In the far reaches of northern Somalia, where the landscape is as complex as the political terrain, a curious conflict has bubbled up. The formation of Khatumo State has become the lightning rod of this controversy. At the heart of it all is Sanaag, where local leaders, with backing from Northeastern State and Sool, fiercely oppose this new state arrangement. Their argument? The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) seems to be orchestrating a maneuver that challenges the provisional constitution itself.

This crisis was brought into sharp focus by a telling report from Axadle. Their coverage, notably a July 11, 2025 post, unveils the tension. Mogadishu’s ambition to bring Sanaag and Haylaan under Khatumo’s umbrella appears to disregard the will of the locals, shaking the foundations of Somalia’s federal aspirations.

The origins of this upheaval trace back to Las Anod, the focal point for Khatumo’s birth. In 2023, the Dhulbahante clan, with support from networks in Northeastern State, managed to wrest control from North Western State of Somalia, a victory over an oppressive grip that exacted a heavy toll. As of April 2025, the FGS officially recognized SSC-Khatumo as a federal member state, encapsulating Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. However, this apparent triumph of self-rule soon morphed into a constitutional entanglement, thanks to Mogadishu’s purported overreach.

Sanaag’s local leaders, with Suldaan Siciid Suldaan Cabdisalaan at the helm, have taken a formidable stance. On July 11, 2025, a live broadcast stirred the country’s political waters when these leaders declared their loyalty to Northeastern State, distancing themselves from the events transpiring in Las Anod. This narrative was further amplified by Sool’s elder, Garaad Jaamac Garaad Cali, who emphasized that no decision about Sanaag’s future could proceed without the elders’ consent.

This resistance is more than just local defiance; it is a symptom of an underlying challenge within Somalia. The 2012 provisional constitution, a product of painstaking compromises like the Garowe Principles, is the safeguard against centralized dominance. Mogadishu’s unilateral action in Sanaag runs counter to this ethos, bypassing the constitutional requirement for mutual agreement on regional boundaries. The standoff has even led to Northeastern State’s withdrawal from the National Consultative Council, a move reported by Axadle on April 15, 2025, highlighting the fraying threads of the federation.

Isn’t it ironic? The FGS, in its bid to combat North Western State of Somalia’s secession, seems to be replicating centralized tactics. Ignoring the voices of Sanaag’s elders, Sool’s principal elder, and Northeastern State’s leadership could very well rekindle old conflicts. Axadle analysts warn against such an approach, suggesting that pushing Sanaag under Khatumo’s banner might stir more violence due to North Western State of Somalia’s persisted claims. What if President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud chose dialogue over dictates?

The federal vision for Somalia, although battered, is not beyond repair. Rather than imposing decisions, Mogadishu could facilitate a meaningful dialogue with Sanaag’s elders, Sool’s leaders, and other key stakeholders. By honoring the constitution’s preference for shared power, the FGS might not only uphold law but foster harmony.

As Axadle poignantly reminds, the unity of Somalia hinges on honoring the will of its regions. The triumph in Las Anod demonstrated the power of solidarity, while Sanaag’s resistance underscores the costs of division. President Mohamud has a choice to make—embrace cooperation or risk tearing the federation apart.