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Somali intelligence forces kill 12 al-Shabaab militants in Galguduud raid

Somalia says 12 al-Shabaab fighters killed in Galguduud raid as forces press pursuit toward El-Buur

Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency said Friday it killed at least 12 al-Shabaab fighters, including what it described as senior figures, during a raid on a militant training site in the country’s central Galguduud region. The operation, conducted with unspecified international partners, also wounded 13 others and sent surviving militants fleeing toward the El-Buur district, according to the agency.

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What happened

NISA said the strike hit a training camp in the Ceel-dhiiqo Weyne area, a sparsely populated belt of scrubland between the settlements of Ceel-lahelay and Ceel-garas. Officials said the compound had been used to prepare more than 400 recruits for attacks on civilians and government institutions—part of al-Shabaab’s long-running campaign to unseat Somalia’s federal authorities and disrupt local administrations.

Security forces were pursuing militants who scattered toward El-Buur after the raid. NISA did not immediately provide images of the site or name the “senior leaders” it said were killed. Casualty figures in active conflict zones are often difficult to verify quickly, and journalists and independent observers have limited access to the area because of poor roads and security restrictions. There was no immediate comment from al-Shabaab.

Why it matters

The operation underscores how the war with al-Shabaab is evolving in central Somalia, where the government has tried to chip away at insurgent strongholds while steadying newly reclaimed towns. Galguduud sits on a strategic axis linking the country’s south with the central trade hub of Galkayo. Al-Shabaab has used rural sanctuaries here to stage ambushes, tax commerce, and rotate fighters. Dislodging a training camp—if sustained—matters not only for today’s battlefield, but for tomorrow’s recruitment pipeline.

Somalia’s government launched a new phase of offensives in 2022, aided by clan militias, to roll back the group’s influence across parts of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, and Galmudug’s interior. Gains have been real but uneven. In several places, militants have melted away only to return with roadside bombs, extortion rackets, or targeted assassinations. The challenge being tested in Galguduud is one many conflict-affected states face: can the state move from clearing to holding, and then to building?

On the ground in Galguduud

Central Somalia’s front lines are not neat. A week can bring skirmishes along dry riverbeds, a convoy rolling past a cluster of acacia trees, and at dusk the quiet return of families to compounds built of corrugated iron and mud. Ceel-garas, referenced by NISA in Friday’s statement, has seen fighting in recent years as federal and regional forces tried to pry open roads that al-Shabaab mines or taxes. In this landscape, an “operation” can be a mix of human intelligence, local militia knowledge, and aerial surveillance—sometimes assisted by foreign partners who prefer not to be named.

For civilians, the stakes are immediate. Cutting off a training base can reduce the flow of new enforcers into nearby villages, where al-Shabaab collects so-called taxes and imposes shadow courts. The United Nations and independent experts have estimated the group raises well over $100 million a year through such mechanisms, money that underwrites explosives, payments to fighters, and logistics. That financial resilience helps explain why the conflict endures even after tactical setbacks.

Regional and international backdrop

The raid also comes as Somalia’s security architecture is in flux. International security assistance is evolving, with foreign partners providing training, equipment, intelligence and occasional air support, while African-led peace support forces draw down in phases. That shifting mix puts more pressure on Somali units—intelligence officers, commandos, police, and allied local fighters—to carry more of the load.

Washington has periodically conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab targets and offers training and advisory support; other partners have helped train elite units that spearhead raids like Friday’s. In public, most of those partners have emphasized a long game: professionalizing Somali forces, strengthening local governance, and widening the space for basic services so that communities are less vulnerable to militant coercion.

What to watch next

  • Whether Somali forces can hold ground around the targeted site and prevent militants from regrouping in adjacent villages or shifting to new hideouts.
  • Any indication of retaliatory attacks in urban centers or along highway corridors that al-Shabaab has hit with roadside bombs in the past.
  • Follow-through on disrupting recruitment and logistics, including arrests, defections, or additional raids on safehouses and arms caches.
  • Humanitarian access in Galguduud, where insecurity and climate shocks have uprooted families; aid groups often struggle to move safely when front lines shift.

Official statements and verification

Friday’s casualty toll and details about the camp originate from NISA, which rarely discloses the full extent of foreign involvement in operations. Al-Shabaab typically disputes government claims or issues its own statements highlighting government losses. Independent verification may take days. Mobile networks in parts of Galguduud can be intermittent, and areas around El-Buur have toggled between contested and militant control—factors that complicate reporting.

Still, the emphasis on a training facility is notable. Training camps are the organizational backbone of al-Shabaab’s insurgency, where new recruits are indoctrinated and veteran fighters cycle through for specialized skills. Striking one can ripple outward: fewer fresh fighters, fewer bomb-makers, and fewer men dispatched to plant improvised explosives along roads used by traders, aid workers, and soldiers alike.

Somalia’s leaders argue that the cumulative effect of such raids will, over time, narrow the insurgents’ options. The question—familiar to conflicts from the Sahel to Southeast Asia—is whether the state can keep up the tempo, protect civilians, and build trust fast enough to keep fighters from returning. In Galguduud this week, that test is again underway.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.

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