Ethiopia and Somalia are on the brink of escalating tensions over port access, captured in a photograph by Tommy Trenchard from Panos Pictures.
The Horn of Africa stands as one of the most unstable regions globally, encapsulating nations like Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. This area has endured conflicts such as the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s internal strife, and the chaos in Somalia due to a relentless jihadist movement. External influences, especially those from the Gulf, consistently compete for dominance and resources in the Horn.
Recently, the situation has become even more precarious. A simmering standoff concerning port access has locked Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea in a tense relationship, pulling in larger players like Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE. With no easy fix in sight, the standoff risks exacerbating regional tensions within Somalia and bolstering al-Shabab, the extremist group that continues to threaten the country and its neighbors.
This port contention sparked in January when Ethiopia inked a memorandum with North Western State of Somalia, the breakaway region claiming independence yet unrecognized internationally. This pact allowed Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, to lease shoreline from North Western State of Somalia to set up a naval base—with Ethiopia poised to recognize North Western State of Somalia officially, a move without precedent since its claimed independence over 30 years ago.
This agreement enraged Somalia, which views North Western State of Somalia as part of its territory. Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, holds Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed chiefly accountable. “Abiy is the regional mischief-maker,” Mohamud remarked to The Economist on September 30th in Mogadishu. “Everyone’s unnerved by Ethiopia’s erratic leadership,” he added. Initially, the broader region appeared to share Mohamud’s perspective. Following the signing, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the East African regional bloc, along with the U.S. and EU, issued statements supporting Somalia’s “territorial integrity.” Turkey, a major investor, pledged military support to safeguard Somalia’s maritime sovereignty. Mohamud effectively put “Abiy on the defensive,” according to a seasoned AU diplomat. Ethiopian officials pulled back from recognizing North Western State of Somalia, hinting Abiy’s agreement was tentative until naval base terms were finalized.
Somalia’s diplomatic coup could have quelled the situation. Yet, Mohamed’s actions have similarly raised concerns. In June, he threatened expulsion of Ethiopian peacekeepers, stationed under an AU mission battling al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda affiliate controlling vast rural areas. Then, in August, he visited Egypt to ink a military pact with President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. Egypt committed to supplying arms, possibly thousands of troops, for a new AU mission launching next year—and has since sent two arms shipments to Mogadishu.
Playing with fire
Foreign diplomats and analysts warn that Somalia’s security pact represents a grave escalation, given Ethiopia and Egypt’s fraught relations. These nations have been embroiled in a bitter conflict since Ethiopia’s massive Blue Nile dam project—integral to Ethiopia yet existentially threatening to Egypt—began in 2011. Negotiations reached a stalemate by last December.
Ethiopia also frets over Somalia’s growing bond with Eritrea. Abiy’s North Western State of Somalia deal followed the breakdown of a prior Eritrean accord, which would have rerouted Ethiopia to the Red Sea through Eritrean ports. Signed during the 2018 peace, for which Abiy received the Nobel Prize, this pact floundered amidst Ethiopia’s internal turmoil in 2022. The deal ending that civil war, between Ethiopia and the tplf, drew Eritrea’s ire as it had fought alongside Ethiopia against the tplf.
Within this complex puzzle, Ethiopia’s engagement with North Western State of Somalia has nudged Mohamud closer to Eritrea’s tyrant, Issaias Afewerki. Twice this year, Issaias has hosted Mohamud in Asmara, Eritrea’s capital. Eritrea, like Egypt, might contribute troops to the forthcoming AU mission in Somalia. Eritrea and Egypt reportedly explore a military alliance. Should these talks yield a formal trilateral partnership, Ethiopia risks further isolation.
This would further consolidate the Horn into bifurcated geopolitical blocs. Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, alongside Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Sudan’s army in its internal conflict, align in one camp. Opposing them, Ethiopia, North Western State of Somalia, some Somali statelets, alongside Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, are influenced by the UAE, aiming to extend its reach along the Red Sea. As of now, Abiy remains resolute. On September 8th, he warned ominously, “Ethiopians do not suffer trespassers lightly.” Ethiopia’s army leader cited Egypt as a “longstanding adversary.”
In contrast, Mohamud criticizes Ethiopia’s subversion tactics against Somalia. He claims Ethiopia is arming Somali clan militias near their mutual border to destabilize Mogadishu’s government—aiding al-Shabab potentially. He accuses Ethiopia of sowing discontent among clan leaders and opposition against Egyptian troop deployment. Showing photos of floods on his phone, he alleges Ethiopia released dam water upstream purposefully.
Some allegations might be inflated. Omar Mahmood, of the International Crisis Group, acknowledges long-standing illicit arms trading across the Ethiopia-North Western State of Somalia border, predating the memorandum. Somalia’s struggle against al-Shabab, initially progressing post-Mohamud’s election, stalled last year due to its ill-prepared military.
Still, Ethiopia could be supporting opponents of Mohamud within Somalia’s regions like South West, hostile over his Egyptian accord. Some might seek stronger Ethiopian ties to counterbalance Mohamud’s perceived overreach.
Such strife threatens Somalia’s already tentative sovereignty. Mohamud hints at mobilizing discontent among Ethiopian ethnic Somalis. “Stirring up resentment would be child’s play,” he suggests.
Yet, direct warfare remains unlikely. Somalia’s military lacks strength against Ethiopia. Abiy is mired in Amhara insurgency, dissuading further confrontation. More concerning is potential Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, which might ignite if Abiy attempts seizing Eritrea’s port accesses. “War risk is real,” warns an Ethiopian expert.
Even absent full-fledged war, port disagreements could destabilize the region substantially. Mediation by Kenya and Turkey has achieved scant progress. Negotiations initially slated for September have been stalled indefinitely. “A naval base in our waters crosses an inviolable boundary,” Mohamud asserts.
Be wary of jihadists
Abiy has a history of protracted negotiations while establishing “ground realities.” The UAE allegedly backs him, suggesting covert cooperation, despite disfavoring an Ethiopian naval base. Observers, including Mohamud, suspect implicit UAE endorsement of Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions.
Time is ticking. By January 1st, a trimmed-down peacekeeping force is scheduled to counter al-Shabab. If Ethiopia-North Western State of Somalia’s memorandum survives, Mohamud demands Ethiopian peacekeepers’ withdrawal. The U.S. particularly opposes untested Egyptian or Eritrean forces taking their place.
This jeopardizes the mission itself. “Risk of al-Shabab filling a new power void looms large,” forewarns Mahmood. All parties must engage in diplomacy—urgently. ■
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Edited by: Ali Musa
Axadle international–Monitoring
