Djibouti’s parliament clears a path for President Guelleh to stay — what it means at home and abroad
In a move that tightens the grip of a long-serving leader while exposing a geopolitical paradox, Djibouti’s parliament voted to remove the constitutional age limit for the presidency, effectively opening the door for 77‑year‑old Ismail Omar Guelleh to seek another five‑year term in the April 2026 election.
- Advertisement -
The measure, adopted with the support of 65 members of parliament according to the speaker, Dileita Mohamed Dileita, is a quiet but consequential recalibration of power in one of Africa’s smallest states. On the surface it is a domestic constitutional tweak. Beneath it lies a matrix of strategic interests — from France to the United States to China — that make Djibouti far more than a dot on the map of the Horn of Africa.
From an age cap to another mandate
Djibouti’s constitution had stipulated that anyone older than 75 could not seek the presidency. That limit would have barred Guelleh from standing in 2026. With its August vote to delete the clause, the National Assembly now hands Guelleh a political reprieve. Under the procedures cited by the speaker, the change can be approved directly by the president or sent to a referendum; a confirming parliamentary ballot is set for Nov. 2.
Guelleh has been at the helm since 1999, succeeding the country’s first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, after decades as his chief of staff. He has overseen steady economic projects — ports, roads and foreign investments — while presiding over a tightly managed political environment in which dissent is constrained, human rights groups say.
“All I can tell you is that I love my country too much to embark on an irresponsible adventure and be the cause of divisions,” Guelleh told The Africa Report in May, leaving the possibility of another term open. Within Djibouti, the ruling Union for the Presidential Majority holds a commanding parliamentary majority and the speaker argued the amendment is meant to preserve “stability” in a volatile region.
Stability, protest and muted opposition
“This vote is not a surprise,” Sonia le Gouriellec, a Horn of Africa specialist at the Catholic University of Lille, told me. “There are protests on social media, but I fear that the opposition will not have the space to express itself in Djibouti.”
That observation captures a common friction in contemporary African politics: popular dissatisfaction often finds expression online, but avenues for street politics, independent media and judicial challenge are frequently narrow. Djibouti is no exception. Rights organisations have long highlighted constraints on freedoms of assembly and speech, while the state points to regional insecurity — in nearby Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea — as justification for a tightly controlled political order.
On the streets of Djibouti City, concerns are often practical and immediate. Traders and port workers I spoke with in past reporting cited import costs, fuel prices and jobs as daily preoccupations. Constitutional clauses rarely animate market stalls. Yet decisions about who leads the country determine the framework within which those livelihood issues are addressed.
Why the world watches Djibouti
For an international audience, the constitutional tweak is as much about geography and geopolitics as it is about local politics. Djibouti sits at the southern gate of the Red Sea, guarding the Bab el‑Mandeb strait through which a sizable share of global maritime trade transits. Its strategic value is why France retains a significant military presence, why the United States hosts its Camp Lemonnier there, and why China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017.
These relationships have helped finance and fortify the country. Chinese investment has built port and infrastructure projects tied to the Belt and Road Initiative; France maintains defence and cultural ties rooted in a colonial relationship. In recent years, disputes have flared over port concessions and the role of external companies, underscoring how foreign investment and sovereignty remain a delicate balance.
That international presence creates a paradox: Djibouti’s stability is prized by external powers for reasons that often override concerns about democratic practice. Western and regional actors frequently treat the country as a secure logistical and military hub in a dangerous neighbourhood — while civil society groups continue to press for greater freedoms and accountability.
Part of a larger trend?
The removal of age or term limits is not unique to Djibouti. Across Africa, leaders have at times reshaped constitutions to extend their terms, creating anxieties about democratic backsliding. Uganda’s 2017 repeal of an age limit and constitutional changes elsewhere have sparked debate about institutional resilience and political renewal.
Those patterns raise wider questions: can the promise of stability and international patronage coexist with genuine political competition? Does extended rule by an incumbent bring continuity that benefits development projects, or does it entrench systems that stifle dissent and innovation?
What comes next
Procedurally, the amendment must pass a second parliamentary vote and be signed off — or put to a referendum if Guelleh opts for public endorsement. Politically, the path is clearer: a president with consolidated control over institutions and the backing of a dominant party faces little domestic obstruction. Internationally, partners who prize Djibouti’s strategic location will likely continue to engage pragmatically.
Yet the deeper contest is societal. Younger Djiboutians, who form a large share of the population, confront high unemployment and limited political space. Social media protests show pockets of discontent, even if streets stay quiet. Over time, the tension between managed stability and demands for voice could shape the country’s future more than any constitutional clause.
As Djibouti edges toward 2026, observers should watch not only ballots but the institutions that surround them: courts, media, civil society and the ways foreign partners respond when governance and security intersect. In a region where borders and alliances shift, the small Horn state’s choices will ripple beyond its arid coastline.
Are long-standing leaders uniquely suited to stewarding fragile states, or do they ultimately hinder the generational renewal needed for resilience? The answer will matter not just for Djibouti but for a world that relies on its narrow strait and the stability that flows from it.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
