Analysis: Egypt’s Troop Move to Somalia — A New Chapter in African Security and Influence
The announcement that Egypt will send troops to Somalia under the African Union’s stabilization mission marks a notable juncture in an evolving map of regional power. At first glance it is a pragmatic step — extra boots to help a fragile state push back al-Shabab — but read more closely it is also a diplomatic and strategic signal from Cairo about where it wants to sit in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
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On the ground: what we know
Egypt’s engagement has been carefully staged. A 16-member Egyptian military delegation led by Maj. Gen. Islam Radwan recently scouted positions in Lower and Middle Shabelle, two regions where al-Shabab remains active. Cairo says the deployment will operate under the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has welcomed the move as a “positive step” toward stabilisation.
These developments follow a flurry of diplomatic activity: a January 2025 state visit by President Mohamud to Cairo that elevated ties to a “Strategic Partnership,” a military cooperation protocol signed in August 2024, and earlier shipments of Egyptian military aid to support the Somali National Army. For Somalis who have long sought dependable partners in rebuilding security institutions, the gestures amount to solemn promise and fresh hope. “If Egypt stands by us in rebuilding our army and our country, it will be remembered,” said Abdullahi Yusuf, a Mogadishu resident — a sentiment echoed across neighborhoods still marked by conflict.
Why Egypt is stepping in
Cairo’s motivations are layered. Security is the explicit rationale: al-Shabab’s insurgency poses a persistent threat to Somalia’s cities and coastline, with implications for maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and for the wider region. But politics, history and economics weave through the decision as well.
- Geostrategic interests: Egypt sees the Horn of Africa as central to the security of the Red Sea and to protections around the Suez route — vital arteries for global trade and for Cairo’s own economy.
- Regional influence: With actors from Turkey and the UAE to Ethiopia and Gulf states already active in Somalia, Egypt’s move is also about ensuring it remains a key voice in East Africa’s security architecture.
- Soft-power and legacy: Egypt frames itself as a stabilizing partner for fellow African and Arab states. A successful, sustained contribution could cement that image and expand Cairo’s diplomatic capital across the continent.
“Somalia has been seeking reliable partners who can help build long-term capacity, not just provide short-term interventions,” said a Nairobi-based analyst. “Egypt’s involvement — if sustained — could be a game-changer.”
Broader regional ripple effects
The Horn of Africa has become a crowded arena for influence. Turkey has deepened ties with Mogadishu through infrastructure and security support; the UAE has invested in ports and logistics; Ethiopia pursues its own interests across borders; and larger global powers watch closely for opportunities to project power or secure maritime routes. Into that crowded field, Egypt is now adding a military face to longstanding diplomatic efforts.
This is part of a wider trend of “militarized diplomacy,” where states use security assistance not just to tackle immediate threats but to build leverage — access to bases, influence over policy, and alignment with local elites. For Somalia, which aims to assume full responsibility for its security by the end of AUSSOM’s mandate in 2026, the question will be whether partnerships translate into durable capacity-building or settle into dependency on external actors.
Risks and limits
There are real limits to what outside forces can achieve. Al-Shabab is deeply embedded in rural areas, adaptable, and able to wage asymmetrical campaigns that have frustrated better-equipped forces. Somalia’s weaknesses are not only military: clan politics, fragile institutions and economic underdevelopment all complicate stabilization.
Moreover, as more countries plant flags — metaphorically or literally — the risk of proxy competition rises. Egypt’s involvement could unsettle other regional patrons or trigger countermeasures from rival states that view increased Cairo influence with suspicion. For Somalis, too, foreign troop presences carry delicate sovereignty questions: who trains whom, under whose command, and to what end?
What this means for the international community
If Egypt’s contingent helps nudge Somalia toward a credible national security force, the benefit will be global: a more stable Somalia would mean safer sea lanes, fewer terrorist sanctuaries, and a reduced need for ad hoc foreign interventions. It would also advance a model of African-led security cooperation under AU auspices, which many have argued offers more legitimacy than externally imposed missions.
Yet success is not guaranteed. The international community will need to back troop deployments with sustained investment in governance, justice, and livelihoods — the non-military prerequisites for durable peace. Without that, gains on the map risk evaporating into the next cycle of violence.
Questions for the future
- Can Egypt balance its strategic ambitions with the patient, long-term work of institution-building in Somalia?
- Will the deployment spur a more coordinated regional approach to the Horn’s security problems, or harden rival blocs?
- Most importantly for Somalis: will this translate into safer neighborhoods, functioning services and accountable institutions — not just a parade of foreign uniforms?
For now, the people on Mogadishu’s streets and in villages across Shabelle watch with cautious optimism. The success of this latest chapter will be measured not by ceremony but by whether Somalis can increasingly claim their own security, governance and future. As Cairo steps into a high-stakes theatre, the rest of the region and the world will be watching to see if military support can be the opening act of a longer story of recovery.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
