Somalia’s deputy minister dismisses plans to create ‘New Jubaland’ in Gedo

Somalia’s government swats down ‘New Jubaland’ talk — but the rumor reveals deeper strains

Somalia’s federal government has moved to tamp down rising chatter about a breakaway “New Jubaland” in the country’s southwest, a rumor that ricocheted through community meetings and WhatsApp groups long before officials stepped in. The denial is clear. The politics behind it are anything but.

What the deputy minister said

In an interview with the Somali outlet Arlaadi Media, Deputy Interior Minister Sadad Aliyow dismissed claims that a new regional administration was being assembled in Gedo. “There are no government plans or discussions to create such an entity,” the deputy minister said, adding that the ministry has not received any formal proposal to split the region from Jubaland.

Instead, Aliyow stressed, Mogadishu remains in talks with the existing Jubaland leadership on governance and power-sharing — and is working to bring Jubaland back into the National Consultative Forum, the gathering where federal and regional leaders thrash out policy priorities and political mechanics. Those talks, by the deputy minister’s account, have been attempted several times but have yet to deliver. In Somali politics, that counts as both a familiar story and an urgent warning.

Why Gedo matters

Gedo is the hinge of southern Somalia. It borders Kenya and Ethiopia, straddles key trade and smuggling corridors, and sits astride the road and river routes linking Mogadishu to the Indian Ocean port of Kismayo. For years, it has been a security chessboard: local militias, federal forces, Jubaland’s troops, and Al-Shabaab fighters have all maneuvered through its towns and scrubland. The stakes are not abstract. When Gedo is tense, markets in Bardhere and Beled-Hawo slow, cross-border trade sputters at Mandera, and Kismayo’s port feels the tremor.

That geography is why rumors of a “New Jubaland” caught fire. In a region where borders are lines on a map and lifelines for economy and security, the idea of a fresh administrative carve-out prompts questions about who commands the police, who collects customs, and whose flag flies at key junctions.

The rumor and the politics of federalism

Somalia’s federal experiment, a decade in the making, has always been a negotiation between center and periphery. Jubaland — anchored in Kismayo and led since 2013 by Ahmed Madobe — has often been the most assertive test case. Disputes over security control, revenue sharing, and representation in federal institutions have put Mogadishu and Kismayo at odds on more than one occasion. In 2019 and 2020, friction in Gedo boiled over into competing security deployments and dueling claims of authority, underscoring how fast constitutional theory can turn into checkpoint reality.

In that light, the “New Jubaland” chatter looks less like an isolated rumor and more like a manifestation of enduring debate: what power should the federal government wield over regions; how are resources from ports and borders shared; and who speaks for local communities when national politics become polarized? Somalia’s constitutional review — on the table for years, with several key chapters still contested — is meant to answer those questions. But as in any young federation, when legal ambiguities linger, political actors test the edges. Rumors, in turn, become a tool and a temperature check.

It is telling that Aliyow’s intervention emphasized process. Getting Jubaland back to the National Consultative Forum isn’t simply housekeeping; it is a signal that dialogue — not parallel structures — remains the chosen path. For Somalis who have watched local councils form and dissolve and watched allegiances shift with each election cycle, that reassurance matters.

Regional stakes: Kenya and Ethiopia

Any move in Gedo echoes across borders. Kenya’s security posture in Mandera and its long-running engagement in the fight against Al-Shabaab leave Nairobi watching developments to the north with a wary eye. Ethiopia, managing its own internal pressures and border security concerns, similarly values predictability on the Somali side of the frontier. Both neighbors want to see Somalia’s federal-regional ties stabilized, particularly as the African Union’s transition mission continues to draw down and Somali forces shoulder more of the security load in the south.

That drawdown is its own clock. The shift from an international to a Somali-led security architecture makes clear, predictable chains of command even more crucial. When rumors of administrative splinters surface, they are not just political headaches; they are potential operational risks. A roadblock in Gedo can slow a counterinsurgency campaign hundreds of kilometers away.

The cost of prolonged estrangement

Beyond the political chessboard, there is the everyday ledger. Traders need to know which customs rates apply. Elders need a neutral table at which local grievances can be mediated. Teachers and nurses need salaries to flow without interruption when institutions jostle for primacy. Donors and aid groups — still vital in parts of Gedo and Lower Juba — need a single, accountable counterpart when food prices spike or floods wash away roads.

Somalis often say, “Nabad iyo caano” — peace and milk — as a shorthand for normal life. Peace is the promise of a functional federal bargain; milk is the promise of an economy that can breathe. The longer Mogadishu and Kismayo remain locked in a cycle of suspicion, the more that proverb feels like a distant aspiration in communities that simply want schools open and markets stocked.

Information in the age of WhatsApp

This week’s rumor also highlights a newer reality: in Somalia, as elsewhere, information moves faster than institutions. A voice note here, a screenshot there, and within hours an unverified claim becomes conventional wisdom in cafes from Mogadishu’s Hodan district to tea shops in Garbahaarrey. The deputy minister’s denial may not end the talk, but it sets a baseline for accountability: officials can be held to their words, and those words can be checked against actions in the weeks ahead.

What to watch

• Whether Jubaland reenters the National Consultative Forum with a clear agenda and timeline.
• Concrete steps toward joint security arrangements in Gedo — who commands, who pays, who is accountable.
• Local reconciliation processes, particularly district council formation and mechanisms to air grievances without securitizing them.
• Transparency on revenue-sharing from Kismayo port and border crossings, often the quiet heart of louder political disputes.
• How the AU mission drawdown intersects with these political dynamics; transitions magnify governance gaps.

A chance to reset

The deputy minister’s message was narrow: there is no “New Jubaland” in the works. But the moment is wider than the denial. It is an invitation to return to first principles — to make the federal bargain work at the granular level of salaries, services, and security protocols, and to bring Jubaland back into the national room where such bargains are hammered out.

Somalia’s recent political history is a tapestry of near misses and hard-won accommodations. At their best, Somali leaders have found ways to turn rumors into conversations, and conversations into agreements that hold long enough for people to feel the difference. Can Mogadishu and Kismayo do that again? And can Gedo — so often a flashpoint — become a proof point that federalism here can be both flexible and firm?

For now, the government’s line is firm: no new administration, no parallel track. The next move belongs to the negotiators — and to the communities who live with the consequences of what is agreed, or not.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.