The Horn of Africa: Balancing Between Breakdown and Opportunity

The recent testimonies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Joshua Meservey of the Hudson Institute and Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations have illuminated a pressing dilemma for Washington: the Horn of Africa stands on a knife’s edge, caught between potential collapse and newfound opportunities. While both testimonies suggest a pivot away from the pursuit of a unified Somalia, advocating instead for partnerships with federal member states or localized actors, this pragmatic approach raises a critical question: could this path ultimately jeopardize U.S. interests in the region?

Allow me to clarify: Somalia is not the easiest partner the United States could hope for. The journey toward democratic consolidation and effective security sector reform has been exceedingly slow, mired in delays. Corruption runs rampant like a persistent weed, and the threat posed by al-Shabaab looms large in the shadows. However, abandoning the idea of a strong, unified Somalia—despite its many imperfections—is not a benign choice. Such a move would equate to a strategic retreat, inviting more assertive global players into the arena, fracturing the nation further and compromising a potentially vital ally for the United States in the Horn of Africa.

Disintegration Is Not a Strategy

Meservey’s testimony leans heavily toward the idea of shifting focus from Mogadishu to the federal member states. He even goes so far as to describe the effort to build a central government as a “failed experiment.” While grounded in certain harsh realities, this perspective overlooks a vital truth: disintegration is not a viable strategy. Yes, collaborating with regional powers might yield fleeting gains in counterterrorism efforts, but it significantly undermines the long-term goal of creating a competent Somali state—one that can secure its own borders, manage its own territory, and genuinely represent its populace.

The alternative is a broken Somalia, fragmented into autonomous regions competing for resources and legitimacy—an inviting setup for outside actors. This environment would not only empower terrorist factions but also enable state actors like Iran, the UAE, and even Russia and China to exert their influence. Each of these competitors has shown a willingness to dive into Somalia’s tumultuous political landscape. Encouraging fragmentation will only weaken the national institutions that are essential in resisting such foreign encroachment.

A Lesson from the Past

The idea that the U.S. should skip working with Somalia’s central government and instead empower local actors is not new. In fact, it’s a strategy that’s been tested before with grave consequences. Back in 2005, during the U.S. campaign against terrorism, the decision to support brutal warlords—despite the presence of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)—marked a critical misstep. The ensuing chaos alienated the Somali populace and paved the way for the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which managed to oust these warlords from Mogadishu by June 2006.

Instead of supporting the peace process in Khartoum between the TFG and the ICU—an opportunity for national unity—the U.S. opted to sanction Ethiopia’s military intervention to eliminate the ICU. This shortsighted approach derailed the peace talks, undermining moderate factions and ultimately enabling al-Shabaab to flourish as one of the most lethal branches of al-Qaeda. Fast-forward nearly two decades, and Somalia—and the world—still grapple with the repercussions of that fateful choice.

The cost has been staggering: billions of dollars wasted, countless lives lost, and a region that remains unstable. These tragic outcomes were anything but predestined; they stemmed from a series of policy decisions that overlooked the vital need for a legitimate, strong Somali state.

The Price of Disengagement

Both Gavin and Meservey highlight a chilling reality: strategic rivals are already deeply entrenched in the region. Iran is restoring diplomatic ties and deploying drones. Turkey operates a military base in Mogadishu, while the UAE extends its influence through economic initiatives and private security forces. Not to be outdone, China is laying down both infrastructure and political capital in the region at a measured pace.

If the consensus is that Somalia is too fractured to hold together, it certainly won’t be left alone. Other powers will slice it into spheres of influence. Each moment that U.S. disengagement continues signals to these countries that Somalia is ripe for the picking. This reality should be alarming for American policymakers. The Somali coastline borders some of the most strategic maritime routes globally. Stability—or a lack thereof—directly impacts Red Sea commerce, Indian Ocean shipping routes, and the strategic calculus of Gulf states.

A Strategic Investment, Not a Charity Case

Supporting Somalia’s state-building initiative should not be seen as merely a humanitarian gesture; it is, in fact, a strategic investment. A functioning Somali state that aligns with Western values—even if it evolves slowly—is in America’s national security interest. It provides a platform for regional cooperation in counterterrorism, curtails the operational room for extremist groups, and opens a door for partnerships in trade and energy development. More critically, it sends a clear message to competing powers: the U.S. will not forsake the region to authoritarian influence.

A Vision for the Future

Indeed, the U.S. needs to rethink its approach. It must engage with civil society, religious leaders, women’s networks, and youth groups—not solely with the political elite in Villa Somalia. Pressure must be applied for accountability in governance and security assistance. But this should be done with the ultimate aim of consolidating, not circumventing, Somalia’s national unity.

Gavin’s call for a Red Sea regional strategy is pertinent, but such a strategy must encompass a coherent Somali element. A fractured and weak Somalia invites regional instability and foreign interference, whereas a robust Somalia—albeit imperfect—could serve as a cornerstone for a more stable Horn of Africa.

The U.S. is at a crossroads. Lowering its ambitions in Somalia carries risks and consequences. As the region shifts rapidly, rivals are watching closely and partners are hesitating. The time has come for a decisive choice: do we desire a Somalia that is united, sovereign, and stable, or one that is split, vulnerable, and easily manipulated?

The choice lies in our hands. Yet, the clock is ticking.

Edited By Ali Musa
Axadle Times International–Monitoring.