Egyptian parliamentarian backs Somalia troop deployment, dismisses Ethiopian objections

Egypt’s troop deployment to Somalia is legal — and a spark in an increasingly combustible region

When Cairo announced in late August that Egyptian soldiers would join the African Union’s stabilization mission in Somalia, the move was presented as a routine piece of security cooperation: units trained in Egypt were to be deployed to the central and southern frontlines — Hiiraan, Lower Shabelle and Gedo — to help Somali forces press the fight against al-Shabab.

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But beneath the procedural language lies a story about shifting alliances, competing national narratives and the risks of turning fragile states into chessboards for regional rivalry. The deployment, endorsed by Mogadishu and formally authorized by the African Union last year, has been sharply criticized by Ethiopia — a long-standing regional rival of Egypt — and has exposed fissures in an already fragile security architecture in the Horn of Africa.

“Legal and legitimate,” says Cairo

Mustafa Bakhri, a member of Egypt’s parliament, told reporters the decision was both legitimate and invited: “It comes at the invitation of Somalia’s government and with the approval of the African Union Peace and Security Council, granting it full legitimacy,” he said, dismissing Ethiopian objections as an attempt to provoke instability. Somali officials say the Egyptian units completed training in Cairo and are ready to be embedded with AU forces fighting al-Shabab.

Egypt and Somalia formalized closer security ties in a bilateral pact signed in January after months of negotiations; President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s visit to Cairo in July further cemented the arrangement, with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi pledging increased training, arms supplies and a broader warning about threats to Red Sea security.

Ethiopia’s alarm and the GERD shadow

That symbolism matters. Ethiopia’s unease is not simply a diplomatic quibble. Addis Ababa’s objections reflect a deeper geopolitical rivalry with Cairo that has centered on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam — the massive hydroelectric project that has strained relations across the Nile basin for years. The GERD dispute, and a tense January 2024 memorandum between Ethiopia and North Western State of Somalia, have contributed to a regional atmosphere in which security moves are read through the prism of water and maritime influence.

“Addis Ababa is deeply concerned,” Ethiopia’s ambassador to Somalia, Suleyman Didefo, told local media earlier this week. In both capitals, leaders and public opinion view deployments through the lens of national pride and perceived threats: for Egypt, securing sea lanes that feed into the Suez Canal is existential; for Ethiopia, preventing external influence on its neighbours is a priority.

Why this matters beyond the Horn

There are three overlapping dynamics at play that make this more than a bilateral spat:

  • Regionalization of counterinsurgency: External powers increasingly treat fragile states as theatres for counterterrorism and maritime strategy. Egyptian troops joining AUSSOM — the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia that replaced ATMIS on Jan. 1, 2025 — reflects a trend in which security assistance is a form of geopolitical projection.
  • Strain on the AU and financing gaps: AUSSOM arrived with a promise of a gradual handover of security responsibilities to Somali forces. But the mission’s finances are brittle. A U.N. funding shortfall in May forced AU members to step in with increased commitments in July just to keep the operation afloat. That raises questions about sustainability: can African-led missions absorb extra geopolitical baggage without becoming overstretched?
  • Potential for miscalculation: Deploying regular forces from a major regional power into contested spaces invites risk. Egyptian officials insist their presence is narrowly focused on supporting Somali operations against al-Shabab and not linked to Nile politics. Yet the optics of Cairo’s military footprint next to Ethiopian security interests can easily fuel nationalist messaging and escalate tensions.

Somalia’s delicate balancing act

For Somalia’s leadership, accepting Egyptian support is a calculated gamble. Mogadishu needs training, materiel and diplomatic backing as it tries to reclaim territory and restore basic services after decades of conflict. Yet the government is keenly aware that becoming a proxy in other capitals’ rivalries could undermine its fragile legitimacy at home and complicate relationships with neighbors who view every foreign uniform with suspicion.

Somalis on the ground live with the immediate costs and benefits. In towns scarred by al-Shabab attacks, the promise of more disciplined troops — trained and equipped — can seem a lifeline. But for communities already weary of being battlegrounds for outside powers, the idea that their territory might serve larger geopolitical aims is unnerving.

Questions for a fraught future

There are no easy answers. Will Egypt’s presence improve the practical capacity of Somali forces to protect civilians and retake towns from al-Shabab, or will it deepen political fault lines and create more targets for extremist recruitment? Can the African Union manage the competing interests of its most powerful members while maintaining cohesion in peace operations? And how will global actors — from the United States to Gulf states and Turkey — respond to a region where maritime security, water politics and counterinsurgency are increasingly entangled?

The broader trend is clear: fragile states are more often becoming arenas of influence in a multipolar world. That raises a crucial question for policymakers and citizens alike — when international assistance becomes entangled with rivalries, who ultimately benefits and who pays the cost?

What will determine the answer in Somalia is not only legal authority or diplomatic endorsements, but whether the deployment contributes to sustainable security for Somalis and whether regional actors can choose cooperation over competition in a part of the world that has already paid a high price for both disorder and great-power tussles.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.

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