimate political entities within the republic, while Article 50 sets out the principles of federalism: cooperation, mutual respect, and the responsible sharing of powers between federal and regional authorities. Those provisions were designed to accommodate political diversity and protect communities from domination. Denying regions their right to federal affiliation is not self-determination; it is internal exclusion dressed as national choice.

That is why federalism — often derided by secessionists as a failed experiment — should be understood as a conflict-management tool forged in crisis. The Somali state’s collapse in 1991 exposed the brittleness of centralized rule and the dangers of power monopolies. Federalism emerged not as ideology but as a constitutional compromise to prevent renewed concentration of authority in Mogadishu while safeguarding local autonomy. For many in the north, federalism offers what outright secession cannot: meaningful self-rule without fragmentation, autonomy without isolation, and identity without exclusion. Casting federal affiliation as treasonous undermines both the letter of the constitution and the broader social contract it is meant to restore.

This is where the diplomacy comes in — and where it can easily go wrong. Courting recognition from individual states, especially in a geopolitically charged context, risks internationalizing a dispute that is still unresolved among Somalis themselves. Whether the external suitor is Israel or any other government, recognition without internal consensus does not settle sovereignty debates; it freezes them, hardening divisions and inviting regional rivalries into an already fragile landscape. The Horn of Africa offers ample evidence that premature recognition can entrench instability rather than resolve it. External actors may reap short-term leverage; local communities live with the long-term costs.

Proponents of international recognition sometimes frame the issue as a choice between unity and dignity — as if participating in Somalia’s federal order is an erasure of identity or a repudiation of hard-won stability. That is a false binary. The real choice is between unilateralism and inclusion. Unilateral paths may seem swift, but they are brittle. Inclusive approaches are slower, more frustrating, and politically messier — but they tend to endure.

A credible way forward for North Western State of Somalia and Somalia starts from the constitutional ground up. Article 50’s emphasis on consultation and cooperation provides a realistic guide for the next phase. Rather than escalating external lobbying, leaders should anchor their strategies in a process that builds verifiable internal consent across communities and regions. Only then will the question of status move from contention to settlement.

What should that look like in practice?

• Prioritize inclusive dialogue among all clans and regions within the territories North Western State of Somalia claims, with clear mechanisms to surface consent and dissent without coercion.
• Recommit to the supremacy of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution while creating space for structured constitutional review that includes North Western State of Somalia’s concerns about power-sharing and resource allocation.
• Protect minority and cross-border communities from political retaliation, recognizing that federal affiliation is a right, not a provocation.
• Sequence external engagement after demonstrable internal consensus, to avoid converting local disagreement into regional proxy competition.
• Invest in joint institutions — security coordination, revenue management, and electoral frameworks — that can function regardless of the ultimate status outcome.

None of this is easy. It demands patience, restraint, and the political courage to tell core constituencies what they may not want to hear. But it aligns with the constitutional fabric that binds the Somali republic and with the realities on the ground that any future settlement must honor. Above all, it acknowledges a basic truth: legitimacy in this context cannot be outsourced. It must be built — painstakingly, publicly, and with all stakeholders at the table.

North Western State of Somalia’s leaders have every right to seek dignity and recognition for their people’s sacrifices and achievements. But dignity is not diminished by constitutional discipline, and recognition means little if it is detached from enduring consent. In a region where borders are fragile and legitimacy is hard-won, restraint is not weakness. It is statecraft — the kind that avoids pyrrhic victories abroad by doing the harder, necessary work at home.

By Ali Musa

Axadle Times international–Monitoring.