No involvement but “heavy and overwhelming responsibility” in the genocide of the Tutsis. This is the conclusion of the Duclert report on France’s role in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. A document delivered on Friday 26 March to Emmanuel Macron. This report, written by a commission of historians led by Vincent Duclert, points to Paris’ “blindness” to the genocide of the “racist, corrupt and violent” regime of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana. François Mitterrand, the then French president, is directly involved. Hubert Védrine was then Secretary General of the Élysée Palace and answered questions from Pierre Firtion.
The Duclert Commission therefore submitted its report to Emmanuel Macron on Friday. How do you react to his conclusions?
Hubert Védrine: I think these are the conclusions of Mr Duclert himself, not the Commission. I do not know what the Commission thinks.
In any case, we have Vincent Duclert’s conclusions, which are quite accurate. In my opinion, this report is important for several reasons. First, it clearly excludes all ideas about France’s involvement in the genocide. That’s the least. It was not just a stupid accusation, but a monstrous and false one. But it is important that he says so. On the other hand, he is, I think, quite objective on Operation Turquoise, which was an operation decided by the UN Security Council, forget all too often. In addition, he does not lend me any particular role in this whole affair, which I have really followed, which I defend and which I try to explain. But I was never a decision-maker on this issue. I am not saying that this should be discarded, because I believe that France is the only country in the world that has tried to stop the civil war mechanism.
This report excludes participation, it is true, but it is still extremely difficult in terms of the policies pursued by Paris at the time. “France has long been involved in a regime that encouraged racist massacres, it is written in this report. She remained blind to the preparation for a genocide of the most radical elements of this regime“…
I completely disagree with this presentation, which seems to me to be incorrect historically and chronologically. Because it all actually started in 1990, with the attacks from the RPF. Nobody says there is a risk of genocide in Rwanda in 1990. That is when the president of Rwanda calls for help. France only agrees to protect them from this military threat because there is a second part: “We will, we will protect you, but we must resolve the issue of Tutsi refugees.” There were two parts. Always come back to it.
Because those who only attack France’s actions are only talking about the military component. France’s military component was not only responsible for limiting the attacks of the RPF and Uganda, there was also a political and diplomatic component thanks to its military presence. The two are linked to a compromise against the Hutus and Tutsis. The Hutus do not want to send, because the compromise that France proposed – and which it finally introduced in Arusha in the summer of 1993 – was very generous to the Tutsis. The army planned for Rwanda in the future, 40% of the army would have been Tutsis, while the Tutsis at that time, it is said, represented 12 to 13% of the population. France was therefore not a friend of the regime. Otherwise she would not have disturbed him. The culmination of the French engagement policy in 1990 in the face of the threat was the Arusha agreements. France then withdrew, so there is no French bankruptcy. There is even a French success.
There are many people on the ground, soldiers, agents, diplomats warning of the situation there and the abuse of the Habyarimana regime. Obviously, we at the Élysée refuse to hear these warnings?
I do not completely agree with this idea. If France is there in the beginning, it is precisely because France fears it. François Mitterrand, who had a great old knowledge of Africa – he had been Minister for Overseas France in his youth – had in mind the terrible massacres against the Tutsis in 1962 during independence when the Belgians were gone. He knew very well that the RPF attack in 1990 would trigger horrific reactions, which would become genocide in a part of the Hutu world. We knew very well, it was a race. So, of course, all people who warn say the obvious. France was there because it had measured a very very large risk in addition to the risk of destabilization of the region. There was a great danger for this type of interior with increasingly hard positions on both sides that we must try to interrupt. So, we can ask ourselves the question: was not France too easy to believe that by finally introducing the Arusha Accords in the summer of 1993, it would work? This is a question we can ask ourselves.
How do I explain that in April 1994, following the overthrow of President Habyarimana’s plan, the Rwandan Provisional Government was formed to carry out the genocide at the French Embassy?
I do not agree, it is an anachronistic shortcut. You reject a period of panic in the early days, a kind of uniquely hostile interpretation, as if France had genocidal intentions, which have just been ruled out by the Duclert report.
Will France not lack clarity on the situation on the ground in the three months that will follow, until the end of the genocide?
