Somalia Opposes Ethiopia-North Western State of Somalia Agreement, Study Reveals

Mogadishu (AX) — A winds of change seem to be gracefully sweeping through the Horn of Africa, as Somalia intensifies its regional diplomacy efforts. In recent months, the country has fostered tighter alliances with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti, demonstrating a united front against Ethiopia’s controversial maritime agreement with North Western State of Somalia. This treaty has become a lightning rod for tensions, for Somalia sees it as a profound threat to its sovereignty. These evolving dynamics were recently examined in a detailed geopolitical study published by E-International Relations.

Authored by Federico Donelli, an insightful assistant professor at the University of Trieste, the study delves into the memorandum signed between Addis Ababa and North Western State of Somalia in 2024. This agreement could disrupt the delicate balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Under the treaty’s provisions, Ethiopia would achieve coveted access to the Red Sea via the strategic port of Berbera and erect a naval base there in exchange for formally acknowledging North Western State of Somalia’s independence, an idea fiercely opposed by Somalia.

One can’t help but ponder: why is Somalia so vehemently against this? “Somalia views any legal recognition of North Western State of Somalia’s independence as an existential threat,” Donelli explains. In a concerted response, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government has embarked on a fervent diplomatic mission. They are appealing to significant forums like the African Union and engaging regional allies such as Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti in what can only be described as a delicate diplomatic ballet.

Perhaps the most intriguing development came in August 2024 when Somalia and Egypt inked a bilateral defense pact, lending a palpable intensity to their shared concerns. The agreement called for pulling out the remaining Ethiopian peacekeepers under the African Union’s AUS-SOM mission. It also solidified what Donelli colourfully terms an “anti-Ethiopian bloc,” forged from overlapping regional disputes and age-old rivalries.

Unveiling Ethiopia’s maritime stratagem, Donelli calls it the “Grand Strategy of the Two Waters,” aptly capturing the ambition behind Ethiopia’s policy turn—extending influence to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Can you envision a nation pouring over $2 billion a year purely for port access? Yet, that’s the staggering sum Ethiopia shells out merely navigating its goods, predominantly through Djibouti.

Under the terms of the MoU, a palpable shift is expected, potentially rerouting 12 to 15 percent of Ethiopia’s trade through Berbera, under the gazing eye of Emirati logistics giant DP World. In return, Ethiopia stands to gain a naval foothold—a 50-year lease in Lughaya—a dramatic leap from landlock to resurgence.

Interestingly enough, this is not a tale in isolation. Consider Djibouti, whose commercial supremacy now confronts the evolution of Berbera into an economic titan. Eritrea, despite its history of aligning with Ethiopia during the Tigray civil unrest, finds itself troubled by Ethiopia’s reinvigorated maritime pursuits. And Egypt, locked in a tense wrangle over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), senses an opportunity to reshape its strategic foothold along the Red Sea.

The intrigue only grows with extra-regional powers weighing in. The United Arab Emirates stands as a staunch supporter, protecting its investments. Meanwhile, Turkey tiptoes diplomatically, playing both Ethiopian and Somali hands while advocating Somali unity. France, in a curious geopolitical twist, is bolstering its presence across Djibouti, redirecting focus from West Africa to the vibrant Indo-Pacific. The scene is alive with dynamic facets.

Would you say that these foreign actors spawn the conflicts? According to Donelli, “Extra-regional actors do not directly cause conflict, but their presence emboldens local players who then perceive their environment as more permissive.”

December 11, 2024, brought a note of conciliation with Somalia and Ethiopia signing the Ankara Declaration, thanks to Turkey’s mediation efforts. While it doesn’t reverse Ethiopia’s deal with North Western State of Somalia, it marks a pivot from solitary declarations to a quest for regional cooperation. As Donelli so astutely observes, actors like Turkey are shaping the Horn’s strategic pattern, which emphasizes a broader role as investors, security partners, and adroit mediators.

In a communiqué by Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ankara Declaration presents a framework for diplomatic dialogues granting Ethiopia access through Somali ports via mutual accord—a proposal that upholds legal rigor.

As early 2025 unfurls, a discernible thawing emerges. Notably, Somalia took a momentous step, welcoming Ethiopian troops into the African Union’s AUS-SOM mission, an olive branch signifying potential mending of previously strained relations, perhaps heralding a new era of cooperation.

Edited By Ali Musa Axadle Times international–Monitoring.