Somalia’s Prime Minister Holds Talks with Arab League Envoy After Attack on Ethiopian Ambassador

Somalia Courts Regional Backing as Horn of Africa Rivalries Reassert

MOGADISHU — When Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre received Arab League envoy Abdullah Al‑Qutaybi this week, the talk was expectedly upbeat: cooperation on politics, economics and security, and a pledge that a high‑level Arab League team will soon visit Mogadishu to launch development projects. But behind the protocol and photo‑ops lies a more urgent calculus — Somalia is trying to rebuild diplomatic bridges and shore up external support in a neighbourhood where old disputes are being reshaped by new power plays.

The encounter, held in the capital’s government quarter, came against the backdrop of a bruising year of broken ties and a wider regional jockeying in the Horn of Africa. Somali officials framed the meeting as part of a broader push to diversify partnerships after a period of heightened tensions with Ethiopia and after signing defence arrangements with Egypt last year.

Repairing fences — or repositioning?

Barre spoke of political reforms, economic milestones and steadying the security situation, while the Arab League envoy signalled practical follow‑through: a delegation to oversee projects and closer cooperation with African Union and Somali authorities. For Mogadishu, the timing is significant. The government has spent months navigating the fallout from an April 2024 crisis when Somalia expelled Ethiopia’s ambassador and shuttered Ethiopian consulates in the self‑declared state of North Western State of Somalia and in Puntland State over a port agreement that Mogadishu saw as an affront to its sovereignty.

Those ruptures were partly mended in January 2025 under a Turkish‑brokered Ankara declaration, when Addis Ababa and Mogadishu agreed to reopen diplomatic channels. But new irritants quickly emerged. Egypt’s August 2024 security agreement with Somalia — which allows for the deployment of Egyptian personnel and equipment and envisages participation under the African Union stabilization mission (AUSSOM) — has revived anxieties in Addis Ababa about shifting regional alignments.

Ethiopia’s unease and a blunt warning

Speaking in Mogadishu this weekend, Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Somalia Suleiman Dedefo set out his country’s reservations bluntly. “We are neither threatened nor comfortable” with the presence of Egyptian forces, he told reporters, while adding that Egypt’s role should be limited to theatres where Addis Ababa sees less direct interest — “such as Palestine, Libya, or Sudan.”

Ethiopia regards the Egyptian deployment as part of a strategic contest to counter its influence, a suspicion fuelled by long‑running tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Cairo has for years argued that reductions in Nile flow would threaten its water security; Addis Ababa insists the vast hydroelectric project is essential to its development and does not imperil downstream neighbours.

From Mogadishu’s vantage point, the Egypt pact is sold as pragmatic help to rebuild a depleted Somali National Army and to strengthen the African Union’s stabilisation efforts against al‑Shabab. “Somalia needs partners who will commit to training and logistics,” a Somali security adviser said this week. “But partners also bring politics.”

Wider layers: external actors and local fault lines

The Horn of Africa has become a chessboard for regional and extra‑regional powers. Turkey’s recent mediation, Egypt’s deployments, Ethiopian sensitivities and the Arab League’s renewed interest are all symptomatic of a larger recalibration as states jockey for influence, economic footholds and strategic alliances.

For Somali political leaders, the appeal of Arab League ties is both historical and pragmatic. Somalia sits culturally and linguistically within the Arab world, and Arab states have been sources of remittances, investment and diplomatic outreach for decades. A formal Arab League presence offers Mogadishu the chance to widen its diplomatic umbrella beyond bilateral patronage and to attract development funds at a time when domestic revenues are low and the fight against Islamist militants drags on.

Yet this multilateral embrace may sharpen rather than soothe regional rivalries. Ethiopia’s warning reflects a broader fear: that security footprints can harden into spheres of influence, and military deployments — even under AU banners — can become tools in larger geopolitical contests.

• Egypt’s stated goal: help rebuild Somali forces and contribute to AU stabilization efforts.
• Ethiopia’s concern: the move could be part of a strategy to counter its ascendancy, especially in Nile politics.
• Mogadishu’s posture: seeking security and development partners while trying to preserve Somali sovereignty and unity, particularly over territories such as North Western State of Somalia.

Why this matters beyond the Horn

The interplay in the Horn affects global concerns: maritime trade through the Red Sea corridor, migration flows across the Gulf, and the stability of fragile states that have become havens for extremist groups. External interventions, if not carefully coordinated, risk turning localized disputes into wider proxy confrontations at a time when climate stress — droughts and erratic rainfall — is already intensifying competition for land and water.

There are institutional questions too. How should the African Union navigate member states’ deeply conflicting interests when those states also bring troops under AU missions? Can the AU uphold its neutrality and legitimacy when powerful members frame deployments in strategic terms?

Questions for the future

As Somalia welcomes Arab League delegations and manages the return of ties with Ethiopia, several questions loom. Can Mogadishu balance competing partners without eroding its sovereignty? Will Ethiopia see Egyptian forces as a permanent concern or a limited, AU‑sanctioned presence? And perhaps most importantly: will regional actors prioritize collective security and development over zero‑sum strategic gains?

On the streets of Mogadishu, where reconstruction meets the ever‑present reminders of conflict, people express both cautious optimism and fatigue. “We want schools, hospitals and roads, not battles fought in diplomatic chambers,” said a teacher returning to work near the seaside district of Hamarweyne. That sentence captures the core dilemma — ordinary Somalis need tangible improvements, but those improvements are entwined with external politics that their leaders must now negotiate on a fraught regional stage.

Somalia’s outreach to the Arab League is more than ceremonial. It is a test of whether a nation traumatised by decades of conflict can diversify its alliances without becoming a battleground for rival powers. The coming months will show whether Mogadishu’s diplomacy can translate into development on the ground, or whether broader regional rivalries will complicate the fragile gains it has made.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.