Analysis: Pakistan’s Saudi defense pact faces its first major test as Iran-Israel war engulfs the Gulf
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in US-Israeli strikes on February 28 and Tehran’s retaliation with missiles and drones — not only at Israel but at six Gulf countries — have thrust Pakistan into the most precarious regional crisis it has faced in years. Bound to Saudi Arabia by a new mutual defense pact, tied to Iran by geography and a tense but necessary relationship, and dependent on Gulf economies for jobs and fuel, Islamabad is working the phones to keep a widening war from reaching its doorstep.
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Within hours of the strikes that killed Khamenei, Pakistan condemned the attacks as “unwarranted.” It also condemned Iran’s cross-border retaliation as a “blatant” violation of sovereignty. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, in Riyadh for an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting as the crisis broke, launched what he later called “shuttle communication” between Tehran and Riyadh. He said he personally reminded Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, “We have a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and the whole world knows about it. I told the Iranian leadership to take care of our pact with Saudi Arabia.”
According to Dar, Iran wanted guarantees that Saudi soil would not be used against it. Riyadh conveyed such assurances, a position Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia publicly welcomed on March 5, saying Tehran “appreciates” the pledge that the kingdom’s territory, airspace and waters would not be used against Iran.
But the restraint appears fragile. In the early hours of March 6, Saudi Arabia’s defense ministry said it intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base. Hours later, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, met Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman in Riyadh. The Saudi minister said they discussed Iranian attacks and “measures needed to halt them” under the two countries’ mutual defense pact.
Pakistan’s tightrope has never been thinner.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement on September 17, 2025, in Riyadh, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Munir presiding. Its central clause says aggression against one shall be considered aggression against both — a formulation that echoes collective-defense language like NATO’s Article 5 without guaranteeing automatic intervention. Even so, the symbolism was unmistakable: a nuclear-armed Pakistan was formalizing a longstanding security relationship with the kingdom just as Gulf states questioned US security guarantees after Israeli strikes in Doha earlier that month.
For decades, Pakistan has quietly stationed roughly 1,500 to 2,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, trained its forces, and helped protect critical sites. What is new is the scale of commitment — and the scenario now confronting Islamabad.
Analysts say Pakistan likely did not foresee a direct clash with Iran so soon after the 2023 détente between Riyadh and Tehran. Some argue Saudi leaders will now test the depth of Islamabad’s promise and that failure to fulfill obligations could leave lasting damage. Others caution that treaties are only as strong as political will, and that the 2015 parliamentary refusal to join the Yemen war still hangs over the relationship.
The Iran constraint, however, is not theoretical. Pakistan shares a 900-kilometer (559-mile) border with Iran, maintains vital (if modest) trade, and has stepped up diplomatic contact; Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Islamabad in August 2025. Yet the relationship is also brittle: a January 2024 exchange of cross-border strikes, initiated by Iran, underscored how quickly tensions can flare.
For Islamabad, Iran’s stability is a first-order interest. An Iranian collapse, fragmentation or the extension of Israeli influence to Pakistan’s western border would be a strategic nightmare. The domestic reverberations are immediate, too. Protests after Khamenei’s assassination turned deadly, with at least 23 people killed nationwide, prompting army deployment and a three-day curfew in Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan’s sizable Shia population — roughly 15% to 20% of 250 million — has historically mobilized around events involving Iran. The country’s violent sectarian past, from Karachi to the tribal belt, remains a live memory.
The security risk is not abstract. The Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistan-origin Shia militia trained and funded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has recruited thousands of Pakistanis, many of whom fought in Syria. Islamabad banned the group in 2024, but its networks are widely believed to persist. In late 2024, more than 130 people were killed in sectarian clashes in Kurram district, the brigade’s primary recruitment ground. In Balochistan — the restive province bordering Iran — separatist violence and cross-border militant activity make escalation scenarios even more combustible.
Against that backdrop, what can Pakistan realistically do if pressed by Saudi Arabia to act?
Direct offensive action against Iran — deploying combat aircraft or striking Iranian territory — is widely viewed as untenable given Pakistan’s domestic constraints and contested western frontier. A more likely path, analysts say, lies in defensive and deniable measures: air-defense cooperation, counter-drone and counter-missile support, intelligence-sharing and technical assistance that strengthens Saudi resilience without placing Pakistani forces in direct combat with Iran.
Such a role would be “militarily meaningful and politically defensible” for Islamabad, as one Gulf analyst put it. It would also be aligned with Pakistan’s immediate interest in preventing further strikes on Saudi territory. Yet even this option is not without risk. Redeploying air-defense assets to the kingdom could thin Pakistan’s own cover at home, while any exposure of covert support could fuel domestic backlash and inflame sectarian tensions.
For now, Pakistan’s most valuable currency is access and credibility. Islamabad can talk to both Riyadh and Tehran, relay assurances quickly, and frame off-ramps when tempers rise. The government has already leveraged that channel to extract and relay Saudi pledges that their airspace and territory will not be used against Iran. Preserving this mediator’s perch — without sliding into an anti-Iran coalition — may be Pakistan’s best shot at minimizing blowback.
The hazard lies in the regional tide. The scenario most dangerous to Pakistan is a collective Gulf Cooperation Council move to enter the war directly. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have warned that Iranian strikes crossed a red line. A joint statement on March 1 by the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reaffirmed the “right to self-defense” against these attacks. If the GCC’s threshold is breached — for instance, if energy infrastructure is hit repeatedly — pressure on Islamabad to demonstrate its treaty obligations will spike.
The economic stakes are enormous. Millions of Pakistani workers in the Gulf send home remittances that prop up a fragile foreign-exchange position. A prolonged conflict that disrupts Gulf economies would hammer those inflows. Energy prices could surge, worsening inflation in a country heavily dependent on Gulf suppliers. And all this as Pakistan manages a separate confrontation along its western border: a spiraling standoff with the Afghan Taliban that began two days before the US-Israel strikes.
None of this means Islamabad can stand still. The government must resource and rehearse air-defense cooperation that can be surged to the kingdom if requested, while ring-fencing critical coverage at home. It must deepen contingency planning with Riyadh and quietly map red lines with Tehran. It must invest political capital in calming domestic tensions — from outreach to Shia leadership and ulema councils to surge policing in flashpoint districts like Kurram and in Balochistan. And it must harden critical energy infrastructure and maritime lanes against disruption.
At the same time, Islamabad needs to maintain diplomatic momentum. The “shuttle” channel that produced limited restraint should be institutionalized, ideally with OIC backing and explicit guardrails against the use of Gulf territory or airspace for strikes by any party. Even partial deconfliction shrinks the space for miscalculation.
Pakistan’s middle path is narrowing by the day. If pulled to choose amid an uncontrolled spiral, Islamabad’s strategic calculus will tilt toward Saudi Arabia — by treaty, by economic necessity, by history. The task now is to do everything possible so that choice never arrives.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
