Analysis: U.S.-backed airpower reshapes Somalia’s fight with al-Shabab — but can gains hold as peacekeepers depart?
Somalia’s government says a combination of U.S.-supported airstrikes and newly expanded ground operations has shifted the momentum in its long war with al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab. Officials tout battlefield gains, especially the retaking of territory long held by the militants and strikes on leadership nodes and bomb-making networks. The turn comes as African Union peacekeepers draw down and Somali forces assume more responsibility for security — a high-stakes transition that will test whether recent gains can be turned into durable control.
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Al-Shabab, which emerged from the Islamic Courts Union in the mid-2000s and pledged allegiance to al-Qaida, once controlled much of southern and central Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu. African Union troops pushed it out of the capital in 2011. The group adapted, reverting to guerrilla tactics, suicide bombings and targeted assassinations while maintaining revenue through taxation and extortion. The United States has conducted airstrikes in Somalia for more than a decade; after a 2020 drawdown, the Biden administration redeployed forces in 2022 to restore a sustained advisory and counterterrorism presence.
What has changed lately is the synchronization of ground offensives with persistent aerial surveillance and precision strikes. Somali commanders and analysts say that pairing has altered a fight long characterized by parity on the ground and limited state reach in the hinterlands.
On the map, officials point to a string of reclaimed areas in Lower Shabelle, Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle and parts of Jubbaland — regions where al-Shabab leveraged rural sanctuaries and supply routes. In Lower Shabelle, the government cites Jilib Marka, Gendershe and Dhanaane as longtime strongholds now under military control. In central Hiiraan, it lists Taydaan and Yasooman, and operations near Masjid Ali Gaduud in Middle Shabelle. In Jubbaland’s Kudhaa area, authorities say joint actions by regional Darawiish units and Somalia’s U.S.-trained Danab special forces killed dozens of militants and seized vehicles.
Al-Shabab has not confirmed those losses, and access to contested areas is restricted, complicating independent verification. Still, the pattern is notable: advances typically follow targeted strikes that hit leadership compounds, training sites or the infrastructure behind improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne bombs. Somali intelligence services, officials say, feed verified targeting data to U.S. Africa Command, which conducts strikes in coordination with the federal government and says it assesses civilian harm risks before firing.
Mogadishu-based analysts describe the cumulative effect. Expanded drone coverage has exposed underground hideouts, arms depots and clandestine logistics lines that were once hard to reach. Once those nodes are degraded from the air, ground units can push into villages and road junctions with fewer ambush risks. Around Mogadishu, officials say drones now provide early warning of militant movement, even as al-Shabab continues to stage bombings despite tightened security.
The timing matters. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia is reducing its footprint as part of a yearslong handover to Somali authorities. That drawdown raises the stakes for Somali forces to hold recaptured ground and keep pressure on militant networks without the same level of international troop presence. It also makes aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — capabilities still largely supplied by partners — more pivotal to a strategy that blends strike precision with mobility on the ground.
Yet power projection is not the same as power consolidation. Somalia faces a tangle of pressures: climate-driven drought that weakens livelihoods in rural strongholds, political frictions between the federal government and regional states, and funding shortfalls for security and humanitarian work. Those structural strains have derailed past offensives, when forces pushed into towns but governance and services lagged — creating openings for al-Shabab to return, tax trade routes and intimidate local leaders.
That history is a caution against over-reading battlefield maps. In rural central and southern Somalia, territorial control remains fluid. Militants shift to hit-and-run attacks, improvised bombs and assassinations when they lose ground. Even as government forces expand their presence in some districts, al-Shabab can still reach wide swaths of countryside with threats, taxation and periodic raids.
To translate momentum into stability, Somalia’s next phase must be as much administrative as military. Officials outline plans to rebuild homes and deliver aid in newly captured areas to prevent a militant resurgence. That “hold and build” effort will be tested on several fronts:
- Security continuity: local police and administrative guards must replace forward military units quickly enough to deter al-Shabab intimidation and taxation.
- Accountable force posture: integrating Darawiish units and elite Danab forces into operations that protect civilians, minimize harm and avoid abuses that militants can exploit for recruitment.
- Basic services and justice: even modest gains — reopened clinics, market security, dispute resolution — can erode al-Shabab’s shadow governance.
- Financial resilience: sustained logistics and pay for Somali forces, plus support to communities hit by drought, will be essential to keep recaptured areas from backsliding.
- Intelligence depth: maintaining local informant networks and timely aerial surveillance to detect regrouping, arms transfers and IED workshops.
International partners remain central to that equation. U.S. airpower and surveillance are enabling factors that provide reach and tempo; they are not substitutes for governance. Rights groups have criticized past strikes for civilian harm, and Africa Command has acknowledged some cases and says it investigates allegations. Transparent assessments, redress where warranted and clear communication with communities can help blunt militant propaganda and sustain support for operations.
The political track will be just as decisive. Durable gains require coordination between the federal government and regional authorities to avoid security vacuums at administrative boundaries. In places where local elites feel sidelined, al-Shabab has historically exploited grievances to reinsert itself. Clarity on roles, revenue-sharing and responsibilities for local security can close those seams.
What to watch next as operations continue:
- Whether newly reclaimed towns in Lower Shabelle and Hiiraan see rapid deployment of police and civil administrators, not just military patrols.
- Evidence that IED networks are being disrupted over time — fewer vehicle-borne bombs reaching Mogadishu, fewer assassinations of local officials.
- Consistency of pay and logistics for front-line units during the African Union drawdown, especially in remote districts.
- Community buy-in: markets reopening, commercial transport resuming on key roads, and local dispute-resolution mechanisms functioning without militant interference.
- Militant adaptation: shifts to cross-regional raids, increased extortion on alternative routes or renewed efforts to undermine local elders.
Somali authorities report thousands of militants killed since the intensified campaign, including dozens in recent operations around Kudhaa. Those figures cannot be independently verified. The more telling metric will be whether civilians in retaken areas feel safer moving goods and seeking services — and whether district administrations can persist without constant reinforcement.
For now, momentum is real but conditional. Aerial surveillance and precision strikes have tilted the battlefield, opening space for Somali ground gains. Turning that space into lasting security will depend on the less visible work of governance: paying police on time, keeping roads open, arbitrating land disputes, and delivering enough services to convince communities that the state, not the shadow of a gunman, is the best guarantor of order.
With international peacekeepers stepping back, that burden increasingly rests on Somali institutions. If they can hold what they have taken — and make it livable — the current campaign could mark a strategic inflection. If not, al-Shabab’s proven resilience will again test the limits of gains won from the air.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