Obviously not. It was discussed between Mitterrand and the government. Édouard Balladur thought that we would not come back, that it would be impossible to deal with and that it would turn against us. It could actually be … François Léotard and the army did not want to come back. And Alain Juppé spoke very early on about genocide, which the Americans did not want to talk about. Americans at the time did not use the term because they feared it would create legal obligations for them. The arbitration was made by Mitterrand, who said: “We will come back because it is too unpleasant. So we will try to take humanitarian action. But we will come back as part of a Security Council resolution.” France was very clear. with the only country in the world that cares. So I do not understand why the question is focused on France. What did all the other countries think? What did they do?
In April, France asked the Security Council for a clear resolution to design the possible mission, which later became the Turquoise Mission, but the Americans do not want it. We will therefore wait until the end of June until there is a permit and the mission that defines Turquoise. It is not a French operation but a UN operation where there are humanitarian measures, no interference and obviously no arrests. It’s not France’s fault. France is the only country that has sounded the alarm.
François Mitterrand is involved in the report. Why was he the one who made the most important decisions in this matter?
It is obvious in the Fifth Republic that the ultimate decision-maker is the president. But I think there is a focus in the Duclert report. It’s a bit easy to attack Mitterrand, to make him wear a kind of hat, especially from a completely unrealistic analysis of the region’s context, Rwanda’s context, etc. easily and not very brave, I think. But it is true that in the Fifth Republic it is the President who has the last word to decide.
But Rwanda was not a priority for France at the time?
Obviously not.
Why is François Mitterrand investing so much in this country? Because of his proximity to President Habyarimana?
He was not involved, it is the attack that triggers the matter, it is not Mitterrand. In addition, he was no closer to Habyarimana than other African leaders. At least at that time, all presidents of the Verépublique had relatively close and fairly regular relations with the African presidents. François Mitterrand had the impression that in a troubled region, Africa of the Great Lakes, Habyarimana was rather a good man who did what he could. So there was no special investment.
Hubert Védrine, we have a ratio of 1200 pages, the result of two years of work by a commission of historians who examined almost 8000 archive documents. We can not sweep away this work with a simple hand wave …
This is not what I do. Do I answer your questions? As far as I know, the conclusions are Vincent Duclert. I do not think there was a collective re-reading of the report. I may be wrong but that’s what I’m getting to know.
As much as I thought the allegations of aiding and abetting the genocide were both stupid and scandalous and completely stupid, the critics gave the feeling that there was only a military policy to support the threat, regardless of the goal Real was the Arusha agreement, just as much, I think that there are some real questions that one can ask.
Which?
The first, the most important, is that in 1990, if François Mitterrand had said: “There is an attack, I know the region, it will be very bad, a terrible civil war, but we can actually do nothing, we have no obligation, it is far, it is very complicated “; in short, if he had said:” We do nothing, we appeal to the UN “which would have done nothing, which would have shocked at that time, really part of the statement that would have condemned this. but we would no longer talk about it. That’s the first question. I do not think it’s illegal. It’s not in the order of delusion or madness, it’s a real issue.
Then, during the process, I found that the more there were signs of violent offensive on the RPF side and radicalization on the Hutu side, the more the fact that we were there to force them to compromise was justified. I do not think there is a clear fault in this. And all those who are wise by saying, “I, I warned, I warned, we did not take into account what I said”, that is stupid. France is there precisely because she foresaw this dangerous spiral.
On the other hand, after Arusha, when we reach agreements that are therefore quite favorable to the Tutsis, I repeat, then we withdraw. There is a UN mission, UNAMIR, but it has no funds, a very limited mandate. So there we can wonder about it at that time. But I know very well that even though everyone congratulated France at the time of Arusha – including Kagame, including the Americans – everyone knew that the RPF was completely hostile to the idea that France would stay because of course the RPF had its plans. But ideally, in retrospect, if we were to rebuild things, if there had been another UN resolution with a clearer mandate for UNAMIR, a mandate to possibly intervene, to intervene … had a decision by the African Union, a major peacekeeping operation, a kind of monitoring of the Arusha agreements, perhaps we would have avoided the result, perhaps the plane would not have been shot, etc.
I think this is a legitimate question. But this debate has not taken place in fifteen years, as France was only accused of being an accomplice in the genocide. It was so monstrous that apparently the debate focused on this extreme point. Although it is a debate that may take place now.
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