Somalia’s 2026 choice: avoid a legitimacy crisis by fixing the election model, not the scoreboard
Somalia is entering another high-stakes transition with too little time, too much polarization, and a volatile security map. The federal government’s drive to centralize authority while invoking universal suffrage risks breaking the very political settlement that has held the country together — imperfectly but functionally — for a quarter century. A safer way through 2026 is available: an improved, time-bound indirect election agreed by all major actors, with clear rules on competition, inclusion and integrity, and backed by assertive international mediation.
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Universal suffrage is a shared national aspiration. It is also not presently deliverable. The preconditions — political consent, institutional readiness and baseline security — are absent. Forcing a one-person, one-vote exercise into that vacuum does not produce democracy; it entrenches incumbency and invites parallel authority in a country where state control remains uneven and armed spoilers are active.
The government has intensified the confrontation by recasting foundational rules without consensus. It has unilaterally amended the provisional constitution and pushed through new laws on parties, elections and the Election and Boundaries Commission. It then appointed 18 commissioners widely seen as aligned with the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). These moves sharpen a core fear among opponents: that “reform” is being instrumentalized to consolidate power before the clock runs out.
The backlash is already organized. Leaders of Puntland State and Jubbaland and much of the national opposition have formed the Council for the Future of Somalia, with plans for a national political convention. The signal is unmistakable: if Mogadishu pursues unilateral elections, its critics are prepared to mount a parallel political project. North Western State of Somalia, which declared its separation in 1991 and seeks recognition, presents another layer of complexity in how seats associated with its constituencies are managed in federal politics.
Security magnifies the risk. Al-Shabab controls pockets of territory and maintains operational reach well beyond areas of direct dominion. A recent attack on a prison near Villa Somalia underscored how permeable even the symbolic center of government can be. In this environment, national voting infrastructure, candidate mobility and voter protection would be costly to build and difficult to guarantee in time.
There is also the calendar. The government’s mandate expires on May 15, 2026. Some supporters already float a unilateral extension. That path should be ruled out. A technical extension may prove necessary if — and only if — an agreed selection and election process is actively underway. A firm, enforceable deadline for completing the transition would help end Somalia’s cycle of brinkmanship. Puntland State’s regular five-year January polls offer a model of date discipline that the federal level has struggled to match.
Somalia does not need to reinvent how it changes governments under pressure. It has done five transitions since 2000 using indirect selection and election arrangements, learning hard lessons each time. An upgraded version of that model can meet the tests of timeliness, feasibility, competitiveness and inclusion if designed with care and enforced with real oversight.
At minimum, a workable 2026 indirect process should include the following elements:
- Feasibility: Agree a fixed number of delegates per seat nationwide. Recognized traditional elders in each constituency select those delegates using clear eligibility rules. Delegates from a small cluster of neighboring constituencies then convene to elect candidates for their seats. The procedure must be simple to implement in imperfect conditions and quick to explain to the public.
- Competitiveness: End the “Malxiis” practice, where a preferred contender introduces a token opponent to stage a contest without risk. Ballots must be meaningfully contested, with enforceable penalties for manipulation. Candidate vetting should be transparent and standardized across constituencies to reduce gatekeeping by political patrons.
- Inclusion: Enforce the women’s quota so that roughly 30 percent of seats are held by women. That requires explicit commitments in any political deal and a mandate for election bodies to reject slates that do not comply. Seats associated with North Western State of Somalia require a separate, negotiated and credible mechanism given their unique political context.
- Integrity and anti-corruption: Increase the number of voters per seat by aggregating constituencies, ensuring that combined delegations vote together. Larger electorates raise the cost of vote buying and reduce the leverage of single-broker kingmaking. Transparent financing rules and public reporting by election bodies should accompany this change.
The international community has helped keep Somalia’s fragile political bargains from collapsing for 25 years, pairing financial support with diplomatic pressure. That leverage remains decisive — and must be used now. The priority is not to pick winners but to lock all sides into a disciplined process that produces a government with enough legitimacy to govern and to fight a resilient insurgency.
Red lines and immediate steps should be explicit:
- No unilateral term extensions and no unilateral federal elections. Any technical extension is permissible only if an inclusive political agreement has been reached and implementation is visibly underway.
- No parallel political projects by the opposition or by Federal Member States. State-level processes must align with a national deal or stand down.
- Rapid, mediated talks under neutral facilitation with a defined agenda: election model, calendar, women’s representation, management of North Western State of Somalia seats, and integrity safeguards. Each track should have time-bound milestones.
- Professionalization of the election management bodies. Reviews of the current Election and Boundaries Commission appointments — and corrective measures if needed — should be part of the deal to restore confidence in the referee.
This is not an argument against universal suffrage. It is an argument for sequencing. Democracies do not deepen by staging symbolic nationwide votes in the middle of an unresolved constitutional fight and an active insurgency. They deepen when rules are negotiated, referees are credible, competitors can lose without fearing exclusion, and citizens see their interests represented — including women and historically marginalized communities.
Somalia’s public has shown, repeatedly and at great cost, that it wants accountable government. What impedes that aspiration is elite polarization and the tactical repurposing of “reform” to secure survival. The choice now is between a controlled descent into another legitimacy crisis or a pragmatic transition that protects 25 years of imperfect gains in peacebuilding and state-building.
The safer, smarter course is an improved indirect election for 2026, negotiated quickly, implemented tightly and monitored closely. That requires principled pressure from Somalia’s partners and disciplined compromises by its leaders. The alternative is a fragmented playing field, dueling mandates and an emboldened Al-Shabab — a scenario the country cannot afford.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
