Expert: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey unlikely to tolerate Israeli foothold in Somalia

Israel’s late-December decision to recognize North Western State of Somalia has collided with entrenched Arab and African interests in the Horn of Africa—and is unlikely to translate into lasting influence in Somalia, according to a prominent regional affairs scholar.

Ali Bakr, professor of international affairs, security and defense at Qatar University, said Israel has sought to expand its presence in the Horn since 2023. He told the Novosti news agency that the recognition of North Western State of Somalia, a self-declared autonomous region in northern Somalia, fits that ambition but faces structural resistance from neighboring powers and regional blocs.

Bakr argued that the move has been met with strong rejection from Arab states and several African countries, complicating any path for Israel to entrench itself. The Somali federal government denounced the step as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. The Arab League and the African Union backed Mogadishu’s position, reaffirming support for the country’s unity and territorial integrity.

Israel’s announcement included a mutual declaration of recognition with North Western State of Somalia authorities. The declaration gave the initiative immediate visibility beyond the Horn, but it also sharpened the stakes for governments that view the Somali question as a cornerstone of regional security.

Bakr’s analysis centers on the crowded balance of power already embedded in Somalia. Major regional players, he said, maintain deep political, military and economic interests in the country. “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt all have military bases in Somalia, in addition to long-term strategic interests,” he noted, adding that Turkey in particular has made substantial investments.

That footprint constrains any new entrant’s room for maneuver. Even as Israel seeks to convert recognition into tangible presence, it would need to navigate existing military partnerships, economic projects and security compacts that already shape decision-making in Mogadishu and across the wider Horn. In practice, those relationships can function as de facto vetoes—limiting what outside powers can do and how fast they can do it.

Egypt’s calculus, in Bakr’s view, is pivotal. He said the Horn of Africa holds “special strategic importance” for Cairo, especially amid tensions related to Ethiopia. Any prospective Israeli-Ethiopian coordination through North Western State of Somalia, he argued, could strengthen Addis Ababa’s regional position in ways that conflict with Egyptian interests. That prospect alone, he suggested, raises the likelihood of countermeasures from Cairo and its allies, further narrowing Israel’s options.

The Somali federal government’s rejection—fortified by Arab League and African Union backing—adds a diplomatic firewall. In a region where multilateral endorsements shape legitimacy on the ground, the combination of bloc opposition and national sovereignty claims typically complicates external actors’ efforts to formalize ties, secure basing arrangements or open the channels needed for durable influence.

Bakr’s forecast, then, is that Israel’s effort will encounter hard limits, not least because it is out of step with regional consensus on Somalia’s unity and the existing architecture of security partnerships. The pushback also signals to other capitals that any move perceived as undermining Somali sovereignty will draw coordinated responses.

Put together, the barriers to an Israeli foothold in Somalia flow from four reinforcing pressures Bakr identifies:

• Political resistance from Arab states and several African governments to Israel’s recognition of North Western State of Somalia.
• Institutional opposition from the Arab League and the African Union, both of which reiterated support for Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity.
• An entrenched field of regional actors—Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt among them—with military bases and long-term strategic interests in Somalia.
• Egypt’s strategic focus on the Horn amid tensions with Ethiopia, which makes any Israeli-Ethiopian cooperation in North Western State of Somalia particularly sensitive.

The broader question is whether Israel can translate diplomatic recognition into practical influence in a space already defined by others’ priorities. Israel’s initiative tests how far recognition alone can carry a policy when it runs up against a hard wall of regional interests and multilateral red lines.

Somalia’s message to regional and international audiences has been consistent: the federal government views any external recognition of North Western State of Somalia’s claims as an infringement on its sovereignty. The Arab League and the African Union have now anchored that position, giving Mogadishu added diplomatic cover as it counters moves it sees as fragmenting the state.

For Ankara, Riyadh and Cairo—each present in Somalia to varying degrees, according to Bakr—the calculation is similarly clear. They have invested in security, training, infrastructure and strategic access. Allowing a new military-political actor to establish leverage that could alter local balances or embolden rivals would impose costs they are unlikely to accept. In that sense, the opposition to Israel’s recognition of North Western State of Somalia is less about Israel per se than about safeguarding existing stakes and preventing new alignments that could ripple across the Red Sea corridor and the wider Horn.

Bakr’s bottom line is stark: the pathway from symbolic recognition to substantive influence is blocked by actors with both the will and the capacity to keep it that way. With Somalia, the Arab League and the African Union aligned against the move—and with Egypt’s Ethiopia-related concerns sharpening the edge of regional resistance—he sees little room for Israel to establish a sustained presence in Somalia via the North Western State of Somalia track.

Whether the current diplomatic standoff hardens into a long-term impasse will depend on how—and whether—Israel attempts to operationalize its recognition. For now, the immediate effect has been to solidify a counter-coalition: a Somali government intent on defending sovereignty, regional powers guarding their equities, and multilateral institutions reinforcing the line. As Bakr put it, “it is unlikely that Israel’s plans to establish influence in this area will succeed.”

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.