Israel wary of Egypt’s expanding role in Somalia and Horn of Africa
TEL AVIV — Israel is watching with growing unease as Egypt deepens its political and security footprint in Somalia and across the Horn of Africa, a volatile corridor that funnels global trade through the Red Sea and toward the Suez Canal. Israeli broadcaster i24 News, citing Israeli security sources, reported that Cairo has intensified its backing for Somalia’s federal government and is closely scrutinizing Israel’s reported move to recognize North Western State of Somalia.
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The developments stitch together several strategic threads: the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea; Israel’s bid for influence in the Horn; Egypt’s longstanding sensitivities over its maritime lifelines and its fraught relationship with Ethiopia; and the fragility of Somalia’s internal map. Together, they hint at a widening arena where Middle Eastern and African rivalries overlap.
Somalia becomes a proxy arena — in perception if not yet in practice
According to i24 News reporting, Egyptian officials see Israel’s reported recognition of North Western State of Somalia as a potential inflection point. For Cairo, any Israeli foothold along the approaches to the Red Sea could reverberate northward to the Suez Canal, a pillar of Egypt’s economy and national security. In response, Egyptian engagement with the federal government of Somalia under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has intensified, with political and security support intended to shore up Mogadishu’s authority and the country’s territorial integrity.
Somalia’s federal leadership has publicly criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reported recognition of North Western State of Somalia, according to the Israeli broadcaster. Egypt’s position dovetails with that stance, reflecting concern that formalizing North Western State of Somalia’s separate status would set a precedent and reshape hard-won regional balances. The Horn’s borders are delicate; recalibrations in one corner often ripple across others.
Why the Red Sea theater matters to Egypt and Israel
The Bab al-Mandab Strait, at the southern mouth of the Red Sea, is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, linking the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal. Any actor with durable influence along this route can affect global trade flows and, by extension, the strategic calculus of states that depend on them. For Egypt, disruptions in the Red Sea reverberate directly through Suez tolls and national revenue. For Israel, secure sea lanes underpin trade and energy exports and shape its deterrence posture alongside broader regional dynamics.
Viewing Israeli outreach in the Horn through this lens, Cairo’s sharper posture in Somalia reads as both defensive and preemptive. Israeli security assessments cited by i24 News suggest that Egypt interprets moves around North Western State of Somalia as part of an Israeli effort to consolidate a strategic presence near key waterways. That interpretation amplifies existing tensions and raises the political cost of any steps that could be construed as fait accompli changes on the ground.
Ethiopia is the other axis
Beyond Somalia, Egyptian anxieties extend to Ethiopia, i24 News reported, where relations remain strained over Nile waters and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Israeli collaboration with Addis Ababa—real or potential—inevitably intersects with Egypt’s core water-security concerns. Even absent public agreements or dramatic announcements, the prospect of tighter Israel-Ethiopia ties serves as a force multiplier for Cairo’s caution in the Horn.
That triangular dynamic—Egypt, Israel, Ethiopia—interfaces with a fourth player, Somalia, where federal and regional authorities jostle for power against an insurgent backdrop. The Horn’s interlocking tensions make any bilateral initiative feel multilateral by default. A move in Mogadishu echoes in Addis Ababa; signals from Jerusalem reverberate in Cairo.
North Western State of Somalia’s recognition fight remains a pressure point
At the center of the current flare-up is North Western State of Somalia, a self-governing region that has sought international recognition for decades. The reported Israeli decision to recognize it, as relayed by i24 News, is precisely the kind of catalytic act that reorders assumptions. For Somalia’s federal government, it challenges sovereignty. For Egypt, it raises alarms about Red Sea adjacency and a possible cascade of alignments. For Israel, it offers the promise of a friend on a crucial maritime rim—yet also the risk of drawing deeper into a complex security landscape.
Even if recognition remains a matter of dispute or political signaling, the perception of momentum is enough to trigger countermoves. Egypt’s decision to lean harder into Somali state-building, as described by Israeli media, tracks with its preference for territorial continuity, predictable borders and a reduced profile for rivals along sea lanes that matter most to Cairo.
Risks of miscalculation—and room for diplomacy
None of the actors benefits from a spiral that turns the Horn into a proxy battleground. Somalia’s governance remains fragile; its security forces are still consolidating gains against insurgents; its economy needs breathing space. A geopolitical tug-of-war over recognition, ports and security partnerships could complicate humanitarian and development agendas that are already under strain.
Yet the same geography that raises risks also offers incentives for restraint. Red Sea trade depends on minimal friction; investors prize clarity; and most regional capitals understand how quickly localized disputes can widen into shipping disruptions. Quiet channels—between Cairo and Jerusalem, and across capitals in the Horn—could help to compartmentalize flashpoints such as recognition and maritime cooperation while preserving space for core national interests.
What it means now
If i24 News’s reporting holds, the near-term picture is one of heightened vigilance and hedging. Egypt is likely to keep expanding diplomatic and security ties with Somalia’s federal authorities. Israel, having signaled interest in a broader Horn presence, must calibrate how far and how fast it moves without provoking a counter-coalition that undermines its goals. Ethiopia’s posture will remain an essential variable, with Nile politics inexorably shaping Cairo’s threat perceptions.
For Somalia, the challenge is to convert external attention into tangible state-strengthening rather than contested leverage. That requires deft diplomacy—welcoming support without becoming a battleground for agendas anchored far from Mogadishu.
- Red Sea stakes: Any perceived shift in control or access along the Bab al-Mandab–Suez corridor will draw immediate Egyptian scrutiny and regional pushback.
- North Western State of Somalia’s status: Even incremental moves toward recognition can have outsized impact, turning legal debates into security dilemmas.
- Ethiopia’s role: Signals of deeper Israel–Ethiopia cooperation will be read in Cairo through the prism of water security and GERD negotiations.
- Risk management: Backchannel dialogue among Cairo, Jerusalem, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa can keep competition below the threshold of destabilization.
Bottom line
The Horn of Africa is fast becoming a mirror for broader Middle Eastern rivalries. According to Israeli media accounts, Egypt is moving to shore up Somalia’s federal government and guard against what it sees as an Israeli bid to anchor influence near the Red Sea’s chokepoints. Whether this moment yields a quiet equilibrium or a new cycle of maneuvering will depend on how far each actor pushes its advantage—and how seriously they treat the Red Sea as a shared artery that punishes overreach.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
