Somalia’s Constitutional Crisis: Power Struggles Put Democracy on the Brink

Opinion/Analysis: Somalia’s constitutional crossroads — process, not power, will decide the future

Somalia’s Constitution is again at the center of national politics. A round of changes presented as a constitutional amendment has triggered sharp objections from federal member states and opposition figures, raising questions about legality, legitimacy and the balance of power in the federation. At stake is not only the letter of the 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution but public confidence in the institutions charged with upholding it.

In a March 7 commentary, Abdifatah Abdinur, State Minister of the Presidency in Puntland State, argued that the process failed key tests of transparency, consensus and procedure. He cited reports that the required two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the Federal Parliament were not secured and that only 34 senators were present for the Upper House vote — short of the 36 attendance needed. He also said some votes were cast online in apparent breach of parliamentary rules and that more than 50 lawmakers were blocked from participating.

Those are serious claims that, if accurate, go beyond parliamentary technicalities. They cut to the core of constitutionalism: rules that bind the powerful precisely when expediency tempts them to bend those rules. In fragile federations like Somalia — still recovering from conflict and building institutions against a history of central overreach and clan grievance — process is substance. How the country amends its Constitution will shape whether the charter remains a social contract or becomes an instrument of short-term advantage.

Somalia’s 2012 charter lays out a high bar for amendment to ensure no single faction can unilaterally reshape the basic order. It envisions public consultation, broad political buy-in and supermajorities in a bicameral legislature designed to reflect both the people and the federal units. The alleged irregularities described by Abdinur and echoed by other critics — thin attendance, disputed voting methods, excluded MPs — raise the specter of a shortcut where a roadmap is required.

Concerns are not confined to the halls of Parliament. Abdinur contends that outgoing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has blurred the separation of powers and encroached on competencies reserved for federal member states, especially around election administration. Puntland State and Jubaland publicly objected to the process. Former national leaders also questioned its legitimacy. Such cross-cutting dissent underscores a central point: constitutional change that lacks federal and political consensus is unlikely to be sustainable, even if it passes procedurally. But if it also fails the procedural test, its durability drops to zero.

Somalia’s political history explains why these guardrails matter. The federation’s architecture was designed to distribute authority across multiple centers, guard against the return of personalized rule and accommodate a diverse society in which trust has been slow to build and quick to fray. When constitutional reform appears to centralize power or side-step formal thresholds, it risks reactivating the very anxieties the federal system was created to calm.

There is also an operational risk. A disputed amendment cannot reliably steer elections, adjudicate disputes or anchor reforms. State institutions derive authority not only from what the law says but from whether citizens and political actors believe that law was made lawfully. The wider the perception that the process was stacked or selective, the narrower the space for compromise in the aftermath.

None of this argues against constitutional reform per se. Somalia’s provisional charter anticipated future revision; indeed, maturing constitutions are often clarified through deliberation. But revision and rupture are not the same thing. The former strengthens the social contract by updating it with buy-in. The latter weakens it by imposing change without it.

What would a repair to legitimacy look like now? First, clarity. The Parliamentary leadership should publish full attendance logs, roll-call tallies, and the legal basis for any remote voting, enabling independent verification. Second, inclusion. Dissenting federal member states — notably Puntland State and Jubaland — should be brought into structured talks with clear timelines and neutral facilitation. Third, restraint. The executive should avoid steps that reshape the electoral playing field absent explicit statutory authority and consensus in the Inter-State Council. Fourth, sequence. Contentious provisions should be decoupled from urgent governance needs so that core state functions do not become hostages to constitutional brinkmanship.

Somalia’s international partners, often asked to underwrite elections and reforms, also have a stake. The most constructive role is not to pick winners in a domestic tug-of-war but to back the rules of the game: verifiable procedures, inclusive dialogue and federal balance as set out in the Provisional Constitution and state charters. External validation should follow demonstrable compliance with these standards, not precede it.

The political impulse to move fast is understandable. Leaders want to lock in priorities before windows close. But in constitutional politics, speed without legitimacy is a false economy. It purchases a headline at the price of future stability — and often invites litigation, boycott and street-level polarization that make governance harder, not easier.

The choice facing Somalia’s leadership is therefore less about the specific text on offer and more about the method chosen to advance it. If the parliamentary majorities were indeed insufficient, attendance incomplete, or rules selectively applied, the right corrective is not to justify the outcome but to redo the process. If dissenting states or lawmakers were sidelined, the right response is to widen the table, not narrow it further.

Somalia stands at a familiar hinge: power can be asserted or legitimacy can be earned. The first path offers short-term victories vulnerable to challenge. The second takes longer but produces settlements that endure elections and leadership changes. In a federation still stitching together trust, only the second path can carry the constitutional project forward.

The way ahead is not mysterious. It rests on first principles that every constitutional democracy recognizes:

• Adhere strictly to amendment thresholds and parliamentary rules, with transparent records.
• Include federal member states and opposition figures in time-bound, good-faith talks.
• Respect the division of powers, especially around elections and state competencies.
• Separate urgent governance from disputed reforms to avoid zero-sum brinkmanship.

Somalia’s leaders must answer a simple question with far-reaching consequences: Do they serve the Constitution, or merely their own ambitions? The country’s future — and the credibility of its federal experiment — depends on getting that answer right, and proving it in the way this amendment effort proceeds from here.

By Ali Musa

Axadle Times international–Monitoring.