This image, courtesy of the Defense Department, features Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Christopher J. Chambers on the left, and Navy Special Warfare Operator 2nd Class Nathan Gage Ingram on the right. Image is credited to Department of Defense/AP.
Tragically, the investigation into the drowning of two Navy SEALs off Somalia’s coast reveals these incidents were preventable. They found a deficit in adequate training and vague instructions on flotation practices at fault.
As night fell, the mission was to intercept a ship smuggling Iranian weapons to Yemen. Chief Special Warfare Operator, Christopher Chambers, and Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class, Nathan Ingram, ended up in tumultuous seas while attempting to board the vessel. Chambers, the platoon’s Leading Petty Officer, toppled from the ship’s side, and Ingram immediately dove in to assist.
Outfitted with heavy gear, the SEALs were overwhelmed by the ocean’s forces in under a minute. Chambers was visible on the surface for mere fragments of 26 seconds, while Ingram surfaced sporadically for 32 seconds.
“Forty-seven seconds: the span of this sorrowful misfortune, with two Naval Special Warfare officers claimed by the sea,” the report outlined. The hefty weight of their gear nullified their physical prowess, and emergency flotation gadgets, if triggered, proved insufficient for buoyancy.
Naval Special Warfare Command wrapped up a lengthy probe into how such highly skilled warriors, members of the U.S. military’s elite unit, drowned during what was supposed to be a well-prepared mission.
“Systemic woes made this preventable chaos,” penned Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, US Central Command’s chief, in his critique. Both Chambers and Ingram were granted posthumous promotions.
Stationed on the USS Lewis B. Puller post-deployment in December 2023, Naval Special Warfare SEAL Team Three foresaw maritime intercepts in their mission goals. That initial month saw two successful dhow boardings under varied sea conditions.
As January 2024 unfolded, Navy reconnaissance pinpointed a sluggish dhow over several days. Plans by SEAL Team Three to intercept materialized on or around January 12. However, mission timing was advanced by a day due to weather reevaluation and operational exercises.
One unnamed official expressed concerns over this acceleration, citing feelings of haste in the report. Others on the crew shared a preference for later timing, craving more preparation time.
Ultimately though, when queried, everyone affirmed with an “ok” and “good to go,” endorsing their readiness. Setting off amidst 6-to-7-foot waves, nearly breaching the 8-foot night-time operation limit, the SEALs faced grueling circumstances marked by three boarding attempts. Six SEALs managed entry during the initial attempts.
The final attempt proved arduous, with no steerage control left as the dhow rolled fiercely under the troubled weather. Chambers, a 37-year-old operator, went overboard during the boarding effort, with 27-year-old Ingram following him into the waters.
Navy SAR missions, stretching 48,600 square miles over ten days post-incident, nonetheless failed to retrieve the SEALs’ bodies.
Per Navy protocols, the sea stands as a dignified resting place for the seafarer’s fallen remains, thus no further recovery sought, stated the investigation report.
Findings noted that while the Naval Special Warfare Force Readiness Manual underscores buoyancy significance, it lacks precise effective buoyancy test criteria.
Investigators identified pre-deployment buoyancy trials in San Diego waters. Alas, no such tests happened post-embarkation.
While the Navy mandates “positive buoyancy” for boarding missions—staying afloat—some resources emphasize “neutral buoyancy,” maintaining water-level steadiness. Team members were to determine the needed buoyancy and self-configure, yet guidance lapses caused confusion and execution troubles.
Insufficient training around the Tactical Flotation Support System, the emergency flotation tool, leaves open whether the drowned SEALs even tried its activation.
The investigation advised action against systemic flaws that led to the tragedy, suggesting a formal buoyancy requirements introduction, fail-safe flotation device evaluation, and a life-saving equipment review on Navy boarderships.
Edited by: Ali Musa
alimusa@axadletimes.com
Axadle international–Monitoring
