Somalia’s Senate: How the Upper House Lost Its Grip on Federalism
MOGADISHU — Somalia’s experiment with federalism, long touted as a path out of decades of central rule and clan rivalry, now faces a painful test. The country’s Upper House — the Senate — was created to be the bulwark of regional interests and a mediator between Mogadishu and the federal member states. Instead, critics say, it has been reduced to a largely ceremonial body as the executive consolidates power and regional grievances harden into open confrontation.
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The erosion of a constitutional safeguard
Senator Abdiqani Geelle of Puntland State, speaking from Garowe, condemned what he sees as the Senate’s decline. “The Upper House has lost its purpose,” he told local media. “It was intended to be a platform for federal harmony, but today it no longer serves that purpose. It’s inactive and disconnected.”
That critique echoes widespread frustration among politicians and civic leaders in Somalia’s member states. Several senators, lawmakers and regional officials describe an institution that seldom intervenes when the federal government and regions clash. Instead of negotiating compromises, the chamber appears paralysed — its members complaining that their primary role has become attending sessions and collecting salaries rather than protecting the constitutional balance.
Somalia’s 2012 provisional constitution envisaged a delicate balance: a powerful, unitary executive in Mogadishu constrained by a representative Upper House that would guard regional prerogatives. The reality on the ground, some worry, is moving in the opposite direction. They point to a Lower House that frequently passes executive proposals with minimal debate — a pattern that erodes trust and widens the gap between the centre and periphery.
The Jubaland flashpoint: Gedo, Addis Ababa and regional anxieties
The friction crystallized in public last month when relations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Jubaland leader Ahmed Madobe turned openly hostile. Reports in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa suggested discussion of creating a parallel administration in parts of Jubaland, notably the Gedo region — a move many see as tantamount to carving up a federal member state.
President Mohamud’s trip to Addis Ababa has been read by analysts as an attempt to secure regional backing for such plans. Ethiopian and Kenyan officials, however, responded sharply, warning against measures that would inflame tensions and risk cross-border instability. For Nairobi and Addis Ababa, Jubaland is not merely a domestic Somali issue: the region sits along key routes used to fight Al-Shabaab and hosts populations whose movements and grievances can spill across borders.
“When central authorities move to absorb regional assets or territory, it is not just a constitutional quarrel,” said a Horn of Africa analyst. “It is a security and humanitarian concern for neighbouring states as well.”
Why the Senate’s weakening matters beyond Mogadishu
When mechanisms meant to manage diversity fail, grievances can metastasize quickly. In Somalia’s case, that risk is compounded by the persistent presence of Al-Shabaab militants who exploit political vacuums and local grievances to recruit or stage attacks. A senate that could credibly adjudicate disputes, represent local voices and check executive overreach would reduce the likelihood that regional leaders seek external patrons or resort to force.
Trust is fragile in Somalia. Many regions have negotiated their own security arrangements with international partners and host foreign military and intelligence cooperation. When those local bargains feel threatened by decisions in Mogadishu, regional leaders may double down on autonomy — or seek outside backing. That dynamic has obvious implications for regional powers, who repeatedly warn of destabilising spillovers.
From a wider pattern: centralization in fragile states
The Somali story is part of a broader global pattern in post-conflict states: executives tempted to centralize authority in the name of stability, while local actors push back to defend autonomy and local governance. Whether in parts of the Sahel, Iraq’s provinces, or other post-conflict federations, the tension between the need for coherent national policy and the imperative of local inclusion plays out with high stakes.
International actors — including the African Union, the United Nations and neighbouring capitals — have an interest in preventing escalation. But heavy-handed external intervention can also delegitimise local institutions. What many Somali regional leaders and civil society activists call for is a reinvigorated domestic approach: a Senate that operates independently, mediates disputes transparently, and brings local constituencies into national decision-making.
Paths to repair and the questions ahead
Rebuilding trust will not be easy. Strengthening the Senate requires more than legislative tweaks: it depends on political will in Mogadishu, pressure from the member states, and perhaps technical support from international partners to improve institutional capacity. Concrete steps could include strengthening consultative mechanisms before major decisions about territories or administrations are taken; ensuring senators have safe access to their constituencies; and empowering the Upper House to initiate independent reviews of executive proposals that touch on regional powers.
But these are pragmatic fixes in a highly political context. Would President Mohamud and his allies accept a more assertive Senate that could frustrate central initiatives? Would regional leaders be willing to bring disagreements into formal legal and parliamentary channels rather than court regional alliances? And crucially, can Somalia’s political class summon the compromise and restraint necessary to let its federal experiment mature?
The answers will shape not only Somalia’s internal trajectory but the stability of the broader Horn of Africa. Without a functioning forum to reconcile competing claims, the risk of fragmentation grows — and with it, the opportunities for extremist groups and foreign spoilers to deepen the fracturing.
Somalia’s Senate was created as a safety valve — a place for local voices to be heard in the national script. If it is to play that role again, it must move from the margins back to the center of Somali politics, as a convener, adjudicator and defender of constitutional balance. Otherwise, federalism itself may be the casualty.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
