Why Hassan Sheikh’s Addis visit matters: a recalibration in the Horn
At a glance
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When Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Addis Ababa this week for talks with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the official line was familiar: friendly neighbours discussing “bilateral and regional issues of mutual interest.” Behind the diplomatic language, however, lay a fraught effort by Mogadishu to reshape the political map of southern Somalia — and to pull a wary Ethiopia into the middle of a struggle that has implications for the entire Horn of Africa.
What brought them together
The visit, coming days after Hassan Sheikh’s trip to Kismayo, was triggered by tensions in Jubaland and the disputed status of Gedo, a border region that has become an intense focal point of federal-regional rivalry. Jubaland’s president, Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe,” controls Kismayo’s port — a strategic prize — and has resisted moves from Mogadishu to weaken his administration. For months, Somali federal authorities have been accused of seeking to create a parallel administration in Gedo, a move that would peel territory away from Jubaland and strengthen the centre’s hand.
Analysts say the stakes go beyond one region. “This is about the future shape of Somalia’s federal model, and which actors — local strongmen, Mogadishu, or external powers — get to decide it,” said Rashid Abdi, a Horn of Africa security specialist. “Ethiopia’s involvement is decisive because Addis can either deter escalation or become a party that tips the balance.”
Layers of interest: Addis, Mogadishu and the neighbourhood
Ethiopia’s calculus
For Prime Minister Abiy, the default interest is stability. Addis Ababa has long feared that local disputes along its border might spill into Ethiopian territory, feed Islamist insurgents, or create refugee flows. Intelligence visits to Doolow in Gedo over the weekend — reported by regional media and confirmed to journalists by anonymous sources — were meant as a clear warning: Ethiopia does not want parallel administrations or sudden changes that could unsettle the borderlands.
But Eritrea, Kenya, Turkey, the Gulf states and others have been active across Somalia, and Ethiopia must also weigh its diplomatic relationships. The country’s own recent flirtations with North Western State of Somalia — involving a reported plan to acquire coastline in return for recognition — collapsed after protests from Mogadishu and a Turkish-mediated pause. That episode showed how quickly geopolitical manoeuvres can provoke diplomatic rows in a region where maritime access and port control are coveted.
Mogadishu’s push and internal politics
President Hassan Sheikh has signalled an intent to reassert federal authority over fractious states. Backing a new administrative carve-out in Gedo would deprive Madobe of strategic leverage and could be presented in Mogadishu as a defence of national unity. But it risks provoking open conflict in southern Somalia, where clan loyalties, local power brokers and armed groups make any political engineering perilous.
“Leaders in Mogadishu are trying to centralise after years of decentralised power, but centralisation without broad consensus is a recipe for more violence,” said a Somali academic in Mogadishu who requested anonymity for fear of reprisal. “The people of Gedo and Jubaland haven’t been part of a conversation that the federal government can impose from above.”
Broader implications for the Horn
Port politics and outside actors
Control of ports is the currency of influence in the Horn. Kismayo provides access to the Indian Ocean; Berbera and North Western State of Somalia’s coastline offer alternative corridors; and Ethiopia, landlocked since 1993, needs reliable access points. Turkey, Qatar, the UAE and China have all invested in port infrastructure and diplomatic ties across Somalia. Any realignment over Gedo or Jubaland could ripple into competition for maritime routes and trade corridors.
We’re seeing a pattern: domestic disputes become regional flashpoints because neighbours have security, economic and geopolitical stakes. The consequence is that local quarrels are rarely local for long.
Security risks
There is a clear security dimension. Al Shabaab retains the capacity to exploit instability, and a contested political realignment could open space for militants to regroup. International partners — including the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Kenya, and Western donors — will be watching closely. If fighting erupts, humanitarian displacement could spike, and the delicate process of transitioning security responsibilities from foreign forces to Somali institutions will be slowed.
Where does this leave the region?
Questions that matter
- Can Addis Ababa act as an honest broker, or will its engagement be seen as siding with Mogadishu?
- Will Mogadishu’s push for centralisation deepen national cohesion or fracture it further along clan and regional lines?
- How will neighbouring powers — Kenya, Turkey, the Gulf states — respond if the balance in southern Somalia shifts?
Answers are not imminent. The last-minute meeting in Addis, reportedly meant to forestall a planned visit by North Western State of Somalia’s leader, highlights the urgent diplomacy at play. But diplomacy can only paper over deeper structural questions: how to build a Somali federation that reconciles centrifugal forces, how to integrate local administrations into national frameworks, and how to prevent external competition from turning domestic politics into proxy battles.
The human element
Beyond geopolitics are the people who live with the consequences. Traders in Kismayo worry that renewed unrest will choke commerce; pastoralists in Gedo fret about cross-border movement and drought; families in Mogadishu and the diaspora watch anxiously as political theatre edges toward potential violence. The Horn’s history is littered with moments where elite deals in capital cities yielded costly outcomes on the ground.
As leaders return home and pronouncements are issued, the critical test will be whether regional diplomacy produces tangible safeguards for communities, or merely swaps one set of patrons for another. In a part of the world where borders have long been porous and loyalties layered, the decisions made in Addis this week could well reverberate for years.
The question for policymakers and citizens alike is straightforward: are they prepared to pursue a stable, inclusive settlement, or will short-term gains be prioritised at the expense of long-term peace?
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
