Understanding Al-Shabaab’s Resurgence in Somalia: A Complex Landscape

Mogadishu (AX) — In recent months, Al-Shabaab has made significant inroads in central and southern Somalia. This surge is intricately tied to widening rifts between Somalia’s federal government and its regional states, leading security analysts to question the viability of the country’s counterinsurgency strategy, particularly as national elections loom in 2026. What does this mean for Somalia’s future? Can a country divided find a cohesive path forward?

Organizations like the Soufan Center and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) raised alarm bells this week, arguing that the increasing political instability is the main factor fueling Al-Shabaab’s resurgence. On July 20, the group reclaimed the towns of Sabiid and Anole in the Lower Shabelle region, located a mere 40 kilometers southwest of the capital, Mogadishu. This occurred just after the withdrawal of African Union peacekeepers and Somali forces, a move that many critics deem as a miscalculation.

As articulated in the Soufan Center’s enlightening report, “These are not isolated incidents — they represent a systematic strategy by Al-Shabaab to encircle Mogadishu and undermine the state.” In a world where the political landscape can shift like sand, one must ponder, how does a state protect itself from such insidious strategies?

The group’s territorial control now spans a triangular zone encompassing Moqokori, Tardo, and Buq-Aqable in central Somalia. This stronghold effectively disrupts supply lines and allows Al-Shabaab to harass federal positions, extending its influence ominously toward the capital. In Moqokori, for instance, residents have reported that the group has resumed tax collection and reestablished local courts. Interestingly, these actions have been paired with a reluctance to engage in retaliatory violence, seemingly in an effort to build civilian trust. Could this be a calculated move to present themselves as a benevolent authority?

Selam Tadesse Demissie, a lead researcher at ISS, offers a chilling observation: the group is now perceived as “one actor among many competing for legitimacy in a fragmented political landscape.” Imagine a scenario where various factions vie for the trust of the people; it complicates the situation significantly, doesn’t it?

Recalling Somalia’s vigorous counteroffensive in 2022 — supported by the U.S. and Türkiye — one must recognize that over 200 towns were reclaimed. However, since the onset of 2024, that hard-won momentum seems to have fizzled out, stymied by escalating national political tensions. A somewhat controversial constitutional review process proposes to replace Somalia’s longstanding 4.5 clan-based power-sharing system with a more democratic one-person, one-vote model. This shift has not been well-received in regions like Northeastern State and Jubaland, where leaders perceive the reforms as undermining their traditionally consolidated power. Both regions boycotted the May 2025 National Consultative Conference and continue to eschew participation in ongoing electoral and security dialogues. What kind of governance can thrive amidst such discord?

As Demissie suggests, political fragmentation is increasingly undermining Somalia’s capacity to sustain its hard-won gains against Al-Shabaab. The strain is not limited to domestic issues; the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) has faced its challenges as well. Uganda recently withdrew its troops from Lower Shabelle following devastating suicide bombings that claimed the lives of over 30 peacekeepers, and unfortunately, no reinforcements have arrived to fill that void.

The Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) reported an airstrike near Buq-Aqable on July 13, which resulted in the deaths of seven militants. Yet, both reports suggest that such isolated strikes have proven insufficient in curtailing Al-Shabaab’s momentum. In contrast, while the U.S. has conducted over 30 airstrikes against Islamic State cells in Northeastern State’s Cal Miskaad mountains this year alone, fewer than 20 targeted Al-Shabaab’s strongholds in the south. This discrepancy raises a poignant question: Is Al-Shabaab, by virtue of this gap in international focus, poised to exploit a strategic advantage?

The ISS report presents two potential futures: either Al-Shabaab makes a bid for complete control — a scenario complicated by internal clan resistance — or it continues to consolidate local power while the federal government becomes a nominal authority holed up in Mogadishu. The latter scenario seems increasingly plausible. The report suggests that Al-Shabaab continues to weave itself into clan structures, positioning itself as a provider of mediation, justice, and a semblance of order in regions where the state has retreated. This raises an unsettling thought: if a non-state actor begins to fulfill the role of a governing authority, what does that mean for the legitimacy of the existing government?

The Soufan Center’s warning is stark: “The current fragmentation of Somalia’s security architecture is alarming. Without unified command, counterinsurgency operations are reactive and lack staying power.” The United Nations and African Union have observed this troubling decline, expressing concern that reduced peacekeeping deployments could further exacerbate the already precarious security vacuum.

In light of these developments, both the ISS and the Soufan Center implore the federal government to urgently mend ties with the regional states and the opposition. The ISS warns that absent political reconciliation, Somalia risks losing both territory and the legitimacy of its governing institutions. Moving forward, can unity and reconciliation transform the landscape, or are we witnessing the impending decline of a nation caught in a web of its own politics?

As we navigate the complexities of Somalia’s future, these questions require not just answers, but actionable dialogue. It’s a weighty challenge, but one that underscores the necessity for all stakeholders to come together.

Edited By Ali Musa

Axadle Times International—Monitoring.