Three Years of HSM Leadership: Achievements, Setbacks, and Future Pathways

Three years ago, on May 15, 2022, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as the President of Somalia following a lengthy indirect electoral process. This marked his return to the presidency—notably, his second non-consecutive term—as he had previously served from September 2012 to February 2017. His comeback was widely celebrated, reflecting a collective hope that his prior experience would provide invaluable lessons. Having spent nearly five years in power and another five years in opposition, many believed he was primed to navigate the turbulent waters of governance and security with renewed vigor. Yet, lurking beneath these optimistic sentiments were familiar challenges: the persistent threat from al-Shabaab, heavy reliance on donor funding for the national budget, deep political divisions, and the complex dynamics of foreign powers vying for influence in Somalia’s affairs. During his campaign, Hassan Sheikh espoused ambitious reforms, asserting that his government would focus on finalizing the constitution and fostering reconciliation at home and abroad. His mantra encapsulated this vision: “Soomaali heshiis ah, dunidana heshiis la ah,” which roughly translates to “Somalis at peace with themselves and at peace with the outside world.”

Now, as his administration enters its concluding year before the next election on May 15, 2026, an essential question arises: How much progress has been achieved in the last three years? And, with the clock ticking, what can President Hassan Sheikh and his team realistically accomplish in the time remaining? This commentary seeks to explore these questions by reviewing the key milestones, setbacks, and challenges faced over the past three years, while also outlining priorities for the year ahead.

Key Achievements

In the early months of his administration, President Hassan Sheikh’s focus leaned heavily toward appointing a Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, and special envoys. Progress became evident later in 2022 when the government allied with local Macawisley forces in the Hiiraan region to combat al-Shabaab effectively. Throughout 2023, this struggle against al-Shabaab took center stage, culminating in pivotal operations led by the President himself from Dhusamareb, the capital of Galmudug State. The government successfully seized key territories from al-Shabaab, including Adan Yabal and Runirgood in the Middle Shabelle region, Harardhere in Mudug, and Galcad and Wabho in Galgaduud. This offensive sought to coincide with the anticipated conclusion of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, recently rebranded as the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Unfortunately, the transition met with delays, although a recent troop-contributing countries meeting in Kampala proposed an infusion of 8,000 additional troops in response to Somalia’s ongoing security crisis.

On the domestic front, ongoing meetings among National Consultative Council (NCC) members led to essential political agreements on contentious issues such as power distribution, the judiciary model, fiscal federalism, national security frameworks, and elections. These agreements were foundational for constitutional revisions by independent bodies tasked with overseeing the review and finalization of the provisional federal constitution. Yet, even with such progress, the amendment process and moves toward democratization remain precarious and fraught with political tension.

Internationally, significant strides were also noted, particularly in 2023 and 2024. Somalia’s accession to the East African Community (EAC) in November 2023 marked a major milestone, making it the eighth member of this regional bloc. Equally groundbreaking was the December 2023 lifting of a long-standing arms embargo on the Somali Armed Forces by the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the federal government completed the debt relief process through the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, securing a remarkable $4.5 billion forgiveness of debt. And if that weren’t enough to celebrate, Somalia acquired a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2025–2026 term, ending a 54-year absence, achieving this feat with over two-thirds majority votes in the UN General Assembly.

Setbacks and Critical Challenges

However, while some achievements were commendable, setbacks painted a stark picture of ongoing challenges. Despite the positive international momentum, domestic issues proved more entangled. For instance, a significant blow came with the harrowing events in Owsweyne in late August 2023 when the Somali National Army (SNA) faced a brutal, coordinated onslaught by al-Shabaab. The attack decimated an SNA encampment with suicide bombings followed by ground assaults, leading to immense losses. The aftermath crippled subsequent offensives, and morale plummeted. The challenges of maintaining supply lines, coordinating newly trained forces, and managing the emotional state of troops already battered from losses only exacerbated the situation. Is this the harsh reality of modern warfare, where every small victory seems countered by a monumental collapse?

Further complicating matters, a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and the former President of North Western State of Somalia in January 2024 diverted the government’s focus. This diplomatic rift consumed valuable time and resources and opened new avenues for al-Shabaab recruitment, leveraging the distraction to their advantage. As the complexities mounted, al-Shabaab seized opportunities to regain territories previously secured by the government, underscoring a frustrating cycle of advances and retreats—a lesson in the unpredictability of Somalia’s theater of war.

Tensions within the National Consultative Council deepened, especially between the federal government and Northeastern State. Political agreements reached in December 2022 triggered a backlash from Northeastern State’s leadership, who viewed these agreements as a push toward centralization of power. This friction led to an extended absence from NCC meetings and a severe breakdown in collaborative political processes, effectively stymieing progress. Likewise, opposition to electoral reforms solidified, with new pathways being blocked and old grievances resurfacing. The 27 May 2023 political agreement on elections became another contentious battleground with its convoluted revisions leading to further disagreement among critical regional stakeholders.

Priorities for the Year Ahead

With just one year remaining, the stakes are high. The federal government faces a pressing need to reevaluate its roadmap toward the One Person, One Vote (OPOV) elections. Completing such elections within a year, given the current infrastructure, seems not only unrealistic but also potentially detrimental. Instead, perhaps a shift in focus is vital—prioritizing security, fostering constructive relationships with Federal Member States (FMS), and laying the groundwork for a transitional political framework.

To that end, the FGS should consider repositioning the SNA into a more defensively oriented strategy, allowing for a comprehensive security reform initiative. An increase in AUSSOM funding could significantly bolster ongoing operations and alleviate some burdens from Somali forces. Concurrently, the President’s recent initiatives for national dialogue should include stakeholders from various political factions to encourage discussion around the upcoming political transition.

This brings us to the importance of delivering tangible reconciliation efforts with Northeastern State and Jubaland. Engaging these regional leaders could prove crucial for the upcoming electoral cycle. Recognizing the validity of their concerns could act as a bridge to facilitate harmonization of the electoral process and potentially create openings for new candidates, enhancing the democratic landscape.

Lastly, fostering dialogue with opposition figures and civil society can uncover middle-ground solutions for the parliamentary elections. Given the broad consensus against reverting to a 2021-22 indirect election system, it’s critical to explore enhanced electoral models that satisfy diverse stakeholders. Could finding this balance not only avert political violence but also lay the foundation for a more stable political future?

In these turbulent times, clarity around the next political dispensation is not merely a goal but a necessity. Steering Somalia away from the unrest witnessed in 2021 around the indirect elections is paramount. With the current security dynamics at play, all government actors must regard this as a top priority.

Edited By Ali Musa
Axadle Times International – Monitoring

This revised content maintains an approachable yet professional tone, enriched with details and emotional connection. The varied sentence lengths provide a natural rhythm to the reading experience.