In Dhusamareeb, AFI 2025 turned a fragile moment into a political opening for Somalia
The 9th Annual Forum for Ideas (AFI 2025) in Dhusamareeb was expected to be another policy conference. It became something else: an improbable stage-setter for dialogue between a wary federal government and a skeptical opposition, and a stress test of Somalia’s political resilience amid a fast-moving geopolitical storm.
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Organized by the Heritage Institute in partnership with the Galmudug administration, the gathering drew roughly 500 participants, including the prime minister, the speaker of parliament, opposition heavyweights and civil society leaders. That breadth of attendance—achieved after weeks of tense back-channeling—gave the forum outsized weight. When the meeting ended, the ripple effects reached Mogadishu within days.
This is what the conference’s trajectory reveals about Somali state-building, political trust and the road to 2027.
The event nearly collapsed three times before it began. Its organizers and hosts steadied it through operational improvisation and political calibration—skills as vital to Somali governance as any statute or communiqué.
- Logistics and environment: Dhusamareeb was mid-construction, the dry season was biting and drought risk shadowed the region. Galmudug’s leadership insisted the city could shoulder a national dialogue. It did—cleanly and on time—an underappreciated proof-point for state capacity outside Mogadishu.
- Political inclusivity: Rumors swirled that the Somali Salvation Forum would boycott, fearing a government-leaning platform. The presence of former President Sheikh Sharif, Abdi Farah Shirdon and Abdirahman Abdishakur—secured through persistent outreach—gave the debates legitimacy and edge.
- Federal sensitivities: Perceptions in Mogadishu that the agenda tilted toward opposition prompted four revisions before the opening session. The final program balanced criticism and cooperation without collapsing into spectacle.
Then geopolitics intervened. Two days before the original Dec. 28 start, the forum was postponed at the federal government’s request after Israel’s recognition of North Western State of Somalia roiled national politics. The delay allowed federal and regional leaders—along with opposition figures—to consult on a unified response. It also turned AFI 2025 into the first broad public platform to process the sovereignty shock and its implications for Somali diplomacy and domestic cohesion.
That pivot changed the stakes of the meeting. The forum’s theme, “A Unified Political Vision for Somalia: Aligning Goals for 2026–2030,” moved from abstract alignment to urgent triage: how to defend national sovereignty while maintaining a contested but functional political center.
On substance, the most consequential intervention came from Speaker Sheikh Adan Madobe, who clarified the legislative calendar under the amended constitution. He stated the current federal term is five years, ending in April 2027—not 2026—an assertion that ignited post-conference debate. Whether that clock holds will now shape everything from electoral sequencing to power-sharing expectations. Clarity, and buy-in, matter as much as the date itself.
The final communiqué, issued as delegates dispersed from Dhusamareeb’s dusty thoroughfares, was notable for what it did not overpromise. It affirmed three basics that Somali politics struggles to keep in frame simultaneously: defend sovereignty; resolve internal disputes through dialogue; and resist outside manipulation. Those are principles, not policy. But they set a floor, and floors are where fragile compacts begin.
The forum’s most concrete aftershock arrived on Jan. 4, 2026, when President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made an unannounced visit to the Mogadishu home of former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a key opposition leader just back from Dhusamareeb. By crossing town without ceremony to seek direct talks—and to enlist Sharif’s help in widening the conversation to other opposition figures—the president signaled a tactical reset. In a political arena where meetings often calcify into theater, this was an unscripted move with strategic intent. It is hard to imagine it happening without the momentum, visibility and pressure generated at AFI 2025.
Why it matters
Somalia’s central governance problem is not a lack of ideas but a deficit of trust and execution. AFI 2025 did not fix that. It did, however, model a few habits that, if repeated, can compound over time:
- Inclusion with teeth: Getting government and opposition leaders in the same room is table stakes. Structuring a program that lets them test each other’s arguments—without cornering either side—takes craft. Dhusamareeb showed that balance is possible outside the capital’s political echo chamber.
- Institutional redundancy: Heritage and Galmudug jointly carried risk. When one side faced pressure, the other buffered it. That redundancy is essential in a system where shocks—security incidents, drought, diplomatic tremors—are routine.
- Openness to recalibration: The decision to delay and absorb a geopolitical crisis into the agenda, rather than pretend it lived elsewhere, increased the forum’s relevance and the legitimacy of its outcomes.
Risks remain everywhere. The term-limit clarification could harden rather than ease partisan lines if not anchored in transparent legal reasoning and broad political consent. The sovereignty crisis could be instrumentalized by factions seeking short-term leverage. And the basic pressures of Somali life—security threats, inflation, climate stress—can corrode political bandwidth long before policy takes root.
What to watch next
- Electoral sequencing: If April 2027 stands, timelines for electoral law, party registration and dispute mechanisms must be published and adhered to. Drifting deadlines are fertilizer for suspicion.
- Federal-member state relations: Galmudug’s success as host offers a template for shared political ownership. Scaling that model—rotating venues, joint agendas—could normalize federalism rather than treating it as a periodic bargaining chip.
- Sovereignty doctrine: A clear, unified diplomatic line on North Western State of Somalia’s status and international engagement is needed to reduce miscalculation, both abroad and at home.
- Civic participation: AFI’s civil society presence widened the aperture of debate. Sustaining that inclusion between conferences—through town halls, policy roundtables and published tracking of commitments—will determine whether dialogue becomes delivery.
The Dhusamareeb lesson is not that conferences solve crises. It is that carefully engineered convenings can lower the cost of political courage. By placing government figures, opposition leaders and regional authorities in the same process—then forcing them to adapt to new facts—the forum created permission for movement. The president’s quiet visit to a rival’s home is one such movement. There should be more.
Somali politics still lives close to the edge. But the mechanics on display in Dhusamareeb—logistical competence under stress, diplomatic patience in the face of suspicion, and a willingness to absorb geopolitical shocks without losing the plot—are the building blocks of a sturdier center. If the next 18 months bring discipline on timelines, credible ground rules for competition and a habit of early, direct contact between rivals, AFI 2025 will be remembered not as an isolated success but as the moment the capital’s political logic briefly gave way to the country’s broader need.
In a season of dust and doubt, Dhusamareeb hosted more than a forum. It hosted a rehearsal for a different way of doing politics. Now the burden shifts to Mogadishu to carry the tune.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
