Navigating Tensions: How Disputes Between Egypt, Somalia, and Ethiopia May Strengthen al-Shabaab

This past Sunday, a mortar attack rocked a military base in central Mogadishu, frequented by officials from the African Union (AU), United Nations, and various international entities, tragically ending the lives of at least two individuals and injuring several others. The terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, immediately claimed responsibility for the assault, highlighting their unyielding aggression in destabilizing Somalia’s government and infrastructure.

Despite some headway in the federal government’s offensive to subdue Al-Shabaab, they haven’t seized the upper hand. The jihadists still exercise control over considerable regions in the central and southern parts of the nation. Tensions among the anti-Al-Shabaab coalition—which includes federal, state, and international allies—complicate efforts as the group’s areas of influence may continue to grow.

Somalia’s leadership yearns to forge a synchronized political and military reaction. However, a newfound defense agreement between Mogadishu and Cairo could jeopardize stability, potentially exacerbating relations with Ethiopia. This development might threaten the continuance of the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with Ethiopia as a primary contributor. The pact may also instigate a clash between Somalia’s federal structure and its regional states, broadening a power void ripe for exploitation by Al-Shabaab and other armed factions.

Since 2007, successive AU peacekeeping operations have been fighting Al-Shabaab, with assistance from the US and Turkey. Yet, ATMIS’s current mandate is reaching its conclusion this year. Global diplomats are tirelessly negotiating for a leaner AU force to step in come 2025, but funding and staffing woes loom ominously over Somalia’s security horizon.

Ethiopia remains pivotal in the military endeavors against Al-Shabaab, deploying between 8,000 to 10,000 troops in Somalia’s heartland through ATMIS and separate agreements with Somalia’s federal administration. This move is crucial for safeguarding Ethiopia’s own borders from terrorist infiltrations. Yet, the new Egypt-Somalia defense strategy risks rocking the boat politically and militarily, directly confronting Addis Ababa.

Relations between Cairo and Mogadishu have tightened in recent years, rooted in mutual frustrations with Ethiopia. Egypt’s tussle with Addis Ababa springs from the Nile dam project, feared to jeopardize its water livelihood. Meanwhile, Mogadishu’s sovereignty felt undermined by Ethiopia’s agreement with North Western State of Somalia leaders. Consequently, Somalia urged Ethiopian troops to exit.

The defense agreement calls for Egypt to station around 10,000 troops in Somalia to challenge Ethiopia, proposing half participation in the upcoming AU mission and half under bilateral terms. Yet, the practical possibility of such a deployment by Egypt is questionable due to its own financial woes and a longstanding reluctance to commit forces overseas.

The Egyptian arms deliveries to Somalia have irked the Ethiopian government. This regional saber-rattling raises two significant concerns in combating Al-Shabaab: it obstructs ATMIS’s planning by marginalizing Ethiopia—a primary troop source—and sharpens Somalia’s internal divisions, complicating the federal-state dynamics.

Indeed, the fragile political fabric of Somalia risks further fragmentation. Discord between federal authorities and states already hinders nation-building efforts. The looming tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia threaten to rip these divisions wider. Calls from Somali state leaders opposing troop withdrawals reveal the precarious balances around Ethiopian military influences and opposition to the Egyptian pact.

Both scenarios—a stalled AU mission and a fractured Somali polity—could invite Al-Shabaab to expand its hold, with destabilizing waves. Ethiopia might face intensified conflicts along its borders. Europe’s humanitarian missions would falter, risking entire European contingents stationed there. A fortified Al-Shabaab could inspire other radical groups and pirate operations, such as those witnessed during Houthi Red Sea confrontations, threatening crucial maritime logistics reflective of Europe’s strategic interests.

The European Union shouldn’t retreat from its invested duties now. Over the years, billions have been channeled into Somalia’s security fabric. The EU’s commitments are seen through military training, anti-piracy, and financial boosts for AU’s peace pursuits. While weariness surges over scant progress, retreat now would nullify extensive diplomatic and financial undertakings.

Given its vested role in Somalia, the EU is aptly positioned to steer reconciliation and calm tensions. Italy, wielding historical sway and impactful alliances, can lead the union in these efforts. The United Kingdom’s key diplomatic endeavors enhance the EU’s mediation reach, making it a credible partnership for tangible outcomes.

While Carter and Nixon-era are over, Italy and the UK, along with the EU, can rally Washington for aligned approaches since the US still holds shrewd stakes in Somalia. Meanwhile, Turkey and the UAE’s prevalent regimes also beckon collaborative potential. Both nations back notable security endeavors in Somalia and maintain solid relations with Mogadishu, Addis Ababa, and Cairo, as they seek to amplify their geopolitical footprint.

It’s imperative for Europe to strategize synchronizing efforts with Turkey and the UAE to press Ethiopia and Egypt into refraining from exacerbating Somali discord. Additionally, backing existing Turkish dialogues in mending Somalia-Ethiopian relations remains necessary to assuage boiling tensions.

The EU, with its partners, should foster better alignment of multifaceted security goals in Somalia as various international players might otherwise magnify fractures. This approach includes forming coordination networks among the EU, Turkish, and Emirati initiatives to streamline diplomatic and military actions for reinforced efficiency. The groundwork must be laid for joint commission engagements, harmonizing dialogues, joint ambassadorial conclaves in Mogadishu, and concerted funding for the future AU endeavors.

To top it all, the EU holds formidable leverage as the bankrollers of ATMIS—vital against Al-Shabaab. Given the gravity of avoiding an Afghan-like downfall, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East stakeholders have ample motivation to chase mediation and unity forward.

Prompt and coherent actions against budding jihadist exploits remain pressing for Somalia’s— and the broader Horn of Africa’s—tranquility and prosperity.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

Edited by: Ali Musa

alimusa@axadletimes.com

Axadle international–Monitoring